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Kansas Open Books Foreword

Recognizing the value of personal letters, especially those written by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the University Press of KanVDVKDVWDNHQWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRUHLVVXH5REHUW:*ULIÀWKV·VHGLWHG
collection Ike’s Letters to a Friend, 1941–1958. Published in 1984, the
correspondence between Eisenhower and his longtime friend Everett E. “Sweede” Hazlett provides many insights onto Eisenhower’s
IRUPDWLYH\HDUVDVDFRPPLWWHGPLOLWDU\RIÀFHUDQGODWHUSROLWLFLDQ
The sixty-six missives—dictated to his personal secretary Ann C.
Whitman over the course of seventeen years—provide a window
onto Eisenhower’s need to balance his professional and public convictions with the desire to remain honest with his friend, Sweede,
and, ultimately, himself.
Written during the war, postwar, and presidential years, Eisenhower’s letters to Sweede represent a long and deep relationship
that began as schoolmates in Abilene, Kansas, in 1910 and lasted
IRU QHDUO\ ÀIW\ \HDUV$V ER\V DQG \RXQJ PHQ WKH\ VKDUHG PDQ\
interests, including military careers, which they both pursued. In
time Eisenhower ascended the ranks quickly, eventually obtaining
the appointment to commander of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary force in Europe in 1943, a post he would hold
throughout the war. By then, Sweede’s career had taken a sharp
downturn as a result of a heart attack he suffered in 1939, essentially
HQGLQJKLVKRSHVIRUDQ\DFWLYLW\RQWKHÀHOG6ZHHGHQHYHUWKHOHVV
VDWLVÀHG KLPVHOI ZLWK DGPLQLVWUDWLYH SRVLWLRQV DQG PDLQWDLQLQJ D
FORVH IULHQGVKLS ZLWK (LVHQKRZHU DQG LQÁXHQFLQJ SROLWLFV LQ WKDW
way. To Eisenhower, however, Sweede’s letters were especially welcome, for much of the correspondence he received, he informed
Sweede, was from people asking for help, giving him unsolicited
advice, or requesting his appearance at a social event. Sweede, in
xi

contrast, wanted none of that. Rather, he engaged Eisenhower as a
friend.
5HDGHUV ZLOO ÀQG WKDW WKH PLVVLYHV LQ Ike’s Letters to a Friend
reveal much about Eisenhower and Sweede’s relationship, though
perhaps not as much as they do about military and political matters.
Despite Eisenhower’s conviction that “Sweede Hazlett was one of
the people to that I ‘opened up,’” the correspondence indicates Eisenhower’s inability or, likely, unwillingness to engage in a personal
or decidedly intimate relationship with Sweede, his lifelong friend.
Indeed, the letters contain subdued affect, with “interesting” being
the most praise Eisenhower heaped onto Sweede’s epistolary talents.
Yet it is clear that Eisenhower valued his friend’s communication,
IRUKHLPSORUHGKLPWRVHQGQRWHVIUHTXHQWO\´7KHÀUVWSDUDJUDSK
of your letter mentions a prescribed periodicity of three months for
your letters,” wrote Eisenhower in early 1952. “I just want to remind
you that the prescription is self-imposed” (97). In other words, Eisenhower stated, write more often.
Along with the notes, Ike’s Letters to a Friend contains an introduction and detailed introductory essays that contextualize the
OHWWHUVIRUWKHUHDGHU*ULIÀWKV·VFROOHFWLRQKRZHYHUODFNVWUDQVFULSWLRQV RI +D]OHWW·V FRUUHVSRQGHQFH <HW *ULIÀWKV PDNHV XS IRU WKDW
absence by providing summaries and quotes from Hazlett’s letters
to Eisenhower to provide fuller meaning and context to their exchanges. Readers interested in learning more about Eisenhower’s
politics— that is, his national and international perspectives, including his staunch beliefs in patriotism and duty, limited government,
DQG WKH GHIHDW RI FRPPXQLVP³ZLOO ÀQG PXFK RI LQWHUHVW /HVV LV
said, however, on Eisenhower’s views on growing battles for social
justice of the day. As many scholars have remarked, Eisenhower refused to take a stand on integration and segregation, leaving it up
WR WKH FRXUWV WR GHFLGH$ ÀUP EHOLHYHU LQ VWDWHV· ULJKWV DQG D FRQservative, he nonetheless believed the decision of Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, Kansas (1954), in which the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that segregation was unconstitutional, had been a
mistake, as had his appointment of Earl Warren as chief justice to the
6XSUHPH &RXUW D \HDU HDUOLHU +H UHJUHWWHG WKDW GHFLVLRQ *ULIÀWKV
indicates. “Later,” Eisenhower “characterize[d] the appointment of
Warren as the ‘biggest damfool mistake I ever made’” (134).
For all the shortcomings of Eisenhower’s administration,
Sweede remained a steadfast supporter and had tremendous pride
in his friend’s achievements. Yet Eisenhower’s success and status
xii

DV D QDWLRQDO DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO ÀJXUH ZDV GLIÀFXOW RQ 6ZHHGH IRU
he refused to ride Eisenhower’s coattails, as he stated. And, though
Eisenhower uttered few effusive words describing Sweede’s friendship, he valued their relationship. When Sweede died from cancer in
1958, a few years after suffering another heart attack and high blood
pressure, Eisenhower wrote to his widow, confessing “I can never
quite tell you what Sweede meant to me. . . . His passing leaves a
permanent void in my life.” While the letters provide many clues as
to the nature of their relationship, they leave it up to us to contextualize and make sense of the greater meaning they bring to their bond
as well as the era. They provide a valuable asset in understanding
how the personal, public, and political worlds of statesmen in the
1940s and 1950s were circumscribed by dominant social mores and
conventions of the time.
Miroslava Chavez-Garcia
University of California, Santa Barbara
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Preface

In 1978, while researching a book on post-World War II
politics at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, I
came across a fascinating exchange of letters between Eisenhower
and an old boyhood friend, Everett E. ("Swede") Hazlett. The
letters had been open to scholars for only a few years, and few
historians had examined them or cited them in their books . I
remember thinking at the time how interesting it would be to edit
them for publication, and in fact, I returned home with a thick
stack of xeroxed copies . In the years that followed, I drew heavily
on the Eisenhower-Hazlett correspondence in my own work,
especially in a long article entitled "Dwight D . Eisenhower and the
Corporate Commonwealth," which appeared in the American
Historical Review (February 1982); and when the University Press of
Kansas indicated an interest in publishing the letters, I naturally
leapt at the opportunity.
The letters are located in one of the Eisenhower Library's most
important collections, the so-called Ann Whitman file, which was
maintained by Eisenhower's private secretary and which contains
the nearly quarter of a million documents that received his closest
attention. The correspondence consists of more than 150 letters
exchanged between the two men between 1941 and 1958. They had
occasionally written to one another before 1941, but none of these
early letters seem to have survived . Almost all of the existing
correspondence is open to the public . The only exception to this is
a brief passage in Eisenhower's letter to Swede on 18 November
1957, which remains closed in accordance with restrictions placed
upon the collection by the Eisenhower family, and in keeping with
a recommendation by the National Security Council to the effect
that the release of this material could constitute an unwarranted
xv

invasion of the privacy of a foreign citizen. Although a few of
Eisenhower's letters to Hazlett have been previously published in
the authoritative multivolume Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower,
whose nine volumes carry the future president from the beginning
of World War II through 1947, the great majority of them appear
here for the first time.
Most of Eisenhower's letters appear to have been dictated, not
written, a fact that may help to explain occasional awkward
phrasings, as well as lapses in grammar and syntax. In editing the
letters, I have tried to be as unobtrusive as possible, occasionally
using brackets to more fully identify people whose names are
mentioned or quietly correcting more or less obvious typographical
errors . I have attempted to place each letter in its historical context
through headnotes, but have tried to keep footnotes and other
scholarly encumbrances to an absolute minimum. For the most
part, I have tried to let Eisenhower and Swede tell their own story.

Scholarship is almost always a collective enterprise, and in the
preparation of this collection I have accumulated more than a few
obligations . I owe a very special debt of gratitude to Dr. John E.
Wickman and the fine staff of the Dwight D . Eisenhower Library,
without whose assistance this project would never have been
possible . Thomas Branigar, an Eisenhower Library archivist and
volunteer at the Dickinson County Historical Society, was also
helpful in providing information about Abilene and its citizens. I
would especially like to thank Burton I. Kaufman and others who
read and commented on the manuscript; the American Philosophical Society, which helped make possible my original trip to
Abilene; Mrs. Barbara Einfurer and the staff of the University of
Massachusetts History Department; and, as always, m y familyBarbara, Matthew, and Jonathan. Finally, I would like to affectionately dedicate this volume to my colleagues at the University of
Massachusetts, most of whom never "liked Ike, " and to my
students, almost none of whom are old enough to remember him.

Robert Griffith
Amherst, Massachusetts
March 1984
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Introduction

The letters that fill this volume are the product of a friendship
between two young men-Everett E. Hazlett ("Swede," the boys
called him) and Dwight D. Eisenhower (like several of his brothers,
nicknamed "Ike"). Forged during the hot Kansas summer of 1910,
their friendship lasted a lifetime-through thirty years during
which their lives roughly paralleled one another, and for nearly
two decades more during which their lives sharply diverged. Yet
the letters that they exchanged are more than simply the chronicle
of a friendship; they constitute, as well, a unique self-portrait of
one of modern America's most important leaders and a highly
revealing inner history of his presidency. "Our deep friendship
endured to the day of his death in 1958," Eisenhower later wrote .
"Our correspondence over those forty-odd years would fill a thick
volume . I drew on it for The White House Years because Swede
Hazlett was one of the people to whom I opened up." 1
The story of Ike and Swede begins in Abilene, Kansas, which,
despite its brief and lurid history as a Wild West cattle town, was
by the time of their youth a sedate midwestern farm community. It
was a good place to grow up in, both later recalled, though neither
of them returned with any great frequency, and with the passage
of years, their ties to the town grew increasingly tenuous.
Nor did they grow up together. Eisenhower, whose father was
an ' ' engineer'' (read mechanic) at the Belle Springs Creamery, lived
with his parents and five brothers in a small two-story frame house
on the south (and "wrong") side of the railroad tracks . Swede,
whose father was a physician and pharmacist, lived with his
parents and sister on the more affluent north side of town . Though
Swede would later proclaim in a burst of patriotism that "there
was never any difference between 'north of the tracks' and ' south
1

Left, Ike in the United States Military Academy' s yearbook for 1915;
right, Swede in the United States Naval Academy' s yearbook for
1915 (courtesy of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library) . " As you well
know, it was only through you that I ever heard of the Government
Academies. To the fact that you were well acquainted with the
methods for entering the Academies and my good fortune that you
were my friend, I owe a lifetime of real enjoyment and interesting
work" (Eisenhower to Hazlett, 11 October 1941).

of the tracks,' " he was wrong . The lines of class in Abilene,
though not impermeable, were clearly drawn and reflected in
dozens of subtle and sometimes not so subtle ways . On the south
side, where Eisenhower lived, were the small frame houses of the
working class . On the north side, where the business and professional classes lived, were many large Victorian homes. As a boy,
Eisenhower attended Lincoln Grammar School on the south side,
while Swede went to the newer and more modern Garfield School
on the north side. It was not until the seventh grade that the kids
from "south of the tracks" joined the others at Garfield, an event
that was often accompanied by fistfights and other youthful
rivalries. Indeed, Ike's two-hour battle with northsider Wesley
Merrifield quickly became a town legend. 2
2

Nevertheless, when Hazlett arrived at Abilene High School for
the beginning of his freshman year, it was Eisenhower who
affectionately dubbed him "Swede" and took him under his wing.
A sophomore, Eisenhower was already a football star and school
hero. Swede, on the other hand, was a gangly blond-headed youth
who sometimes became the target of school bullies. "He was a big
fellow, too, but he had been raised in a quiet atmosphere and
occasionally a few people smaller than he would try to bulldoze
him," Ike later recalled . "I felt protective, a sort of obligation to
him, and I took it upon myself to tell a few of the so-and-so's to lay
off. " 3
Swede spent only a year at Abilene High, however; he
completed his high-school education at a military academy in
Wisconsin and then secured a congressional appointment to the
United States Naval Academy. He failed the mathematics section
of the entrance test, however, and came back to Abilene in 1910 to
prepare for a reexamination. By the time he returned, Eisenhower
had already graduated and was working nights at the creamery. "I
had been seeing more and more of Ike, during vacations, as the
years went on," Swede recalled, "and this summer I spent many
of my evenings at the creamery, helping him to while away the
hours. We played a bit of penny-ante poker-giving him the start
that ended in his reputation as the best stud player in the Army.
Still being kids, more or less, we also weren't above raiding the
company's refrigerating room occasionally-for ice cream, and for
cold storage eggs and chickens which were cooked on a wellscrubbed shovel in the boiler room. " 4
Before long, Swede had convinced Eisenhower that he, too,
should try to secure an appointment to Annapolis. It was not
difficult. With one of his older brothers in college at the University
of Michigan, and with younger brothers Earl and Milton coming
along, Eisenhower found the service academy's free education
extremely attractive . As it turned out, he was forced to settle for
West Point instead, since he would be twenty-one before the next
class enlisted and thus would be too old to begin at Annapolis.
Both Ike and Swede passed their entrance examinations the
following year and entered their respective schools as members of
the class of 1915.
They saw one another only occasionally during their academy
years, and even more infrequently after graduating. They wrote
from time to time, and though no letters from these years appar3

ently survive, Swede later remembered that during World War I,
Eisenhower had written "griping because I was overseas while he
was kept at home, training our new tank corps." The two were
reunited in 1923, when Ike was stationed at Camp Gaillard in the
Panama Canal Zone and the submarine that Swede commanded
put in for repairs at the naval base at Coco Solo. Swede was
impressed by the fact that Eisenhower had "fitted up the 2nd story
screened porch of their quarters as a rough study, and here, with
drawing board and texts, he put in his spare time re-fighting the
campaigns of the old masters." Eisenhower himself later recalled
his tour of duty in Panama, under Gen. Fox Conner, as "a sort of
graduate school in military affairs and the humanities." He would
later excel at the army's prestigious Command and General Staff
School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Their paths did not cross again until 1935 in Washington,
where Ike was serving as a senior aide to Army Chief of Staff Gen .
Douglas MacArthur and where Swede, now a commander, was
serving in the Navy Department. Swede later recalled that Eisenhower was already "rapidly becoming known as an Army 'comer'
. . . but [that] he was still a Major with no immediate prospects ."
A few months later a reluctant Eisenhower left for the Philippines
with MacArthur, and more than a decade elapsed before the two
friends would see one another again.
During the years that followed, the lives of both men changed
dramatically. In Swede's case, the change was for the worse. A
severe heart attack brought his promising career to an end in 1939,
on the very eve of World War II . He returned to duty during the
war, first as an academic administrator at the naval academy, then
later as commander of the naval training program at the University
of North Carolina. He retired in 1946, remaining in Chapel Hill
with his wife, Elizabeth, or "Ibby" as she was called, and their two
daughters, Mary Elizabeth and Alice. He continued to experience
poor health, including high blood pressure and excruciating headaches, a second heart attack in 1953, and finally cancer, from which
he died in 1958.
Eisenhower, meanwhile, after a sometimes frustrating three
years in the Philippines, returned to the United States in 1939 to
begin the quick march that would soon lead to his appointment as
supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe
and, eventually, to the presidency of the United States.
4

The correspondence between Eisenhower and Hazlett resumed during the fall of 1941, only a few months before Pearl
Harbor. At first, Ike's letters to Swede were short and infrequent, a
fact possibly dictated by the heavy demands of command, by
wartime censorship, and by Swede's reluctance to intrude on his
old friend. There is a tentative quality to these early letters-as
though the two men were attempting not only to remember who
they had been but also to come to terms with who they had
become, trying, as it were, to reestablish a relationship that had
been attenuated by the passage of years. In the second of the
letters, for example, Ike refers to "Mrs. Hazlett," scarcely a sign of
close friendship . In the years that followed, however, the letters
increased in length, frequency, and personal warmth . Ike wrote to
Swede four or five times a year throughout the late forties and
early fifties, and even more often during the presidential years.
Nor were his letters perfunctory or merely social; indeed, they
increasingly became long and detailed expositions of what Eisenhower was thinking and doing. It is this quality, of course, which
makes the collection so interesting to historians .
Though Eisenhower saw Swede only infrequently-on two
occasions in 1947, when he was in North Carolina; in 1957, at the
second inaugural, and twice while Swede was hospitalized in
Bethesda Naval Hospital near Washington-their friendship steadily deepened. For his part, Eisenhower gratefully recalled the
pivotal role that Swede had played in the summer of 1910. "As you
well know," he wrote in the first of these letters, "it was only
through you that I ever heard of the Government Academies. To
the fact that you were well acquainted with the methods for
entering the Academies and my good fortune that you were my
friend, I owe a lifetime of real enjoyment and interesting work."
On Swede's part there was tremendous pride in Eisenhower's
achievements, as well perhaps as the vicarious satisfaction of those
needs that were denied to him in his own career. " I can't begin to
tell you what a glow of pleasure I get out of all the honors being
heaped upon you," wrote Swede in 1943. But there were also
undercurrents of uneasiness in the relationship, especially as
Eisenhower became not merely a highly successful army officer but
also a national and world hero. These undercurrents were reflected
both in Swede's sometimes extravagant praise for Eisenhower and
in his sensitivity about the nature of their relationship. "A year
ago," Swede wrote in June 1945, " I boasted to all who would listen
5

of our friendship; but now the aura of your glory has become so
blinding that I fear even to admit acquaintanceship for fear I'll be
accused of 'basking'-something I've never done in my life." Ike
was quick to respond to Swede's feelings, repeatedly reassuring
him that success had not altered their relationship and that he
would be upset "if you feel it necessary to say that you didn't
know that other guy from Abilene." In November 1945 he wrote to
Swede that he would "admit, for the sake of argument, (though
without acknowledging any sense in the proposition) that so far as
the headlines of the past few years are concerned, we are somewhat like Mutt and Jeff. I've been long; you've been short. You will
remember that as between Mutt and Jeff themselves, comparative
elongation made little difference, either in their recurring fights or
in those instances when they were both on the same side of a
question. What I am getting at is, so far as the Swede-Ike
relationship is concerned, there is no 'big' and certainly no 'little'
shot."
Although Eisenhower, as we have seen, later recalled that
Swede was one of the few people to whom he '' opened up,'' this is
a very relative judgment. Certainly, in the correspondence there is
little of an intimate or highly personal nature. Eisenhower didn't
"open up, " in that sense, to anyone. He once wrote to a friend:
"Anglo-saxon men usually find it difficult to exchange direct
expressions of sentiment and affection. I am as subject to this
inhibition as is any other person. " 5 There was, moreover, an
element of circumspection in virtually all of Eisenhower's letters,
including those to Swede. In his correspondence, as in his public
utterances, Eisenhower was careful not to criticize others or to put
to paper words that might, if revealed, prove embarrassing. Nor
were there any of the profanities that frequently peppered his
private conversation. Indeed, there was a stiff, almost formal
quality to most of his correspondence, even to family and good
friends such as Swede.
It nevertheless seems clear that the letters to Swede were
important to Eisenhower and that they became more so through
the years. Once embarked on a letter, some of which ran as long as
eight to nine single-spaced typewritten pages, he would indeed
pour out his thoughts and feelings. Nor did he shy away from
important or controversial topics-Vietnam, the Middle East, civil
rights, defense spending, the problem of who would succeed him
as president, all found their way into his letters to Swede. The
6

result is thus a documentary record of considerable value in
understanding Eisenhower and in evaluating his presidency.

While contemporary observers praised Eisenhower for ending
the Korean War, for restoring a measure of political tranquillity
after the hysteria of the McCarthy era, and, negatively, for not
dismantling the New Deal welfare state, some of them also
charged him with a failure to provide leadership in meeting the
difficult new challenges of the postwar world. Many portrayed him
as a weak and politically na·ive president who, as Walter Lippmann
put it, was never willing "to break the eggs that are needed for the
omelet ." A poll of seventy-five historians, conducted during the
early 1960s, rated Eisenhower only twenty-second among American presidents, between Andrew Johnson and Chester A. Arthur.
By the end of the 1960s, however, historians and other
intellectuals had begun to change their views, portraying Eisenhower as a more complex, intelligent, and even skillful chief
executive .6 The opening in the late 1970s of important new
collections by the Eisenhower Library-among them the Eisenhower-Hazlett correspondence-soon led to a flood of books and
articles extending and qualifying this new interpretation .7
Much of the early "revisionist" literature seemed limited by
the debates of the past : Was Eisenhower an active or passive
president? Was he a skilled leader or a bumbler? Was he dominant
or subordinate in his relations with powerful advisors such as John
Foster Dulles? Some revisionist accounts were suffused with
nostalgia for the 1950s, a supposedly golden age of lost innocence
and balanced budgets; others sought to use Eisenhower as a foil
with which to attack the policies of his successors, emphasizing the
differences between him and other postwar presidents and ignoring the many similarities.
The steady accumulation of newer studies on the Eisenhower
years, however, now permits historians to proceed beyond the
narrow limits of the early "revisionist" literature toward a broader,
if also more complex, understanding of Eisenhower and the
Eisenhower presidency.
The Eisenhower who emerges in these letters was not a
dimwit who, as one particularly nasty barb had it, didn ' t read
much "because it made his lips tired," but was a man of solid
intelligence, self-confident, orderly, and disciplined in his mental
7

processes. And although he wrote with little grace or literary flairhis letters were, at best, plain-spoken and, at worst, stiff and
rhetorical-he nevertheless generally expressed himself both
clearly and coherently.
It should also be clear that the Eisenhower who wrote these
letters was no apolitical babe in the woods, Walter Lippmann and
others to the contrary notwithstanding . To be sure, Eisenhower
went to great lengths to avoid labeling himself a politician and
almost always used the words "politics" and "politicians" in a
pejorative sense, as when he wrote to Swede in 1943 that he did
not "mean to sound like a demagogue or a politician." Eisenhower
nevertheless understood politics, especially the managerial politics
of large organizations, and he fully enjoyed the exercise of power.
He may not have been a "Machiavelli in pinstripes," as some
overly enthusiastic revisionists have seemed to suggest; but he was
nevertheless an extremely skilled chief executive and, within the
limits that he believed to be appropriate for presidential action, a
successful political leader. 8
As I have argued elsewhere, Eisenhower was a product of the
organizational revolution that had transformed American culture
during the twentieth century. 9 He understood the dynamics of
large organizations and extolled their ability "to produce orderliness, which means restriction upon irresponsible human action."
Yet, at the same time, he feared the propensity of organized
interests-"pressure groups," he generally called them-to pursue
their own narrow ends or, worse yet, to impose those ends on the
state, turning the government itself into little more than a battleground for class conflict. As he told a Columbia University
audience in 1948: "Danger arises from too great a concentration of
power in the hands of any individual or group. The power of
concentrated finance , the power of selfish pressure groups, the
power of any class organized in opposition to the whole-any one
of these, when allowed to dominate, is fully capable of destroying
individual freedom.''
Such conflict, Eisenhower believed, was neither necessary nor
inexorable. Class interests were interdependent, not irreconcilable.
As he told an audience in 1947: "In our tightly knit economy, all
professions and callings . . . have points of contact and areas of
common interest. Banker or housewife, farmer, carpenter, soldier-no one of us can live and act without effect on all the others."
Eisenhower believed that the role of civic-minded managers like
8

himself was to dampen popular passions, to quietly reconcile
group conflict, and to convince business, labor, and agriculture to
pursue enlightened long-range goals rather than immediate selfinterest.
As the letters to Swede make clear, Eisenhower's vision of a
harmonious corporate commonwealth,'' and of the role of professional managers in resolving conflict, grew out of his military
experiences during World War II and out of the bitter interservice
rivalries that followed the end of the war. Indeed, Eisenhower's
keen sensitivity to the narrow self-interest of the military services
constitutes one of the principal themes of this collection, a theme
that links his leadership during World War II, his experiences as
army chief of staff in 1946 and 1947, his opposition to increased
military spending during the late 1950s, and his warning, in his
1961 farewell address, on the dangers of the "military-industrialcomplex."
Eisenhower's vision of a harmonious and orderly society at
home was closely paralleled by an almost Wilsonian faith in an
interdependent and cooperative world order . Indeed, the two
were inextricably linked in his mind; for if the United States did
not sustain such an order through liberal foreign aid and trade
policies, it would be, as he put it, "doomed to eventual isolation
and to the disappearance of our form of government." To Swede
he gave a single, "simple" example of the problem that the United
States faced: "No other nation is exhausting its irreplaceable
resources so rapidly as is ours. Unless we are careful to build up
and maintain a great group of international friends ready to trade
with us, where do we hope to get all the materials that we will one
day need as our rate of consumption continues and accelerates?"
America faced, he wrote in his diary, what Marxists called the
"contradictions of capitalism," both the conflict among the "capitalist states for the domination of the world' s surface" and the
conflict "between the advanced, industrialized nations of the
world and the dependent masses of backward peoples ." Here,
too, Eisenhower believed, conflict, though real, was inevitable only
if nations did not abandon their narrow, selfish rivalries for mutual
cooperation .
For Eisenhower, as these letters make clear, France became a
metaphor for international short-sightedness through its actions in
Europe, Indochina, and North Africa. Yet, as he wrote to Swede,
"the fact is . .. that while we get almost disgusted with the picture
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that France .. . presents, we need only to look at the rest of the
world-indeed to ourselves-to see many points of similarity." If
the Western nations could only resolve their differences on the
basis of the " long-term good of all," Eisenhower believed, then
"we could laugh at the other so-called ' contradictions' in our
system, and ... be so secure against the Communist menace that
it would gradually dry up and wither away." Thus, abroad, as at
home, narrow self-interest had to give way to broad long-range
goals, and conflict to cooperation and harmony.
There were, of course, sharp limits to Eisenhower's philosophy, and contradictions in it that he never fully faced, much less
resolved. His vision of a "corporate commonwealth" was profoundly conservative, indeed, at points almost antidemocratic. He
distrusted popular passions, detested conventional politics, and,
as his 22 July 1957 letter to Swede makes clear, had little but
contempt for Congress. He was insensitive to the plight of the poor
and was slow to respond to the burgeoning crisis of civil rights. He
never endorsed the Supreme Court's decision in Brown vs . Board of
Education of Topeka, Kansas; indeed, he privately thought that it was
a mistake . And when he was compelled to order federal troops into
Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957, he was careful to couch his actions
in terms of defending civil order, not civil rights . As he explained
to Swede: "My biggest problem has been to make people see ...
that my main interest is not in the integration or segregation
question. My opinion as to the wisdom of the decision or the
timeliness of the Supreme Court's decision has nothing to do with
the case .... If the day comes when we can obey the orders of our
Courts only when we personally approve of them, the end of the
American system . .. will not be far off."
Committed to a minimalist state and to a political economy in
which conflict would be resolved voluntarily through cooperation,
self-restraint, and disinterested public service, Eisenhower could
do little but fume privately when business leaders refused to
exercise the restraint that he believed necessary. "I want to give
business an honorable place, but they make crooks out of themselves," he angrily told his secretary. More fundamentally, he
never recognized, or if he recognized, he chose to ignore, that by
minimizing the role of the state, he implicitly endorsed the power
relationships created by the marketplace and thus foreclosed the
efforts of workers, farmers, and consumers to redress those
relationships through governmental intervention .
10

Nor, finally, could he resolve similar contradictions in his
thinking on international affairs. To be sure, Eisenhower's conduct
of foreign policy was characterized by restraint, by a constant effort
to balance ends and means, and by a refusal to be stampeded by
more precipitate advisors. As Robert Divine has observed: "Nearly
all of Eisenhower's foreign policy achievements were negative in
nature. He ended the Korean War, he refused to intervene
militarily in Indochina, he refrained from involving the United
States in the Suez crisis, he avoided war with China over Quemoy
and Matsu, he resisted the temptation to force a showdown over
Berlin, he stopped exploding nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. "10
Yet, critics of America's cold-war policies are ill-advised to
seek in Eisenhower, as some have done, a counterhero or foil to
use against Truman and Kennedy and Johnson. Eisenhower fully
shared the conservative, anti-Communist premises that shaped
postwar American foreign policy, and when he chose, he could act
on those premises with ruthless dispatch . Thus, while he declined
to intervene militarily in Indochina, this was a decision produced
more by France's refusal to meet American conditions than by any
particular aversion to the use of force against social revolutions . As
he wrote to Swede, he had been unable to obtain " the conditions
under which I felt the United States could properly intervene to
protect its own interests." After the French collapse, Eisenhower
committed the United States to the support of a client state in
Vietnam and to the undermining of the Geneva Agreements, both
of which actions would lead directly to an expanded American
involvement in the decade that followed . Moreover, many of the
"successes" of which he boasted to Swede-Iran and Guatemala,
for example-have come back to haunt our own times.
The Eisenhower who emerges from these pages thus bears
little resemblance to the bumbling caricature of late 1950s journalism. But neither does he fit the mold of those who in recent years
have sought to bend the Eisenhower legacy to their own ends,
whether liberal opponents of the Cold War, conservative critics of
Democratic fiscal policy, or White House aides seeking to "Eisenhowerize" Ronald Reagan. Eisenhower is, rather, a complex,
multidimensional historical figure whom we must study on his
own terms if we are to understand fully our recent past. It is my
hope that the publication of these letters will contribute, in some
small measure, to that understanding.
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1941

In 1939, shortly after the beginning of World War II, Eisenhower returned from the Philippines to take up a series of
important staff assignments and to begin his meteoric rise through
the army's higher ranks. In June 1941 he became chief of staff for
the Third Army and was stationed at its headquarters in San
Antonio, Texas. In September 1941, just before his fifty-first
birthday, he was promoted to the temporary rank of brigadier
general. Meanwhile Swede, who had suffered a severe heart attack
in 1939, had returned to light duty as a teacher and administrator at
the United States Naval Academy. On October 5 he sent Eisenhower a letter of congratulations on his recent promotion. "It gave
me as much pleasure," he wrote, "as if the honor had come to
myself. For I still feel, you know, somewhat responsible for your
having launched yourself in a service career."
Among the old Abilene friends to whom Eisenhower refers in
his reply were Charles Harger, the owner and editor of the Abilene
Daily Reflector, a prominent Abilene Republican who had helped
Eisenhower secure his appointment to West Point; Charles A.
Case, an attorney and director of the Abilene National Bank;
Arthur Hurd, another prominent attorney; Reynold Rogers, a
banker; Joner (sometimes Jonah) Callahan, who ran a drugstore;
Oscar and William Sterl, who owned a men's clothing store; and
John Henry Giles, an Abilene lumber dealer.
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11 October 1941
Dear Swede:
Of all the things that have happened to me incidental to my
promotion, none has been nicer than the receipt of your very fine
letter. I truly appreciate it.
I am happy to know that in spite of the affliction of a defective
"pump" you are engaged in work that is not only necessary, but
which is an integral part of our effort to re-arm. While it is naturally
a disappointment to you that you cannot be taking part in the more
strenuous phases of naval activity, it must be a source of great
satisfaction to know that you are doing something well that must
be done. In the Army our biggest job is the production of young
leaders . To it we give more concern than to any other single thing.
Anyone who has studied this defense problem seriously will
readily see that your job is one of vital, even if indirect, importance
to the final solution . On top of all this, you must be developing into
a bang-up "prof" when they have already made you the Executive
of the department.
Both last summer and this I made very short visits to Abilene.
My Father and Mother are both still living there, although both are
getting feeble . During each visit, I have had a chance to call on
most of our old friends, notably Mr. Harger, Charlie Case, Art
Hurd, Reynold Rogers, the Ster! Brothers and Henry Giles . I
mustn't forget Joner Callahan. All of them seem to be going their
accustomed ways with very little noticeable change either in
themselves or in the town .
I will not worry you with a recital of the many various details
since I last saw you. However, shortly after coming back from the
Philippines, I was again placed on staff duty, and at present am
Chief of Staff, Third Army. I scarcely need say that I am kept busy.
My son, John, entered West Point this summer. I think that his
deeper affections really attracted him toward Annapolis, but some
years ago we discovered in him a slight color confusion with
respect to the fainter shades; enough so that we were told he could
not meet the Naval Academy requirements in this respect. For
some years, his O .A.O. [one and only] has been a young Navy gal
named Nancy Sabalot . One of his final acts before entering the
Point was to go through Washington to see her once more. He is
6'1" , weighs only about 145, and is blond, gangly and awkward.
When he fills out he ought to be quite a boy. So far, he is
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apparently doing well enough in his studies, but is having a terrific
time with demerits.
You are quite right in your thought that you are responsible for
my being in the Military Service. As you well know, it was only
through you that I ever heard of the Government Academies. To
the fact that you were well acquainted with the methods for
entering the Academies and my good fortune that you were my
friend, I owe a lifetime of real enjoyment and interesting work.
Incidentally, every time I go home I remind all and sundry of this.
Mamie and I send our very best to you both. I will try to do my
part in seeing that our correspondence is not interrupted by
another three year lapse.
As ever,
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1942

In December 1941, less than a week after Pearl Harbor,
Eisenhower was ordered to Washington by Army Chief of Staff
George C. Marshall, who quickly assigned him to work on the
organization of U.S. and Allied military efforts in the Far East. By
early 1942, however, Eisenhower was already looking beyond the
immediate crisis and toward the development of a broad strategic
concept for conducting the war. On his desk pad he wrote : "We've
got to go to Europe and fight-and we've got to quit wasting
resources all over the world and still worse-wasting time. If we're
to keep Russia in, save the Middle East, India and Burma; we've
got to begin slugging with air at Western Europe; to be followed by
a land attack as soon as possible." Planning for this operation,
which was approved by President Roosevelt in April and given the
code name BOLERO, would occupy virtually all of Eisenhower's
time and energy in the ensuing months. In May he flew to London
to confer with the British Chiefs of Staff on the critical issue of a
unified command . He returned to the War Department on June 3,
the same day on which he wrote the following brief note to Swede.
A week later, Marshall named Eisenhower commanding general
for the European Theater of Operations, and on June 23 he left for
London once again.
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3 June 1942
Dear Swede:
My excuse for not answering earlier your nice invitation of
May 21 is that I have been out of the country. I just returned this
morning and find that Marnie has been up at West Point and will
return this evening or tomorrow.
I am sorry to have missed the ball-game, but I expect to take
most seriously your invitation to come to Annapolis for a weekend.
Just when that can be, the Lord only knows, but it would be a real
pleasure to spend a quiet time with you and Mrs. Hazlett .
I hope it won't be long before I can send you a warning note
that we will be on the way unless you stop us.
Thank you a lot for your congratulations and good wishes . I
am not sure that the congratulations are deserved, but the good
wishes are certainly needed!
Cordially,
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1943

Almost a year passed before the two friends again exchanged
letters . In the intervening months the plans of Eisenhower and
other American leaders for a cross-Channel invasion of France had
been delayed as the Allies struck instead in North Africa. Eisenhower was named commander in chief of the combined operation
and was promoted to the rank of general, receiving his fourth star
in February 1943. By April, and in spite of a host of military and
political complications, the campaign was nearing its successful
completion.

7 April 1943
Dear Swede:
You cannot imagine how much good your letter did me. It
arrived two days ago and already I have read it three times . I have
received lots of proforma congratulations, but no other letter has
seemed to me to be so genuine in its expression of good will and in
its appreciation of the fact that all the hardest tests are yet to come.
Nothing that I can say can possibly ease your disappointment
in being excluded from the more active phases of this war effort.
However, as the responsibilities thrust upon me have become
wider and heavier, I have come to appreciate more and more
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clearly how true it is that nations, not armies and navies, make
war. Everybody has a job. Yours happens to be in a niche that does
not completely satisfy all the training you have received, the
experience you have gained, and the thought you have expended
in the naval profession. But I am almost fanatic in my belief that
only as we pull together, each of us in the job given him, are we
going to defend and sustain the priceless things for which we are
fighting. It seems to me that in no other war in history has the issue
been so distinctly drawn between the forces of arbitrary oppression
on the one side and, on the other, those conceptions of individual
liberty, freedom and dignity, under which we have been raised in
our great Democracy.
I do not mean to sound like a demagogue nor a politician. In
fact, once this war is won, I hope never again to hear the word
" politics ." But I do have the feeling of a crusader in this war and
every time I write a letter or open my mouth, I preach the doctrine
that I have so inadequately expressed above.
Needless to say, it would be a great pleasure to have you by
my side . Admiral [Ernest J.] King gave me a Naval Reserve officer
(Lt. Comdr. [Harry C.] Butcher) for a Naval Aide. He lives with me
and is my constant companion. All other naval officers in this
command are incorporated in the navy set-up, the Americans
under Vice Admiral [H. Kent] Hewitt, who reports in turn to
Admiral of the Fleet [Sir Andrew Browne] Cunningham (one of the
finest men I have had the privilege of meeting) .
Thanks again for your fine letter. I hope that when this war is
over, you and I can get together to review events and relate to each
other our experiences.
With cordial regard,
As ever,

After the victory in North Africa, Eisenhower turned his
attention to Italy, where Allied forces under his command landed
first in Sicily and then, in September 1943, on the toe of the boot
itself. By early October the Allies had taken Naples; but the
advance then stalled as the Germans committed some twenty-five
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divisions to the defense of Italy while the Allies, at the same time,
began diverting troops and supplies for a long-delayed crossChannel invasion of France.

20 October 1943
Dear Swede:
Your letters are not only entertaining; they are fine for my ego.
Naturally, I like to get them.
I can well understand your disappointment in being turned
down again by the medicos. However, I am happy to see that you
have taken the decision as philosophically as is possible and are
not letting it get you down. In a way, your case is like that of [my
brother] Milton's . He thoroughly detested his final job in Washington but felt that it was most essential to the war effort and felt
rather guilty in considering the acceptance of the presidency of
Kansas State. He cabled me on the matter and I sent him a long
message, setting forth my own ideas in considerable detail. Briefly,
they are that no man in the world today has a more responsible job
than those who are influencing the thinking of the younger
generation, yet in school. The teaching of the obligations as well as
the privileges of American citizenship, the virtue of old-fashioned
patriotism, the need for a clean, honest approach to intricate
problems and the necessity for earnest devotion to duty, are things
that must be thoroughly inculcated in the rising generation, if we
are to survive as a sturdy nation.
You may say that such a thought provides only cold comfort to
a man who is trained for emergency action and, when the
emergency arises, is confined to something that is not to his
personal liking. I really think you would be wrong in feeling that
way. I mingle all the time with men of our armies, men of
considerable intelligence . It is amazing to find out how few have
any concept of obligation to the country that has given them
privileges which they assume to be a God-given right and theirs
without cost. It is amazing also to hear ideas expressed which
indicate a belief in the invincibility of America, whether or not she
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really girds up her loins to wage a bitter fight. Therefore, the
soldier often sees no reason why he should be undergoing
hardship and discomfort, and one of our major problems is to
attempt education along these lines at the same time that the man
is called upon to enter a fight where strong convictions along such
lines would be the surest way of making him invincible on the
battlefield.
This is clumsily and possibly even incoherently stated but I am
sure you will detect my absolute sincerity.
I am writing to my son John today. Whether or not he will get
down toward Annapolis and, if he should, whether or not he could
compete, even momentarily, with the snappy blue uniforms of the
Midshipmen, I still feel that I owe it to him to pass on your
information as to your older daughter. At least they have two
things in common-they are both blondes and their fathers are
both from Abilene, Kansas.
My very best to you and your family and please write to me
when you get a chance.
Cordially,
P.S. In late years I have seen Bob Baughey [Robert M. Baughey, a
public-relations officer in the War Department] occasionally and, at
one time, I asked him to go along with my command. At that time
he had another job in view and so I have lost track of him.
However, I will send his name on to the proper Staff Section to
determine whether I might get him over here for assignment.
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1945

A year and a half elapsed before Eisenhower again wrote to
Swede . In the intervening months, of course, Eisenhower had
organized and led the Allied invasion of Europe. The story of that
effort, which began on 6 June 1944, is among the most often told of
the war and need not be repeated here . Suffice it to say that by
April 1945, when Eisenhower next wrote to his old friend, Germany' s armed forces had been shattered. Eisenhower himself had
been awarded a fifth star and had been promoted to the newly
created rank of General of the Army. In his letter to Eisenhower on
January 29, Swede had expressed a preference for the title of
Marshal, but then had observed that the problem created by
George C. Marshall's name probably had led to its rejection. He
also had written that while he thought that the navy "usually did
things better than the Army, " he did give the army credit for
"dipping deep in the hat and pulling you up to the top when you
were needed." At the same time, he wrote, this wasn't "a very
flattering commentary on the thousand odd files who outranked
you ." Swede, meanwhile, had been eased out of the Naval
Academy to make room, as he put it, for the "young, be-medaled
heroes just back from the wars ." He was promoted to captain and
placed in charge of the navy's Reserve Office Training Corps
program at the University of North Carolina.

22

18 April 1945
Dear Swede:
Your letter of 29th January took almost three months to reach
me-I don't know whether it is because your North Carolina
station may be off the main rail lines, or because I have neglected to
give my postal authorities the devil for the past several weeks.
I agree with your opinion on the awkwardness of my current
title. Luckily, every General in our Army has always been addressed as "General" whether or not he officially has qualifying
terminology in front of the word or behind it. You are quite right in
observing that it doesn't matter a darn to me .
Nothing in your letter intrigued me more than your comparisons in the Army and Navy systems, as applied to their methods in
selecting their field leaders in time of war. You seem to believe the
Army was almost foolhardy in the matter but did believe that it
took a certain amount of nerve to shatter precedent. Finally, it
occurred to you that the Army system is not very flattering to the
files that were jumped in the process . With this particular point I
do not quite agree. As I see it, seniority, in itself, is of little moment
in time of war. The head of the whole organization must make his
best guesses as to the individuals he considers equipped for
particular tasks and then he perforce gives them the rank suitable
to the task. His choice usually falls upon those that he believes will
make good-if he makes a wrong guess then he has to correct the
mistake . This process applies all the way down the line. Seniority
normally means experience, and experience is always important.
But endurance and experience are not to be confused in their
meaning, and experience alone will never meet the peculiar
requirements of war leadership .
This same process applies throughout. Every day we are
selecting men here for division or corps command, and our
selections normally do not take seniority into account unless all
other factors are so nearly equal that this one should govern. In the
average case the ranks conferred are for the war only and everybody can go back to his old rank and seniority can again have its
heyday.
I am much interested in your new job and sincerely hope that
you won't work too hard . It is especially gratifying that you are
your own boss and can therefore apply to your job more of your
own individual ideas.
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Your tale about reactions and conditions at home is highly
intriguing. I don't know exactly what it takes to work the United
States up to a real fighting pitch and to keep it there, but it is very
difficult for us here to believe that anyone can take this thing as a
routine affair, and have much time to think of profits, night clubs
and horse-racing . Actually, I think that the average American feels
much more deeply about these matters than we normally assume . I
receive lots of mail and invariably it reflects a very serious attitude .
Not long ago I had a chance to see my son. He was much
annoyed with me that I took him away from his job with one of the
fighting corps to come back a little ways to see me . However, we
had a splendid evening. Since I had not then received your letter I
didn' t have a chance to remind him that your blonde is still
unmarried. Anyway, my love to her and to "Ibby." Incidentally,
my curiosity is stirred every time I see that nick-name in one of
your letters. What is the legal version?
As ever,

Eisenhower arrived back in the United States in June 1945 for a
round of triumphant public appearances. In mid July he returned
to Germany as commanding general of United States Forces,
European Theater, and commander in chief of United States
occupation forces in Germany. For the next six months he was
immersed in the almost daily crises of the occupation . Although he
handled this new job with his customary skill and patience, it
seems clear that his heart was never in it and that like the men and
women under his command, he was anxious to have done with the
aftermath of the war and to return home. ''I must say,' ' he wrote to
a former aide, " that the job of fighting a war was not so wearing in
its irritations and frustrations as is that of trying to produce
peaceful and effective agreements to carry out governmental
policies in Central Europe."
Swede, of course, was tremendously proud of his old friend,
but he was also a little uneasy about Eisenhower's new celebrity.
"A year ago, and for many years before that, I blasted to all who
would listen of our friendship," he wrote; "but now the aura of
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Eisenhower's triumphant return to Washington, D.C., 18 June 1945
(by permission of United Press International).

your glory has become so blinding that I fear even to admit
acquaintanceship for fear I'll be accused of 'basking,' -something
I've never done in my life." Somewhat taken aback by Eisenhower's vigorous defense of the army's promotion policies, Swede
also apologized for having bothered Eisenhower with the issue at
the height of the final offensive against the Germans.
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9 July 1945
Dear Swede:
Although I talked to you on the phone this morning, I am
writing this note because since that hour, I have read the letter you
wrote me on the 17th of June . I do not remember exactly what the
point was in our "promotion" discussion; but it is possible that I
merely felt it necessary to listen to my own voice on the subject . In
any event, I assure you I had no feeling that we were in any hot
argument. All such subjects as that have a definite fascination for
me and I am apt to get very verbose, once I get started.
As for writing you on April 18-if that was the date-I knew on
March 24 that the enemy was absolutely whipped and was rapidly
disintegrating. He had not the slightest chance and from then on it
was merely a question of when could we get either an orderly
surrender to all the combined powers, or failing that completely
occupy his country. During mid-April my mind was completely at
ease so far as the actual fighting was concerned.
I am sorry to note in your letter that you are beginning to find
it necessary to play down our lifelong friendship . Making the
headlines has a thousand disadvantages, but I am going to be
upset if you feel it necessary to say that you didn't know that other
guy from Abilene .
I haven't the slightest idea of what is happening or is to
happen in the Pacific. I do know that I am not to be officially
connected with it in any way. My own admiration for [Adm.
Chester W.] Nimitz is probably no less than yours even though I
know him only by hearsay and by his accomplishments. Every
word I have ever heard about him confirms the feeling that I
always get when I look at his picture-he is top flight in every
respect.
My best to Elizabeth and please don't wait so darn long before
writing to me again .
As ever,
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Eisenhower returned to the United states in November 1945 to
succeed George Marshall as army chief of staff. For the next two
years he would be preoccupied with the army' s campaign for
Universal Military Training (UMT), with the struggle over military
unification, and with the attempt to devise a military strategy for
the emerging Cold War. The battle over unification was particularly intense, with the navy strongly resisting efforts to consolidate
the three services. A unification bill finally passed Congress, as
Title II of the National Security Act of 1947, but not before it had
been considerably weakened by naval opposition.

27 November 1945
Dear Swede:
This time your letter caught me in the hospital, flat on my back
trying to ward off serious consequences from a very heavy cold
and an attack of bronchitis . So for once it doesn't seem worth while
to try to convince you that your letters, far from being a bore, are
entertaining, interesting and helpful. But with regard to the
reluctance you feel in writing to me, I will admit, for the sake of
argument, (though without acknowledging any sense in the proposition) that so far as the headlines of the past few years are
concerned, we are somewhat like Mutt and Jeff. I've been long;
you've been short. You will remember that as between Mutt and
Jeff themselves, comparative elongation made little difference,
either in their recurring fights or in those instances when they were
both on the same side of a question. What I am getting at is, so far
as the Swede-Ike relationship is concerned, there is no "big" and
certainly no " little" shot. In all sincerity, and with the utmost
frankness, your letters present to me a more objective view on the
subjects we discuss than any other advice I get. You can well
imagine how I look forward to receiving the very few communications you deign to send me .
With all that out of the way, I'll get down to the matter I want
to discuss now. As you would guess, it is "unification." You reflect
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some of the fears I have heard voiced either in the press or verbally
by other naval officers, namely, that some "swallowing up"
process would inevitably follow upon any closer unification of the
Services, at the top, than we now have. Frankly, I not only cannot
understand how such a thing could come about-I am certain that
no one wants it and I, for one, would battle it to the death . One
brother does not devour another; a guard on a football team is
equally important with the tackle!
The American public should understand that war has become
a triphibious affair, and unless one laboriously picks out special
circumstances, land, sea and air in varying ratio are employed in
every operation of war. The closest possible kind of association
among the individuals of these three forces throughout their
Service careers is mandatory. You must remember that for the past
three and a half years I have not been an infantryman! I have not
even been a ground commander. I have had land, sea and air, and
during that period I believe that my viewpoint has been as much
naval and as much air as it has been ground . I do not mean that
I've learned the techniques of sea and air; but if my headquarters
had not had the sense to give as much weight to the technical
advice of those two Services as in the case of ground, then our
operation would have failed.
Yet it was a laborious process at the beginning to weld all these
three Services together and to convince each, in the field, that its
own characteristics, capabilities and welfare would be as influential
in determining upon an operation as would those of the other two
Services . Early conferences were carried on almost in the "catbulldog" atmosphere, each Service fighting for itself and its
requirements and quite certain that no one else was concerned in
them. This mutual suspicion and fear rapidly melted away and I
think there is no question that GHQ, both in the Mediterranean
and in Northwest Europe, was almost a model of unified, integrated, and enthusiastic cooperation . But I believe that we should
in time of peace so organize and train that a happy family can start
operating in this fashion on the day we put it together, not after
each Service finds by experience that the others regard it as a friend
and part of the team rather than one of the enemies in the
operation .
What I have said is not mere loose talk or even merely an
impression. It is fact and I could give you a number of instances as
specific illustrations . Moreover, the fault was not to be found
exclusively with any one Service . However, all this is somewhat
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beside the point because everybody now agrees that in any war
theater there should be one commander and his authority should be so
clearly established that there is no question as to his right to handle
the three Services as he sees fit . The real point at issue is whether
or not there would be any peacetime advantage in establishing by
law a closer unification at the top .
Now forget for a moment that you are a naval officer and
regard yourself merely as a taxpayer. You are interested in national
security and therefore in the armed forces of your country. You are
entitled to some kind of presentation or explanation that would
enable you to make a reasonable guess whether this whole subject
is being properly treated by Congress or whether all of the fighting
Services are being placed on a starvation basis and their efficiency
reduced to former deplorable levels . Since war is a triphibious
matter, how can you make any judgment upon this matter at allwhether you are in private life or whether you are chairman of a
Congressional Committee-unless the broad yearly program for all
three Services is presented to you as a unit? Do you not need to know
whether ground forces have been provided to complement the
navy and the air, and the navy both the others? If the members of
each of these Services-and remember that service pride and esprit
in each are equally strong-come to you unilaterally and plead for
support, I am unable to see how you can get a balanced picture.
Each of the Services will consider itself individually responsible for
the safety of the nation and, if you are truly security minded, you
will wind up with numbers of duplications which in the long run
you cannot afford. The degree of autonomy that should be
permitted to each Service so far as its own operations and its own
affairs are concerned, should not be lessened. But all of us get into
our heads that no one of these Services is complete within itselfthat it needs the other two-and that since each is complementary
to the other two, the whole program of preparation must be a
balanced one . Added to this it is well to remember that the
example of single command would have a great effect upon the
second lieutenant and the ensign as well as upon all the men they
command .
It seems to me that such a system, also, will provide more
easily for combined training and closer association of individuals
through the years . On this subject I am almost a fanatic. War is a
matter of teamwork, and teamwork is not possible among people
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that are mutually suspicious. I will put it stronger than this: perfect
teamwork can be achieved only among friends.
I had not heard that any other person had ever suggested a
single uniform, which I did once, merely to illustrate the extent to
which I believe we should all think of ourselves as one common
family. I do not suggest what that uniform should be, and actually I
think it is probably an impracticable suggestion, possibly even an
unwise one, but if such a thing were adopted I personally would
not care one whit what the color of the uniform should be. It could
be blue, green, olive drab or a skyblue pink. On that point,
however, I accept your suggestion and will not mention it again!
One other thing I should like to make plain. I think I told you
before of my admiration for Nimitz, based upon newspaper
accounts and reports of friends, and many of the naval officers
with whom 1 have come in contact in this war. Because it happens
that argument on this subject has largely, to my astonishment,
developed into an Army-Navy argument, I would very much like
to see, if the thing ever comes about, a naval officer designated as
the first Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Armed Forces. So far
as I am concerned there is not the slightest bit of personal or
Service consideration attached to the project. Until a few weeks
ago every naval officer I had met was an enthusiastic supporter of
the idea. I believed that there would be some argument on the
matter, particularly in Congress, but I really thought that the great
mass of army and navy officers were for the thing 100% .
For myself, there is nothing I want so much as opportunity to
retire. If this evening, as I lie here in bed, I could believe that when
I got up I could get Mamie down here from her hospital and we
could start out roaming the United States looking for the home we
would like to live in the rest of our years, I would be up and on the
go within twenty minutes . The job I am taking now represents
nothing but straight duty. Naturally I will do it as well as I know
how, but I do hope that when I get a chance to meet Nimitz and the
rest of the Navy files, I can convince them that no consideration of
personal or Service ambition has a single thing to do with my
views.
I know of many examples of perfect cooperation and teamwork between armies, navies and ground forces of two nations
that would delight your heart to hear. Possibly one day I will try to
write them down. They were heart-warming experiences. But the
tragedy was that initially, at least, they were considered notable,
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almost unique. I hold that perfection of teamwork and of friendly
cooperation should be accepted as a matter of course and I believe
we can bring that about if we practice it and preach it and so
organize as to exemplify it in time of peace. We will always have
enough esprit de corps in each Service. Continuance of the ArmyNavy game will itself insure sufficient competition to make us both
want to excel.
You mentioned a number of younger admirals in your letter.
Of them I think I know only [Rear Adm. Forrest P.] Sherman. I
wish you would ask your brother-in-law [Rear Adm. Frank G.
Fahrion] to drop in on me the next time he goes through Washington. I should like very much to see him.
Until you mentioned again the publication of my speeches
[Swede had been asked to write a forward to a collection of
Eisenhower's speeches, the profits from which were to go to the
Army Relief Fund] I had forgotten all about the matter. I will look it
up as I had given my permission subject, however, to the proviso
that neither the publisher nor myself would make a cent out of the
matter. I do not know what has happened.
My best to you and Ibby, and whenever I can get that son of
mine home from Germany I will chase him up to Frederick to call
on the little "Miss Swede."
Take care of yourself,
Cordially,
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Eisenhower and Swede continued to joke about encouraging a
romance between their children, John Eisenhower and Mary
Elizabeth Hazlett. Swede had earlier asked Eisenhower to remind
his son that there was "a damned good-looking (and sensible)
blonde out at Hood College at Frederick who would like to meet

. "
h1m.

25 January 1946
Dear Swede:
Thank you very much for the copy of the Chapel Hill Weekly. I
enjoyed the editorial and the article as well as your note.
The article was particularly amusing so far as I was concerned
because it proved that in spite of your laborious efforts to deny
acquaintanceship with me someone finally caught up with you.
I probably wrote you in my most recent letter that I personally
have nothing further to say on the subject of unification. So far as I
am concerned the greatest factor in the problem right now is my
conviction that Nimitz is a man of extraordinary qualifications,
including ability and devotion to duty, and on top of these, is a
friendly soul with whom it is a pleasure to work. He and I
communicate constantly and no matter what the outcome should
32

be in Congress I have no doubt that he and I will succeed in
instituting a lot of reforms that are badly needed.
My son is still in Germany. In fact, even if he should be
ordered to some other duty as a matter of mere routine I would
probably have to stop him because there would be an accusation of
favoritism . Aside from the natural desire of Mamie and myself to
see him, I am hopeful that he will get home and meet that daughter
of yours before she goes and gets herself married. I chuckle to
myself every time you and I exchange any ideas along this line
because the spectacle of a couple of old-time Kansas farmer boys
timidly sticking their noses into Cupid's business is, after all, a bit
on the ludicrous side .
Love to your family and warm regards to yourself,
As ever,

Even before the war was over, prominent Americans were
urging Eisenhower to run for the presidency; and although Eisenhower undoubtedly had at least considered the possibility, he
continued to insist throughout his private correspondence, as he
did in public, that he had absolutely no such ambition. In October
1945 Swede had written that "no matter what party you affiliated
with, (and I have no idea if you're D. or R.) you could carry the
country without even taking to the road." The following February,
Swede returned to the subject, concluding, however, that "I have
an idea that you have no real interest in public office ."
Swede, whose health continued to decline, had meanwhile
been relieved of his command of the Naval ROTC at North
Carolina . Although offered several posts at the university, he
declined them, deciding instead to devote himself to retirement
and to the occasional writing of juvenile fiction .
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13 March 1946
Dear Swede:
Thank you very much for your letter which was written while I
was on my recent swing around the country. I stopped at Abilene
and saw Charlie Harger, Sam Heller [president of the United Trust
Company in Abilene] and Charlie Case. Others I didn't get to see
because I was too rushed.
I share your sympathy for Bradley.111 You can be certain that
he took that job only because he was ordered to do so. He was
under no illusions as to the shower of brickbats that was certain to
come his way. However, in that respect his attitude was no
different from mine with regard to this post I am occupying.
Your conclusions concerning my attitude toward politics are
100 per cent correct. When trying to express my sentiments myself
I merely get so vehement that I grow speechless, if not hysterical. I
cannot conceive of any set of circumstances that could ever drag
out of me permission to consider me for any political post from
Dog Catcher to "Grand High Supreme King of the Universe."
Moreover, I find myself in rather general agreement with your
general observations concerning the receptive boys.
It was a blow to Beetle Smith when he was told that they
wanted him to accept the Moscow job.[ 21 He is a thorough-going
soldier, extremely capable and occupies a place of high regard and
esteem among those people in Europe with whom he worked . I
know of no one better qualified for the job but of course his
ambitions do not lie along diplomatic and political lines .
In the same position I am sure that I would feel the same as
you do about taking a job in the University. I would far rather
attempt to write. You have a distinct flair in that line and I don't see
why even "light fiction" should be beyond your reach . I am
certain that there are a number of special writing fields in which

1. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, who had commanded the American forces in the
Normandy invasion, served as head of the Veteran's Administration from 1945 to
1947. Swede had written that his heart went out to Bradley and " his enmeshment
in [American] Legion politics. "
2. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, who had served as Eisenhower's chief of staff
during World War II, had just been named ambassador to the Soviet Union, where
he served for the next three years.
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you could enter with real success . Anyway it is the type of effort
that should be fun and even if the publishers won' t take your stuff,
I'll bet a nickel that Ibby would like it-possibly even your young
blonde . Why don't you start writing some Wild West stories; I
guarantee I'll read them. Moreover, I will write to the publishers
and demand that I want to read "Wild Bill and the Long-horned
Steer, '' ''Early Days in Abilene,'' ''The Smokey Hill, ' ' -all by E. E.
Hazlett, Jr. Maybe we can work out a reciprocal agreement. You do
the writing, I'll do the reading and I'll howl to every publisher for
more and more of your stories .
My love to the family and warm regard to yourself,
As ever,

Eisenhower wrote this letter shortly after a joint task force
under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had detonated
the first of two atomic tests at Bikini atoll in the Pacific. The SHAEF
(Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) Reports that
Eisenhower mentions included both his "Report on Operations in
Northeast Europe" and a copy of the February 1944 directive to the
supreme commander from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Publication of the reports was designed, at least in part, to answer
criticism of the conduct of the European campaigns.

1 July 1946
Dear Swede:
I am sorry that your trip had to be put off but please count on
staying in our house whatever time you can spend in Washington
when you come through this way. We have lots of room in the old
house at Fort Myer and you can be as comfortable there as any
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place else in the City. Certainly, it is about ten degrees cooler than
in the center of town.
Right now my plans call for me being out of town between the
15th and 21st of July and between the 1st and 20th of August.
Outside of these two periods I expect to be in Washington almost
constantly. Between the 10th and 15th of September I will probably
have some prominent guests from Britain staying in the house but
otherwise the slate is rather clear. If your own plans would so
develop that you simply had to go through here during a period
when I am absent, then we will have to count on your stopping by
on your way back home. Please do not feel anything but the
greatest freedom and confidence in coming up to the house;
Mamie and I are really looking forward to a visit with you and your
family. As an added attraction, I might tell you there is even an
elevator in the house so that if the doctors are always jumping you
about climbing stairs you can thumb your nose at them.
This morning' s papers say that the first test shot at Bikini went
off alright. While I am certain that we will learn much from the
technical reports, my own idea is that if this hellish contrivance is
really effective against ships, it will be from some type of under
water use rather than from air bursts . However, we can wait and
see.
Because you were interested enough to want to read one of the
SHAEF Reports, it occurred to me that you might like to have one
in your library. I will get hold of one at once and send it under
separate cover. You understand, of course, that it was written a
year ago and that I have never had time really to go over it and edit
it as I should like. A few of the paragraphs or pages were written
personally; the most of it was done by the Historical Section from
the records they had in Europe and I got a chance merely to take
out most of the vertical pronouns and to insert items that I thought
of particular interest. All that was done before I came home last
November and I have not since changed it in any way at all.
Security staffs went over it-when the Combined Chiefs of Staff
agreed to its publication-to make sure that nothing in it violated
standing agreements concerning secret matter. No other changes
were made.
With warmest regards to you and your family.
As ever,
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"You've owed me a letter for damned near a year," wrote
Swede on 28 March 1947, quickly adding, however, that "I have
no complaints ." In any case, Eisenhower and Mamie visited the
Hazletts in April during a trip to nearby Fort Bragg. They talked
about the presidency, the " burning question, " as Swede put it. " I
still insist you're the best man in sight and could have it in a walkaway, " Swede wrote. " But if you don't want it, that' s that!" The
following month, Swede sent Eisenhower the original of an
illustration that had appeared in the Hearst papers, along with
excerpts from Kenneth Davis's biography of Eisenhower.

22 May 1947
Dear Swede:
Instantly on receipt of your letter I looked into the matter of
the receipt here of a set of prints of the drawings made by your
friend, Mr. William Prince, for Kenneth Davis' book "Soldier of
Democracy." I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I sent to Mr.
Prince, which, I believe, is self-explanatory. Incidentally, the
original drawing of which you wrote was received this morning . I
think it is exceptionally good .
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Chapel Hill, North Carolina, April 1947
(courtesy of Dwight D . Eisenhower Library).
The Eisenhowers visited the Hazletts while
Ike was on a tour of duty at nearby Fort
Bragg as army chief of staff. They talked
about the presidency. "I still insist you're
the best man in sight and could have it in
a walk-away," wrote Swede. "But if you
don't want it, that's that!"

I am due in Raleigh on August 28 to speak at the Farmers' and
Farm Women's Convention. I would be delighted to see you, but
frankly have no knowledge of how much time I will have available
for myself. Customarily when I am the guest, I leave the matter of
my entire schedule in the hands of my hosts . However, in this
instance, I will ask my aide to get in touch with you about the first
of August to see if perchance we can have a few minutes together
in my hotel suite at Raleigh, and also to inquire about the
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possibility of having you attend the dinner at which I shall speak.
As far as I know now, Mamie is not accompanying me to Raleigh .
Mamie and I enjoyed our visit to Chapel Hill. I hope to see you
in Raleigh. In any event, please don't hesitate to let me know
should you find at any time that you are coming this way.
Sincerely,

By early 1947 Eisenhower had decided to step down as chief of
staff, a job he had found even more trying than the occupation . As
he wrote to his son, it was "a sorry place to land after having
commanded a theatre of war." As chief of staff, he had found
himself not only embroiled in the bitter fights over unification and
the draft but caught as well between the shrinkage of military
resources that was produced by postwar demobilization and the
growing demands that were being placed on the military by the
expansive new diplomacy of the Cold War. "The World situation
presents nothing that can be classed as improvement, " he wrote .
"Coupled with this is the Congressional determination to slash
into budgets that are already practically incapable of carrying out
our great bag of commitments, and you can see that our days are
anything but hilarious ."
In May 1947 he was approached by Thomas J. Watson, the
president of IBM and a trustee of Columbia University, who
offered him the presidency of the university. Eisenhower had
talked before of heading a college or university, and though he
doubtless would have preferred a smaller or at least a nonmetropolitan institution, he nevertheless accepted Watson's offer.
Although he would continue as chief of staff until early 1948, his
appointment as president of Columbia was announced in late June
1947.
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19 July 1947
Dear Swede:
As always your letter provided me with an interesting and
sane interlude in an otherwise hectic day. I am truly sorry that you
have had to enter the hospital, but I think you are wise in getting a
thorough check-up when you find yourself ailing.
There are dozens of different considerations that finally influenced me to say "yes" to the Columbia Trustees. One of these
considerations was their clear understanding of the point that I
would never really separate myself from the uniformed services of
the country. I explained to them carefully that I have lived 36 years
in one idea and for one purpose and that as a result I had absorbed
several simple conceptions and observations that would remain
with me until the end of my days. From my viewpoint, going to
Columbia is merely to change the location of my headquarters;
perhaps it would be more accurate to say that I am changing the
method by which I will continue to strive for the same goals.
I believe fanatically in the American form of democracy-a
system that recognizes and protects the rights of the individual and
that ascribes to the individual a dignity accruing to him because of
his creation in the image of a supreme being and which rests upon
the conviction that only through a system of free enterprise can
this type of democracy be preserved. Beyond this I believe that
world order can be established only by the practice of true
cooperation among the sovereign nations and that American
leadership toward this goal depends upon her strength-her
strength of will, her moral, social and economic strength and, until
an effective world order is achieved, upon her military strength. It
is these simple conceptions that I will take to Columbia. If by living
them and preaching them I can do some good I will hope to stay on
indefinitely.
I did not mean suddenly to become pontifical-I have merely
been struggling to get over to you something of my basic reasons
for deciding to undertake that job when the time comes that The
President feels I may be released here. That time, incidentally, is
still some months distant.
Additionally, of course, there are certain other influences that
affected me. Among these was pressure from a number of different
directions to agree to undertake this or that job when this one
should be finished for me. Regardless of my regular response that I
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did not care to think of such things until my period of active service
was over, a number of individuals-with their own conceptions
concerning the direction in which my duty lay-continued their
approaches, sometimes directly, sometimes through close friends .
All of them finally understood that I would not consider anything
commercial in character; the offers I have received of this type at
times appeared to me fantastic. At the very least I have stopped all
this by announcing what I hope to do with my personal future.
On the other side of the picture, Mamie and I both hate New
York City and recoil from the thought of living there permanently. I
know nothing about the workings of a great University and am
certainly far from being an "educator." With regard to a residence,
I am already searching for a country place somewhere up in the
Connecticut area and we confidently expect to live in such a place
throughout the year, except possibly for the deep winter months.
With regard to the lack of scholarly attainment, the Board of
Trustees insists that they want an organizer and a leader, not a
professor.
That tells the story in rough, halting fashion. It has been
encouraging to receive from many College Presidents and a great
number of Professors messages expressing their satisfaction that I
have accepted the job.
With regard to John: I think that like all young officers he has
of course contemplated the possibility of resigning to enter some
civil pursuit. However, I believe it was merely a manifestation of
the doubts that nearly always assail a man after he has committed
himself to a lifetime of service in one channel-his whole purpose
seems to be to improve himself as an Army officer and I think he
will stick to it without question.
I have none of the details of my Raleigh trip. Ordinarily I
would fly down there in the afternoon, attend the evening meeting
and fly back the next morning. If I can possibly see you and Ibby it
will provide a real enjoyment to the trip, but from long and bitter
experience I have found that my hosts on such occasions usually
schedule every possible minute so tightly that there is little time
left to do anything else . However, I will have an aide get all the
details as soon as possible and I will communicate them to you
when I can.
At least, here's hoping.
My very best to both of you and to the children.
As ever,
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What a letter!-But if you could know how pressed I am you'd
understand. [This is a handwritten postscript.]

Eisenhower wrote a brief note to Swede on August 20, inviting
Swede to join him in Raleigh where he would be speaking at North
Carolina State and dining with the governor. In his reply, on
August 20, Swede noted that several newspaper columnists had
recently speculated about Eisenhower's political ambitions and
declared that 'T d like to back you in a corner in Raleigh to find out
if you've changed your mind."

25 August 1947
Dear Swede:
Your note just reached me. I am delighted that we shall meet
for a few moments in Raleigh, even though I shall apparently have
the sketchiest of opportunities to talk to you .
Possibly you can go along with me to my train which I
understand is not to pull out until 9:45 and this might give us an
opportunity to talk a bit longer. I am due to go to Abilene about
October 25 where I will attend a testimonial dinner to Mr. Harger. I
would also like to tell you about my latest visit there which took
place in June .
Please don't concern yourself about the possibility that I have
"changed my mind." You may be certain that I have been
absolutely truthful in every public statement I have made on the
personal political question and you can be equally sure that I have
not directly or indirectly given to anyone the right to represent my
feelings and convictions differently at any place or at any time .
It is difficult for many people-particularly those who have led
a political life or are engaged in newspaper or radio work-to
believe anyone who disclaims political ambition. Even though they
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may accept without the faintest hint of challenge any statement a
man might make about any other subject in the world, on this one
thing they maintain a position of doubt, not to say suspicion.
Frankly, if Mamie and I could have our way we would, without the
slightest hesitation, retire to the quietest and least publicized
neighborhood in the United States. We have become convinced
that a completely private life is denied us-this conviction, as much
as anything else, is at the bottom of my agreement to attempt the
job in New York. Beyond this, however, I have no plans, no
personal ambitions, and I am attempting to live this as honestly as I
say it.
My own deepest concern involves America's situation in the
world today. Her security position and her international leadership
I regard as matters of the gravest concern to all of us and to our
national future . Allied to these questions of course is that of
internal health, particularly maximum productivity. While there
may be little that I can do about such matters, I do have the
satisfaction of feeling that whatever I try to do is on a national and
not on any partisan basis. Moreover, I flatter myself to believe that
the people who listen to me understand that I am talking or
working for all, not for any political party or for any political
ambition . This is the attitude I hope that I can preserve to the end
of my days .
My very best to Ibby and the girls and, as always, my very best
to you.
Sincerely,

Pressure on Eisenhower to become a candidate continued to
mount, as did speculation in the press . The latter, Swede wrote on
October 25, "has been throwing out so much smoke that, being
gullible, I began to suspect at least a spark." If Eisenhower were
really determined not to run, Swede asked, shouldn't he "make an
unequivocal statement on the subject-one that no one can shoot
holes in?"
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29 October 1947
Dear Swede:
While I have not been invited to the meeting of the North
Carolina Press Association in January, it will be impossible for me
to attend even if I am asked . My life is just as hectic as ever and I
have flatly refused, for many weeks past, to add a single engagement to my schedule . In fact, I have had to break three or four of
long standing. At the end of this week I must make a run to Texas
and stop at Little Rock on the way back. I am desperately trying to
make those my only public appearances during the month except
for a two-minute appearance here in the city in an effort to help out
the Community Chest campaign.
All the so-called experts in the field of political analysis
continuously point out that without artificial stimulus all these
"boomlets" for particular individuals sooner or later collapse. I
have been pinning my faith and my hopes on the correctness of
this assertion-I have made my position very clear and still feel
sure that I am not going to be faced with an impossible situation. It
has been a most burdensome, not to say annoying, development.
It has even resulted in bringing down on my naked head a lot of
attacks from people who would ordinarily have no reason for
concerning themselves about me one way or the other. But because
they see in me some possible thwarting of their own purposes,
they use the method of cursing anyone that gets in their way.
Personally I feel that there are a number of candidates in the
field who would make acceptable political leaders and I cannot
conceive of any set of probable circumstances that would ever
convince me that it was my duty to enter such a hectic arena.
I am counting on going to the Army-Navy game this year,
primarily because Lord [Harold] Alexander, Governor General of
Canada [who had served under Eisenhower in North Africa and
Italy], is going to attend and I am rather in the position of being
one of his hosts . Frankly, I think I would far rather have the day
just to sleep, and read about the results the following morning in
the papers. In any event I shall not attend any of the other games .
In Abilene I found that my circle of old acquaintances and
friends seems gradually to contract. On this trip I did see Lois
Barger Parker-the first time I have seen her since we graduated
from high school in 1909. I saw no significant physical change in
the town-that is one comer of the country that seems to drift
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along in the even tenor of its ways, and its people are the happier
for it.
It is nice to know that you and your family had such a fine time
at the beach. When a whole family loves the sea, the sunlight and
deep-sea fishing, it certainly simplifies the vacation problem. With
us the matter is somewhat more difficult because Mamie has no
interest in outdoor life. I am perfectly ready (always assuming we
can get any kind of an opportunity) to go to a mountain stream or a
farm with some birds on it or to the seashore . But since none of
these places has a definite attraction for Mamie, we always have a
big discussion and end up by traveling around and tiring ourselves
out. In any event, we are going to take 60 days between the
termination of this job and the beginning of the next and incidentally, during that time, I am going to be careful to retain my active
duty status .
Give my love to Ibby and the girls, and with warmest regards
to yourself,
As ever,
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On 22 January 1948, Eisenhower at last put an end to speculation when he released a letter to New Hampshire publisher
Leonard V. Finder, in which he wrote that his "decision to remove
myself completely from the political scene is definite and positive ."

26 January 1948
Dear Swede:
By this time you have possibly noted in the public press that
all your remaining questions about a political career for me have
been definitely answered. Several of my warm friends-men
whose judgment I completely respect-differed from me sharply as
to the wisdom of issuing such a statement. In fact, I had only two
real supporters, among all my friends, in my belief that I must do
so. There were many factors other than those mentioned in my
letter to Mr. Finder that had some influence with me but I think I
am honest in saying, as I did in the letter, that personal desire and
convenience were not predominating among them. Now that it is
done, I can at least devote my mind unreservedly to a number of
other important things and will not feel like I am constantly on the
"witness stand."
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I read the letter from your friend [Harold W.] Whicker and I
must say that I found it most interesting and intriguing. Discounting or even eliminating his over-generous opinions concerning my
personal characteristics and qualifications, the letter is indicative of
the thinking of a very, very large number of people in this country
today. Most of them, however, have not Mr. Whicker's ability to
express himself. Incidentally, some of his sentences are a little on
the lengthy side for my simple mind but even so he succeeds in
expressing himself clearly and forcefully.
I also read his letter on our educational institutions. You have
asked me to return it and I shall do so in a few days but first I think
I should like to have a copy of it made because I shall want to refer
to it from time to time. My most persistent reaction to his two
documents is that it is a tremendous loss to our country that he is a
confirmed invalid . We need crusaders; he is obviously the type of
man that would never give up in his pursuit of an objective and
even though some would certainly accuse him of lopsidedness (I
am speaking now particularly of his castigation of our educational
system) he would certainly make a lot of complacent, ritualistic
people most uncomfortable. If ever I get out in that region I am
going to look him up because I have the feeling that an hour's
conversation with him would be truly stimulating. When you write
to him please assure him of the profound impression his effort
made upon me and tell him that the highest praise I can give is :
"Our country needs more of his type ."
Washington is undergoing a touch of real winter. The temperature must be somewhere around 15 or 20 today and we have
quite a bit of snow. The forecaster says we shall continue to have
no change for two or three days. I suppose that you have gotten a
touch of the same thing down at Chapel Hill.
I have seen pictures of Dick Scott of the Navy [an AllAmerican football player and class president who would soon
marry Swede' s older daughter] and from them I should say he is a
fine-looking boy. I should like to get a chance to have a real talk
with him because I should like to subject to microscopic examination every young man fortunate enough to run around with the
Hazlett girls.
I do not remember whether I have told you that Mamie and I
are counting on being grandparents in early April. Far beyond this,
we are already counting on the selection of the school the young
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grandson or granddaughter (I wish we could figure on twins) is
going to attend .
Within ten days or two weeks I expect to turn over this job but
I shall be around the city until May 1st, when I go to New York.
Right this minute we have a household upset with sicknessMamie's Dad became quite ill while visiting us. However, anytime
you have a chance to get up this way send us a wire and count on
staying with us, certainly up to the middle of April-after that we'll
always have an extra room in New York.
With love to Ibby and the girls,
As ever,
P.S. Tell Whicker to get a description of the effort being made at
Amherst [College] to revitalize educational processes.

On 12 April 1948 Eisenhower wrote Swede a short note,
apologizing for its brevity and assuring Swede that "no one writes
me letters that are more acceptable and intriguing than yours." He
was far more reserved, however, in responding to a proposal that
Swede passed along on April 21 . An editor at Dodd, Mead and
Company, which had published a children's book on submarines
by Swede, had proposed that he and Eisenhower "collaborate" on
a book based on Eisenhower's Abilene boyhood. While Swede
assured Eisenhower that he had "never had even the slightest
desire to capitalize in anyway on what is to me a precious
friendship," he nevertheless seemed to be genuinely interested in
the project. Eisenhower responded with characteristic circumspection, offering to provide Swede with information but carefully
maintaining his own distance from the project. Eisenhower's own
memoirs, Crusade in Europe, was scheduled for publication in the
late fall.
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28 April 1948
Dear Swede:
In the note I sent just before going on vacation I included my
apologies for its brevity. I now repeat them.
I, of course, have no objection whatsoever to your writing any
book, article, or pamphlet that you may think worthwhile doing. If
the subject should happen to be anything connected with me or
my life I would be delighted to provide you with whatever factual
information my memory might still retain. On the other hand, I
could not be a collaborator in the book-it would have to be your
effort alone . As I see it, the difference between you and someone
else writing on such a subject is that you are fully acquainted with
the Kansas background from which we both came . Moreover,
because you are one of my oldest and dearest friends I would spare
no pains to help you dig up facts. Beyond this I could not go, and I
believe that your publishers are a little bit off the beam in
suggesting that we should "collaborate."
If you should decide to undertake such a task you can provide
me with a questionnaire and I will do my best to fill it in. The
matter, therefore, is strictly between you and your publishers and
you can act in the certainty that I will be as helpful as is possible. I
should think that the decision you would have to make was
whether or not the effort would be worth-while as I cannot
conceive that there would be any great demand because here and
there in books, articles, and just plain commentary there has been
an awful lot written about the Eisenhower tribe. It is only fair to
say, however, that while it all has pretended to be factual reporting
some of it has gone deeper into the fictional world than you would
possibly dream of doing even in a book that was frankly fictional.
I did not do any fishing on my vacation. Mamie and I simply
went down to Augusta National with a few friends and lived on
the golf course there for 10 days . Incidentally, I did not improve my
playing a bit, but I did have a whale of a lot of fun. It was the best
two weeks I have had in many years .
I cannot be sure what my schedule calls for on the 6th of June
[when Swede's daughter was scheduled to marry Richard Scott] . It
is my impression that that is the exact date of one of the busy
commencement programs at Columbia. However, I assure you
that even if I could get off for a few hours in the afternoon and fly
to your daughter's wedding, to return that evening to New York, I
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would feel it a great privilege to do so . Won't you please write to
me again at Columbia University about the end of May to remind
me to make a special effort?
One of the reasons I accepted the Columbia job was because I
thought that while doing something useful I would still be in a
position to relax a bit; to base myself better than I have been able to
do for the past many years . My schedule of appointments for the
first month there has already grown to appalling proportions. If
current indications provide any index of what my future life there
is to be, I shall quit them cold, and deliberately go to some
foresaken spot on the earth's surface to stay until I am fully ready
to go back to work on the only basis that it appears I am ever to be
allowed to work, namely under full [and] heavy steam.
I do not know whether you occasionally make trips to New
York to see your publishers. If you do, you can always count with
certainty upon a warm welcome at our house and a roof under
which to lay your head. You know that there could be no more
welcome guests for us than you and Ibby.
Last weekend I went to Kansas . I tried desperately to avoid
making the trip because it cropped off the last three days of my
planned vacation. However, Mr. Harger, who is about the only
man of the older generation left that helped me get into West
Point, made the invitation so personal that I felt I had to go . The
meeting was at Wichita but a few Abilene-ites headed by Mr.
Harger were present for the luncheon . I was in the city only a
matter of two or three hours .
With love to the family and warmest regard to yourself,
As ever,

Eisenhower was to be formally installed as president of
Columbia University on 12 October 1948 and had invited Swede
and his wife to attend . In his letter of September 28, Swede had
expressed relief at Eisenhower's decision to steer clear of politics
but had also observed that only that morning a columnist had
"intimated that you and George [E.] Allen were conniving on the
Democratic nomination in 1952!" Allen was a lawyer and business50

man with an ingratiating sense of humor and a flair for cultivating
the friendship of Washington's politically powerful, including
Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman (who in 1945 appointed Allen
director of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation), and Dwight
Eisenhower. He later wrote about his experiences in a book
entitled Presidents Who Have Known Me (1960 ed ., New York: Simon
& Schuster).

6 October 1948
Dear Swede:
I am not astonished that you find it impossible to come to the
party here on the 12th . It will be quite a formalized affair and the
crowd will make impossible any real contact with such old friends
as may come . From my viewpoint, I would far rather you make a
trip to New York at a less hectic period-in which case we could
really make some progress in settling the world's major problems .
Incidentally, I think I have told you there is always room for you
and Ibby in our house whenever you can come this way.
I tender my most sincere sympathy in the loss of your dog.
You do not have to describe to me what he meant to you, but I do
hope you will be successful in finding his brother to take his place .
While many people have tried to make something of my
friendship with George Allen, the fact is that it is just that and
nothing more. His wife and mine have been very close friends for
years, and I met George at the beginning of the war. Since that
time my contacts with him have brought me nothing but satisfaction; he has never attempted to dump any kind of problem,
political or otherwise, in my lap. He is one of those delightful
persons who has a rollicking attitude toward life and he himself is
always the butt of his innumerable stories and jokes. In addition to
all this, he has behind his clownish exterior a very shrewd clearthinking brain. If ever you meet him you will understand what I
mean.
You mention some columnist saying that George and I were
conniving for the 1952 nomination . He unquestionably got his lead
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on that one from a telecast made by George Allen during the
Democratic Convention . Some reporter asked him a question,
"Are you for Eisenhower for President?" Quick as a flash he
replied, "Of course, like everybody else I think he would make the
best President this country ever had, but I am for him in 1952 not
1948." That is the sole incident when I have heard George say
anything about 1952, and he was definitely kidding a reporter.
I had no idea that I was putting you on the spot in my answer
to your query about a story on our youthful days in Abilene. To
correct that error, I simply give you carte blanche to quote me as
you please on that subject-if you want to tell your publisher that I
violently object, go right ahead. On the other hand, if someone is
going to write that kind of a story I secretly would rather have you
do it than anyone else. I still fail to see, however, how any great
amount of interest could be engendered in a story of the commonplace happenings involving a bunch of boys in a small western
town of forty-five years ago.
My love to the family and, as always, warmest regards to
yourself,
Sincerely,
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1949

The National Security Act of 1947, which had effected a partial
unification of the armed services, did little to diminish interservice
rivalry. Indeed, the battles of the late 1940s were among the
bitterest in service history. At stake was which branch would take
the lead in implementing the nation ' s emerging nuclear weapons
strategy. The navy ' s hope rested with a new class of "super
carriers" which would be capable of handling B-29 bombers
carrying atomic bombs . The air force, on the other hand, countered
with the new long-range B-36 bomber. Secretary of Defense Louis
Johnson' s April 1949 decision to halt construction of the "super
carrier" USS United States prompted the resignation of Secretary of
the Navy John L. Sullivan and led to an angry attack on the
administration by high-ranking naval officers.

27 April 1949
Dear Swede:
Your splendid letter reached me while I was in Key West and I
still was very miserable from a queer sort of digestive or stomach
disorder. In the last two or three weeks I have improved markedly.
For the past two weeks Mamie has been with me here at the
Augusta National Golf Club and I have been puttering around
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with a bit of golf every day. I expect to be down here for another
week as a minimum.
I have not your letter with me for the moment and, consequently, cannot discuss intelligently the various and interesting
points you raised-however, I do recall your expression of fear that
I should not appreciate the true value of the carrier. I am quite
certain that no one has a greater respect for the carrier task force,
under conditions suited to its use, than I do . Moreover, I believe it
is one of the finest weapons that we can maintain in our Arsenal of
Defense because of the great flexibility permitted in its use during
the early days of an emergency when we know that everything is
going to be different from what we had previously anticipated. I
would be among the last people in the world to consent, in these
days and times, to the elimination of the carrier from the U.S.
Navy. I believe that most people hold similar views although there
seems to be vast differences of opinion concerning the types and
numbers of carriers that we should attempt to maintain in time of
peace . There is, as you know, a tremendous argument going on
about the wisdom of building the so-called Super-Carrier. I certainly do not pretend to know the answer to this one.
The great difficulty comes about through the tendency of each
Service to measure its importance to the country in terms of the
size of its current budget. The struggle for the lion's share of the
defense dollar is never ended-it is conducted relentlessly and
endlessly, in the Halls of Congress, in the public press and in interService argument and conferences. All of these arguments carry
great air of authenticity because of the fact that a democracy will
always have an obvious deficit in the desirable strength of its
security establishment. But since a democracy must always retain a
waiting, strategically defensive, attitude it is mandatory that some
middle line be determined between desirable strength and unbearable cost. Since, therefore, each Service always will have less
strength than it considers necessary, it can always develop plausible, and sometimes bitter, argument for greater and greater
appropriations. What we must do is to forget and abandon this
type of approach. We must put our consolidated professional
brains to the job of determining the general character of the
defense establishment when needed and these same professionals
should logically reach conclusions as to proper priorities in producing such defensive strength under limited budgets. Stated in a
crude and incomplete way, this is the problem of today.
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Frankly, I have found many of our younger officers showing
greater appreciation of these facts than I have discovered among
our seniors. I do not despair of the future because I believe the
younger generation has more sense than ours has so far displayed .
But I must say that the current task of getting every one to
approach these questions from the single viewpoint of the country's good-and without unreasonable prejudice or bias in favor of
some particular theory or weapon is truly difficult. For this
situation I blame no one, nor any particular service-at least I
attach to no one else any more fault than I do to myself, but I am
quite certain that unless we rapidly arrive at some sensible solution
of this problem we are going to damage the country financially and
without adding to its defensive strength .
The subject is no longer discussed, in Washington, in terms
other than those of controversy. If someone expresses doubt as to
the great effectiveness of the B-36, then he is instantly "anti-Air";
if someone else sees weakness in the theory of employing a supercarrier or mildly objects to the Navy' s developing a land Army, in
time of war, of 600,000 Marines (which it did in World War II), then
he is called " anti-Navy."
All this distresses me greatly. I have been very proud of
membership in the Armed Services and have felt that, jointly, they
provided to the country the greatest body of honest, selfless,
intelligent public servants that could be found anywhere. Consequently, it hurts me to see a public impression growing up that
these men do nothing except to quarrel and fight among themselves for access to the taxpayers ' pocketbook. Most of the time
and in most problems they work together beautifully and are in
complete accord. Such things do not, however, make "news" ;
seemingly, only the quarrel can do this. Consequently, our Armed
Services and their military leaders are getting a bad name, most of
which is undeserved, but for which there is, unfortunately, some
foundation .
I did not mean to grow so garrulous this morning.
Give my love to Ibby and the children, and of course, warm
regards to yourself. In all this Mamie joins me enthusiastically.
As ever,
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The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 increased the
authority of the secretary of defense and further reduced the
autonomy of the individual services. The angry debate over the
naval budget and over plans for the supercarrier continued unabated, however. Swede, of course, took the navy's side, referring
to Louis Johnson, the new secretary of defense, as a " bozo" with
an "anti-Navy bias ."

12 August 1949
Dear Swede:
Since you have called my attention to the point, I now realize
that I do answer your letters far more promptly than I do those that
reach me from most other people . The reason-from my viewpoint-is a simple one . Yours are interesting, and the others
usually fall into one of three categories . The first category comprises requests of various kinds for help . Sometimes this is merely
money begging, more often it is a request that I use some fancy
"influence" for everything from obtaining scarce theater tickets to
obtaining civil service positions in our occupation forces .
The second category is made up of advice, usually from
strangers, and its purpose is to tell me what my duty is and what I
am to do about it. Like the first category, the subject matter of this
covers a very wide range.
The third category involves invitations to dinners, to conventions, to university ceremonies, to luncheons, dinners, breakfasts-it would be impossible to indicate the scope if I would fill up
this page with words. Only a few others-indeed a very very fewwrite to me as you do, merely as a friend who seems to get some
kick out of receiving my answers .
Of course I was tremendously intrigued to have your reaction
on "unification." Right now I am a member of a Board which has
been meeting here in Denver for the last two days . It was
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appointed by the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) [James V. Forrestal, who resigned in early 1949 and committed suicide a few
months later] to examine the entire subject of Academy education
in the three Services with particular emphasis on the possibility of
using these years of education to promote ultimate unification .
I don't know when I have undertaken anything (even though I
went on this Board with extreme reluctance) that has given me so
much encouragement in the pursuit of real and sensible progress.
In the first place, the Board is made up of a very fine group of
educators. Associated with it are a number of Panels each of
which, in turn, comprises a group of outstanding men. All of these
people have given earnest and effective attention to the problems
at hand.
You will be interested to know that the education records of
West Point and Annapolis have received the highest praise from
this entire group, although it is clear that some of these people
entered upon their examination with preconceived ideas that they
would find nothing except the things to criticize. Comparative
records established in many colleges through examination upon
graduation show that the Academies stand exceedingly high.
About the only real criticism voiced by this group of educators was
that little was to be found in the curricula and methods at West
Point and Annapolis that encouraged free-thinking and selfconfidence.
Far more encouraging to me however, than these pleasing
reports upon two institutions that so deeply involve our sentiments, was the obvious interest taken by all my associates in
analyzing the need for teamwork among the Services and in their
development of ideas as to how this could be secured. Every
conceivable kind of idea was discussed and a wide variety of viewpoints was brought to bear. However, the whole thing was done in
an atmosphere of friendliness and I am quite sure that every
participant believed that much has been accomplished. This Board
and its Panels have been meeting intermittently for some months
and I am certain that out of its work is going to come much that is
good. Incidentally, I met for the first time, Admiral [Raymond A.]
Spruance. Frankly I think he is one of the finest Naval officers I
have ever met. He is quiet, modest, and self-confident without
being either dominus or patronizing. I like him extremely and wish
I could have had more time with him.
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Incidentally, and before I drop completely the subject of this
recent Board, the studies reveal that the curriculum at West Point is
somewhat more crowded and intensive and requires a greater
number of hours of work than at Annapolis. Some years ago I
think the reverse was true, and I thank the Lord that I went
through the Academy when they were not so much engaged in the
cramming business. Frankly I honestly believe it far easier if we do
not place too much dependence in mere knowledge-in other
words, I do not believe too much in cramming.
With respect to the carrier, I do not follow your argument
about the so called "super ship." If an Air Force bomber cannot
penetrate into the heart-land, then how is this going to be done by
a bomber flying off a super carrier? Each will admittedly have to fly
far beyond the range limit of fighter planes. Consequently, while I
hold to my opinion that a certain number of so called "freak"
["fleet"] carriers can be a most favorable element in our defensive
structure, I do not see how we can give the super carrier a
sufficiently high place in our priorities that we can afford to build
them in an era when we are going to face smaller and smaller
appropriations. Please do not for one moment interpret my words
to mean that I would not like to see a vast amount of this practical
experimentation-provided the Nation could afford it. Finally,
there must however be a line drawn between the requirements of
economy on one side, and hope for improvement in our defense
establishment on the other.
In this whole discussion about unification there has developed
a lot of froth and fuming, and a lot of heat, much of which was
completely unjustified . No one has really plugged for a lop-sided
single arm of defense organization. No one has advocated any "all
the eggs in one basket" type of philosophy. These expressions and
ideas are first used, in my opinion, by someone who argues hotly
for a particular detail and soon there develops an attempt to smear
each side of the argument, by the other, by all types of extravagant
expressions and which, while he may develop some public or even
Congressional support, are usually proof of nothing more than the
mental poverty of their originators. In all this no one party has
been soley guilty, just as no one has been completely innocent. It
seems to me that lately there has been a very great decrease in this
type of thing and I honestly believe that notable progress already
made in unification is not only indicative of a greater application of
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good sense and less temper, but implies also a still greater progress
for the future.
Louis Johnson may make mistakes, but I believe he is thoroughly and completely determined to turn in the finest possible
performance that he can. You say he has an "anti-Navy" slant, but
I doubt such a generalization is completely accurate . I know that he
came into his present job with the feeling that our present Navy
could scarcely be justified on the basis of the naval strength of any
potential enemy particularly when it is clear that any other navy
worthy of the name belongs to a traditional ally. On the other hand
he, like everybody else, had and has a healthy respect for hostile
submarines and he was very anxious that the Navy consolidate all
resources and brains in the field of anti-submarine warfare. I have
never found Secretary Johnson opposing anything for the Navy
that appeared clearly needful in the combating of the submarine
for the complete control of the seas. I know that in some instances
he has approved measures and forces that he considered overgenerous for these purposes. He, like most others, clearly recognizes that the greatest point of argument between the Navy and
Air Force is the extent to which we should plan a Navy to take part
in bombing operations against inland targets and where the effect
upon the control of the seas is necessarily, more or less, indirect.
There are of course dozens of lesser problems and a myriad of
details on which arguments develop, but fundamentally all of
them finally come back to the one basic question.
One of the lesser problems you have already mentioned-the
mission, strength and armament of the Marines. For example, all
airplanes fly off a land base or a floating base; why then must we
have a third Air Force when we already have one each for the
floating and the land bases? Until World War I the Marines were
never used in a formation as large as a brigade . The question
naturally arises; why has it become suddenly necessary to develop
a Marine force of hundreds of thousands in war and carry, in time
of peace, the great financial burden of preparing for such a war
time force?
Another item; for many years, starting first in 1930, I have
been one of those in the Army who insisted on getting rid of oceangoing Transport Services. During all the years that I was a junior
officer I was slapped down on this argument by my superiors.
Finally I became Chief of Staff and I asked Admiral Nimitz whether
he would take over the whole organization since I was now in a
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position to do something. I was astonished to find that the Navy
did not want it because they thought that the Army was trying to
make a "service organization" out of the Navy. At the same time I
was opposed by most of my own people, particularly by those
holding high positions in our "Transport Service," but the real
block at that time was the Navy didn't want it. Now I note that
since Louis Johnson has gone into office that this move has been
made. I cannot say who is completely right because only experience will show whether we have greater efficiency with less costs
and whether the needs of all Services in any possible emergency
will be better fulfilled, but the point is that at last someone is in a
position to make a decision and to make it stick.
Possibly in my enthusiasm in the young officer I may have
over-stated my case. I do not mean to say that a young officer
twenty years from now will be as much of a fuddy-duddy as I am,
or as some of those who twenty years ago appeared to me to be
blocking all progress. What I was really trying to emphasize was
that the Army and Navy, by their nature, can fall into the
administrative hands of oldsters. Maybe I could express my
thought a little better by saying that for every General or flag officer
over fifty-five I should really like to see one not over thirty-five. Of
course I realize that such a statement is on the cock-eyed side. The
applicable actuarial data would finally defeat this unless every once
in awhile you should find one of these high ranking officers when
he was about forty years old. Unfortunately the calendar will not
stand still when we find a brilliant fellow when he is thirty or forty.
You mentioned in your letter that one of your friends kidded
you about me being back in politics-for me you can say that I
consider him some kind of a "blankety-blank-blank, " for if he can
show for once that I have been in politics, he has no right to use the
word politics. Moreover, you are most assuredly right that nothing
has happened that has changed the convictions I expressed a
couple of years ago. You may be quite sure that if anything ever
occurs that appears so cataclysmic as to cause me to change in this
regard you will be one of the first to know it. So in the absence of
such unforeseen and catastrophical development you just go right
ahead on the line you are pursuing.
It was nice to have the news of your daughter and her new
husband. I have heard much about Spike Fahrion. All of it good .
Incidentally, it is astonishing how many of your old friends and
shipmates I have run into. Most of them seem to know that you
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Eisenhower at Camp David, Maryland, 1 August 1954 (United States
Navy photograph, courtesy of Dwight D. Eisenhower Library).

and I have been life-long friends and I have been most pleased by
the fact that I can give them news of you.
One last word, because of your question about :·_1y painting, it
is rank hypocrisy to allow what I do to go under such an exalted
name, as I am a deliberate dauber. It is easy enough to do if you are
fortunate enough to have a place to permit your easel, paint and
wet canvas to stand. It becomes a little difficult when you must
clear them away after each ten minute tour at the canvas. Personally, I was almost fired because of my deficiency at drawing at West
Point and I have nothing whatsoever of artistic talents. I simply get
a bang out of working with colors and occasionally one of my
efforts comes out with sufficient appeal about it to entice some of
my friends to steal it and carry it away. Many others find their way
to the waste paper basket. If you are interested I would be pleased
to tell you how I got started, the materials I use and so on . Most of
mine are done between eleven and twelve-thirty at night, but I can
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guarantee you that if you ever take it up it will consume so many of
your vertical hours that you will wonder how they have ever
slipped away from you.
Marnie and I send love to you and your nice family. We are still
looking forward to the day you can visit us in New York.
Cordially,

Further reductions in the navy's budget, together with the
cancellation of the supercarrier, eventually led to the so-called
revolt of the admirals, to an acrimonious congressional hearing,
and to the dismissal of Adm. Louis E. Denfeld, the chief of naval
operations.

17 November 1949
Dear Swede:
Your letter of the 2nd seemed to me to be so full of misinterpretations of what I thought I had said to you in the past that I
was bewildered-until I had the idea of sending for a copy of the
letter I wrote to you from Denver. Never again am I going to write
a letter that must be dispatched under the "dictated but not read"
category. To illustrate how badly garbled that letter was I use only
one example: In one place where I said "fleet carriers" I found the
worthy sergeant transformed it into "freak carriers."
Consequently, rather than review the entire file of correspondence, I think that I shall merely, on the basis of your latest
communication, set down a few of my opinions or convictions and
hereafter use this effort as the "alpha" of my running essay effort,
of which, of course, you will be the entire reading public.
To deal first with the most important point of all, I very much
doubt that Mamie and I shall get to the Army-Navy game. We have
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just returned from a four day visit to Annapolis and that represents
about all the time we have to spare before we take off for Texas on
the last day of the month for a two weeks' stay. However, it is
remotely possible that, even at the very last instant, we may find it
possible to go .
Because there are a number of subjects, not all of them related,
which I would like to mention in this letter, I am going to do so
rather briefly. I hope that this will not mean to you that I am
arbitrary about any of them. There are few-maybe none-concerning which I would not quickly change my opinion if someone
should present to me an argument that struck me as applicable and
convincing.
First-I have long advocated the peacetime maintenance and
operation of a number of so-called "fleet carriers ." The convincing
reason for doing so is, to my mind, the flexibility of this particular
weapon . It should be useful in almost any corner of the globe and
since every war starts under unforeseen circumstances, it strikes
me as good insurance to have something that could be used, under
current conditions of warfare, anytime and, with obvious limitations with respect to land masses, anywhere .
Having said this much, the question becomes, in a limited
budget, how many of these can we afford to keep in action during
years of peace? This is admittedly a very difficult question, and the
Navy opinion should be more influential than that of any other
professional service. Nevertheless, all Services are forced into the
problem because the matter finally becomes one of dipping ten
glasses of water out of a six-glass bucket. We must never lose sight
of the fact than an over-riding priority for a reasonable number of
combat units does not necessarily mean an indefinite or additional
number of these same units should take priority over all other
classes of weapons and engines of war.
It was on questions such as this that the recent "war" broke
out in Washington, and I tell you frankly that I was discouraged
and saddened by the whole business. Because of the pressure of
time I cannot expand too greatly upon this subject. But I cannot
help but feel some resentment toward those who started this open
warfare, with its resultant loss of confidence among great sections
of our people in the judgment, selflessness, and integrity of their
military leaders.
With respect to the super-carrier I think that in some one of my
letters I must have expressed my views on this particular subject. I
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agree with you that, if we are down to the basic question of
survival in a force-driven world, and if we are efficiently and
effectively using every dollar that the Congress gives for security
purposes, then considerations of economy cannot validly be advanced against defense requirements. In attempting to assist Mr.
Forrestal (and later Mr. Johnson) I have studied dozens of specific
projects for saving money without hurting or diminishing our
combat forces. It is possible that every answer I have received has
been completely logical and correct. At least they all-(with only
occasional minor exceptions)-argue that there is no possibility of
saving in overhead, administrative, and routine costs without
damaging directly and seriously our combat forces . I could discuss
various aspects of this with you by the hour-here I can say only
that I believe, with Mr. Johnson, that if we really put our hearts
into the job, both by individual Service and by unified effort, that
we can save millions. Nevertheless, I doubt that we could save, by
these methods, enough money to build a super-carrier and at the
same time procure all those other valuable items that probably
have, in the minds of most, equal or greater priority than the
super-carrier. Strangely enough, after many witnesses in the
recent investigation had deprecated and belittled the effects of
strategic bombing, they-the same witnesses-urged the need for
the super-carrier and development of the long range bombing
planes that would fly off its decks . It seems to me that there are
obvious internal contradictions in any such argument. Moreover, if
anyone ever convinces me that a "super-carrier" is essential to the
control of the seas, I'll be for that, too!!
I think that you will find my past letters full of expressions
exhibiting concern for "American control of the seas ." Nobody
will fight harder and longer for a Navy adequate to perform this
function than I will. Moreover, I think that I shall probably be as
liberal as most in my readiness to agree that numbers of missions
become part of the function of controlling the sea that do not
confine themselves to the mere attack of Naval targets. I can
see that many operations against ports, submarine installations,
coastal communication centers and the like, while actually conducted over the land, are designed for direct assistance in controlling the seas . But when the relationship between the specific attack
and the control of the seas becomes so tenuous, and the support so
indirect, that the Navy assumes responsibility for attacking targets
in the very heart of the enemy homeland, then I can say that we
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have either gone far afield in the allocation of tasks or (and this is
always possible) our idea of coordination among the three Services
on the basis of mutually supporting missions is a completely false
one.
If we adhere to current doctrine and are not ready to meet each
other on a basis of mutual confidence and trust, I could understand
an argument that might be advanced by the Air Corps about as
follows: " Give the Navy everything it needs to control the seas:
ships, guns, Marines, airplanes, and let the Navy organize those as
it pleases . But give the Air Forces everything they need to bomb
the enemy strong points: industrial centers, transportation systems, etc., etc. If this means that one or more of the Air Forces'
landing fields should be mobile, and maintained on the sea, then
also give the Navy enough services to protect our field. In other
words, the "super-carrier" would belong, under this argument, to
the Air Forces!
Personally, I am very strong for the Navy, but I venture to
doubt its effectiveness in bombing the Victoria Falls. This attitude,
on my part, shows an even greater concern for the primary Navy
mission, control of the seas, than is exhibited by those who want
the Navy to do everything from pole to pole . At least, I think I have
demonstrated that in the arguments that develop when all of these
serious questions are dragged out before the public and each
debater attempts to capture the interest and the vote of the public,
there is no limit to the potential distortion, confusion, and emotional heat in which these subjects will be surrounded.
I was somewhat astonished to read your reservations about
[Adm. Forrest P.] Sherman. Whenever, in previous letters, you
have mentioned him, it has always been in glowing terms.
Certainly your good opinion has had considerable influence in the
development of my own. For my part I have, as yet, found no
reason for any change. When Sherman was representing the Navy
in the writing of the unification law two years ago he was an
extraordinarily able and tireless advocate of the Navy position. I
have never seen any slightest swerving in his belief in the Navy's
mission and in naval efficiency, loyalty, and integrity. While no one
asked me for recommendations concerning the identify of a new
CNO [chief of naval operations], it is quite true that I have
frequently expressed quite favorable opinions about Sherman, in
the presence both of my superiors and of others. It is always
possible that these may have swayed some others, including those
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in authority. If this should, by chance be true, I assure you that it
was your expressed opinions as well as my own beliefs that were
responsible for my statements.
Only the other day I had a long talk with Sherman at
Annapolis. I took at least ten minutes to express to him your
sentiments of respect, admiration, and liking. I also told him of my
hope that he would someday have an opportunity to drop by
Chapel Hill and talk to you, because I thought any man in the
Service today would profit from listening to the results of your
study, reflection and experience. If I have erred as seriously as your
letter now indicates, I am in a hell of a spot. (However, don't let it
worry you. I have been in much worse ones and gotten out of them
safely.)
Actually, there were a dozen other subjects I was going to take
up in this letter. I now find that everytime I start talking about
these matters at all, my anxiety to be completely fair and square
leads me into so many divergent directions that it is impossible to
discuss them adequately in a letter. Someday we simply must get
together for a couple of days of undisturbed conversation.
Give my love to Ibby and the girls.
As ever,

Eisenhower replied to a Christmas card from Swede in a short
note dated 21 December 1949, then returned to the exchange over
Admiral Sherman the following day.

22 December 1949
Dear Swede:
Apparently my most recent letter to you tended to excite you a
bit. I hope it did not raise your blood pressure beyond the blow-off
point.
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I think that now I have a clear picture of your estimate of
Sherman. While it is true that this estimate is somewhat different
from what I thought it was, some months ago, yet my own
acquaintanceship with the man, added to what I thought, originally, was your opinion, gave me a composite reading that was not
greatly different from the one you now present. No harm has been
done.
Churning around in the back of my mind is the impression
that I may have already answered your letter on this point. If I
have, just take this repetition as another indication of approaching
senility, and throw the thing in the wastebasket. At least, nothing
will be hurt if I send you, even for the second time, very best
wishes from Marnie and me for a fine Christmas and a 1950
crowded with good things for all the Hazlett family.
Cordially,
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1950

By the time he wrote this letter, and despite claims to the
contrary, Eisenhower had begun to sound more and more like a
candidate. He entertained a steady stream of visitors, including
New York's Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the unsuccessful Republican candidate for the presidency in 1948, all of whom urged him
to run. And though he continued to disavow political ambitions,
both publicly and in private, his speeches and correspondence
took on an increasingly conservative and ideological tone as he
inveighed against "statism" and called for a return to the " middle
way."

24 February 1950
Dear Swede:
Naturally, I cannot challenge your assertion that I had to take
the red ink, but I do repudiate your additional postulate that I had
to " like" it. To prove my point I am taking advantage of your
approaching anniversary (or its approximation, in view of the leap
year uniqueness of your birthdate) to send you a new typewriter
ribbon. If on arrival, it appears to be packaged in a way that you do
not like, I hope that you will find it possible to exchange for one
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you really want.lll My additional hope is that, in black print, I shall
occasionally get a letter that is as interesting and completely
intriguing as your latest one to me.
In its reading, it took me half of the first page to decide that
you had not gone a bit balmy. This, because of the fact that I had
not previously seen the story about the "best dressed men"; I had
not even heard of it. My reaction is that some people must not have
a hell of a lot to do if they have time to devote themselves to such
drivel. My clothes are made by a Jewish friend of mine who has
been in the men' s tailoring business all his life. He has one or two
tailors who make clothing on the "special order" basis. Since my
friend keeps my measurements on hand, he comes up here with a
new suit every several months, usually of a cloth and cut of his
own choosing. So far as my own intervention in such matters is
concerned, one of Mamie's chief causes of complaint is that I will
not even buy a pair of socks for myself. She keeps in constant
touch with my friend [Sarg. John] Moanny (a Negro who has lived
with me since the very first days of the war) in order that she can
keep me stocked with the necessaries of decent existence. This
constitutes my entire knowledge of my own sartorial requirements
and equipment.
Gordon Gray strikes me as being a citizen of fine character and
sensibilities.f 2 1 He is endowed with good judgment and a likeable
personality. I do not suppose that you would class him as an
intellectual giant, but such people are usually uncomfortable
characters to have around anyway. I understand that he is a
wealthy individual-which won't be any handicap in the running
of a modern university. I predict that he will eventually achieve a
high place in the affections of the University family in Chapel Hill,
including the faculty portion.
Like you, I was somewhat astonished that Milton finally made

1. Swede had typed his letter of February 19 with a red ribbon on his " ancie nt
Corona ." The package that Eisenhower refers to was a new Royal typewriter.
2. Gray, whose famil y held a controlling interest in th e R. J. Rey nolds Tobacco
Co mpany, had held a number of positions in the Truman admini stration , including
that of secretary of the arm y, and had rece ntly been appointed president of the
University of North Carolina .
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up his mind to leave Kansas State.(31 He was well situated there
and his standing with the Regents and the Legislature was well
exemplified when his most recent budget was not only approved
in detail but, in certain important particulars, was increased over
the amounts he requested. Recently the authorities completely
remodeled his house, to include full air conditioning-something
that is really more than a convenience in Kansas summers, as you
well know. His state-wide standing was comparable and he was in
constant demand in all the larger centers as a speaker and a
distinguished guest. Moreover, he has been offered the Presidency
of several other universities, including one or two quite large ones
where pay and perquisites far exceeded what he was getting at
Kansas State. Some of these he refused to consider for a single
moment because of what he deemed to be unsatisfactory academic
standards.
In my opinion, the decisive factors in finally taking him to
Pennsylvania State were purely personal. First, he has gotten to
the point where the doctors urge upon him some regular outdoor
recreation and Kansas offers little or none of this in the only thing
he really likes-fresh water fishing. Pennsylvania's streams and
lakes are numerous, and most of them provide exactly the kind of
outdoor sport that he loves. On top of this is the fact that his wife's
parents live in Washington, D.C. One of our brothers lives near
Pittsburgh and so, by coming East, both sides of the family tend to
find greater family companionship than they do in the West. You
must realize that, since our father and mother died, there remains
in Kansas among our close relatives only [my brother] Roy's
widow and one of her daughters. Of course, the greatly increased
pay and emoluments that go with the presidency of Penn State can
scarcely be considered as drawbacks.
I have read some of the same comments that you have
concerning my alleged dissatisfaction with my present position!
They are merely examples of distortion and inaccuracy. It is true
that in attempting, at times, to explain to my friends the difficulties

3. Milton Eisenhower, Ike's youngest brother, had served in a variety of
governmental posts before becoming president of Kansas State University in 1943.
In 1950 he assumed the presidency of Pennsylvania State University. In 1956 he
became president of Johns Hopkins, a post that he held until his retirement in 1967.
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of my present life, I have dwelt upon the conflicts that arise
between the details of university administration, unusually persistent adhesions from a past life, and, finally, the demands that
arise out of my earnest effort to be of some help to people who are
struggling manfully to support the essentials of the American way
of life. Actually, I believe that if a man were able to give his full or
nearly full attention to such a job as this, he would find it
completely absorbing. On a campus like Columbia's, the greatest
opportunity is that of meeting constantly with fine minds, in every
kind of discipline . Because I love to partake in or, at least, to listen
to discussions on such subjects as economics, history, contemporary civilization, some branches of natural and physical science,
public health and engineering, you can see that living with a
distinguished faculty gives to me many wonderful hours that I
could never have in any other environment. Sometimes, however,
my loyalties to several different kinds of purposes lead me into a
confusing, not to say almost nerve-wearing, kind of living. At such
times, just as anyone else would do, I unquestionably express
myself in tones of irritation and resentment, and I have no doubt
that a chance listener could interpret some of these expressions as
irritation with my "apparently" sole preoccupation-that of administering the affairs of this great University. Actually, such
outbursts (which, of course, are nothing but a manifestation of a
soldier's right to grouse) are directed at myself for allowing
confusion and uncertainty to arise where system and serenity
should prevail. I hope you can make out what I am getting at but,
in any event, I do assure you that, if I were convinced that I had
made a mistake in coming to Columbia, I am not so stupid as to fail
to recognize the instant and obvious cure. As long as I am here,
you can believe that I am not only interested in the task, but I still
believe it to offer a way in which I may render some service to the
public at large.
With respect to my political difficulties, it is a curious fact that,
while little mention of them is made nowadays in the public press,
I am by no means free of the problem . A quite steady stream of
visitors, to say nothing of correspondence, reaches me under one
excuse or another, and with the frequent consequence of long
political discussion that rarely fails to drag me, as an individual,
into future speculation . I have heard much of my "clear duty" and
have learned to answer this by inquiring as to the comparable duty
of my caller. It is astonishing how frequently the conversation can
71

instantly be turned, by this query, into other channels . However,
the attempt sometimes backfires, particularly when I learn that an
individual has devoted time and effort and a great portion of his
substance to the attempt to counteract government by bureaucracy
and the discernible drift toward statism. Since I abhor these two
things, you can see that occasionally I get myself into a conversational morass.
Fortunately, these incidents are not of great frequency, but on
the other side of the picture, they usually involve people of
prominence, who, therefore, cannot be disregarded. In some
instances, 1 have the utmost respect for their expressed convictions. Some are businessmen, some are avowed politicians, some
seem to be only public-spirited citizens and some can be considered no less than statesmen. In any case, I am merely trying to let
you see that the problem is not entirely a thing of the past. It often
plagues me at present and some people seem to think it has a
future. This last, at least, I do not admit.
I do not recall the exact terms in which I previously expressed
to you my opinion of Louis Johnson. I am quite sure, however, that
those terms have never included the word "profound." I am
convinced he is honest but he is, of course, avowedly a politician
and he is impulsive. These last two factors lead him to believe that
the public likes rapid, even spectacular, decisions . Couple this
attitude with a conviction that we had better economize or we are
going to lose the things that are of the greatest value to us, and I
think it is not too difficult to understand his general motivation.
You will recall that, for a number of weeks after Mr. Johnson
first took office, he insisted upon my remaining rather regularly in
Washington to consult with him and with other responsible
officials of the Security Establishment. In recent months, he has
not continued this insistence. While I am obviously welcome in his
office, he no longer seems to sense the need he once expressed
constantly and urgently. This change, I have no doubt, comes
about because of increased confidence on his own part as well as a
possible feeling that I do not fit into a situation which, after allfrom his viewpoint-is political and partisan as well as professional
and national. Moreover, he has Bradley as Chairman of the JCS
and cannot, by any means, ignore his position and counsel. I know
that you do not consider him an ideal public servant in his present
post; but will you name any individual-who could be considered
reasonably available-that you would think ideal?
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I admire and like Spike Fahrion so it is not difficult for me to go
along with a great portion of the Service quarrel analysis that he
sent to you. I must remark, however, that it is almost impossible
for any Service person to achieve a completely objective and
disinterested viewpoint toward the development and incidents of
that whole unfortunate episode. Actually, I think that you and I
could probably come as close to achieving this attitude as could
anyone; you, for the reason that you are naturally fair and just by
temperament and were removed from the scene both geographically and functionally, while I, because of my wartime post and
the way in which I was used, while in Washington, by the
Commander in Chief. You, of course, saw nothing but a rather
amusing and even slightly ridiculous aspect to the last two
sentences of Spike's presentation. [Fahrion had closed his analysis
of the "revolt of the admirals" by remarking that "someone
facetiously said last night that the solution to the whole problem
was to have the Army join the Marines, and the Air Force the
Naval Air; then make Johnson SecNav and the whole problem of
unification would be solved. Not so farfetched at that, when you
consider we have been running a unified show for many years."]
Yet to such people as Bradley and [Air Force Chief of Staff Gen.
Hoyt S.] Vandenberg, those two sentences, which for many
months have been bandied about Washington's cocktail lounges,
presented something more than mere cause for a chuckle. They
were acutely aware of the fact that the proposition was more than
once suggested with some seriousness, at one time, apparently,
with deadly earnestness . So far as I am concerned, I have always
felt that if we could see anything logical in turning the whole job
over to one Service I would be very glad to have the others bow out
of the whole picture, no matter which ones might be involved.
But I have earnestly supported the proposition that each
Service has an indispensable role in the provision of reasonable
national security and that, if it will only perform that role adequately, it will have little time to devote to invasion of the missions
of others. I think the sad part of the whole business is that each
Service is seemingly incapable of confining itself to its own obvious
tasks, but rather feels a compulsion-in order that it may demonstrate its own importance and indispensability-to assert a competency in the performance of other Security tasks which it does not
and should not possess .
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You may have read my testimony before the Investigating
Committee or, if not, you may have seen the recent article, in U.S.
News and World Report, in which I expressed my views on these
points. Certainly I believe that there is in each Service the brains to
do the job right if only each can become respectful of the importance of
its own task and does not feel it necessary to try to grab off the jobs
of others .
So far as Mr. Johnson's economy measures are concerned,
there is a very long story involved. I do know that he has asserted a
hope of saving money without hurting combat strength-and after
many, many years in Washington, both in subordinate and in
higher positions of authority and responsibility, I must say that I
know of no way of forcing the Services to cut administrative and
overhead cost to the bone except by arbitrary action. This does not
mean that I would support every move that Mr. Johnson has
made, although I understand that he has several times referred to
his current proposals as the "Eisenhower Budget." Last spring
when I was in Washington, my job was to propose a division of the
available money, under varying assumptions as to quantity, so as
to carry out as nearly as we possibly could the essentials of the
agreed upon strategic plan. This says a very great deal in a
relatively short sentence. Particularly, it says a lot in the way of
difficult problems. My experiences in the attempt to achieve some
success are far too long and involved for me to attempt to describe
them in anything less than a full Volume. But I would be quite
ready to wager that, if I could send to you the full record of all of
the efforts that were made, of all the different types of approaches
that were used, and could show you the responses received from
each of the Services, you would agree that the answers recommended were about as logical and as nearly correct as any
individual could make them. Such a wager I would make with
some confidence because of the fact that I kept pounding away
until the actual percentages of the total budget-that had to be
allocated on my judgment (that is, outside the roughly agreed
upon conclusions of all three Services)-were extremely small.
While I am relying upon a weakening memory, I am quite certain
that, even in the smallest of the several budgets on which we
worked, the percentage could not have been more than three or, at
the very maximum, four. So you will see that from my viewpoint
the heat and intensity that characterized the quarrel were un74

justified and evidenced to me a flagrant failure to place national
convictions and requirements above those of Service.
I realize that I have never before attempted to explain some of
these things to you in such detail . I would probably be even more
explicit in this particular exposition except for the obvious requirements of secrecy in all of the deliberations and functioning of the
Chiefs of Staff and of their relationships with their civilian superiors. But I should like you to believe that there are many sides to
this whole argument and it has been a weary battle to get men to
forget self and to turn their minds to the critical situation in the
world and to think of nothing else. It is because I believe that
Sherman possesses a sensitive and logical concern for the national
picture, as opposed to any more narrow one, that I spoke so
warmly of his appointment. He has, so far as I know, both the
ability to do the job and the will to do it properly. Each of these
qualifications is extraordinarily important in this day and time.
Along with a letter of such length must come my profound
apology, but I just felt today like attempting to give you a fuller
explanation of some of the events of the past, and of which I have
some knowledge, than I have given you before.
As a sort of postscript to the above, I must tell you that I agree
with your opinion that no personal aide should be with any
General too long. For this reason, as much as I appreciate his
services and as grateful as I am to him, I have constantly urged my
present aide to transfer to other duties. Moreover, no one has ever
been on my personal staff for one single second except by his own
preference. The only thing that I have not done is to insist upon a
transfer against the expressed desire of the individual concerned. I
must remark also that where you recalled the length of my service
with MacArthur at 5 years, you should have used the figure "9."
As ever,

Capt. John G . Crommelin, Jr. , had been a principal figure in
the "revolt of the admirals" during the fall of 1949 and was
subsequently disciplined for his role in the affair. He continued to
attack the administration, however, and became increasingly ac75

tive in right-wing politics . In 1954 he would help lead a petition
drive on behalf of Sen . Joseph R. McCarthy. "That bozo should be
given the silent treatment," wrote Swede on 14 March 1950.

20 March 1950
Dear Swede:
Had I known that I could possibly have impressed you so
much with one miniature typewriter, I would have sent you one a
long time ago.
I am sorry to hear that you and Ibby have had this virus
pneumonia. Mamie's father had a siege of it when he was visiting
us this winter and I think it was only this new drug, aureomycin
(possibly that is nearly correct), which pulled him through . This
note brings my fervent hope that you both are well again .
I cannot recall the man from Abilene named [Walter] Alexander. Your story of the love life of his father left me a bit amazed; I
did not realize that we had an Abilenite who was so light-footed
and light-hearted as to jump out of one matrimonial venture in
order to get tangled up with a senorita. It must have been the
Naval influence!
I was interested to read your observations about Crommelin.
By the way, you may have seen an account of one incident that
occurred just after he reached San Francisco. (If I told you about
this in a former letter, just please skip it here .) He asked for a press
conference and talked rather wildly about a "Prussian General
Staff in the Pentagon ." Apparently failing to stir up comment as he
had hoped, he finally fired a gun which he hoped would be of
really big caliber. It was something about as follows: "I am
particularly disturbed that a man in uniform who is definitely a
candidate for the Presidency, but who will not announce his
allegiance to either political party, is free both to influence decisions within the Pentagon and to present his views to the Congress ." There was a bit more to the story, as reported to me by
Forrest Sherman, but that will give you some idea of the fantastic
lengths to which the man goes in order to attract attention. I think
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that you understand, as clearly as anyone else, that I have gone to
the Pentagon or to the Congress only when ordered or insistently
requested to do so . Moreover, I have constantly pled that we
should forget the quarrels of the past and, particularly, the attempt
to fix blame for unfortunate outbursts. I have constantly urged that
we turn our attention to the future on the basis of mutual cooperation
and understanding. Crommelin, I think, cannot fail to know this as
well as anybody else . But I think, also, that he has gotten so avid
for acclaim and headlines that he will say anything in order to
achieve that purpose .
With respect to the handling of the case, I must say that I feel
sorry for the Navy, particularly for Sherman. While it has been my
practice always to ignore this type of thing and so deny to the
offender the opportunity to appear as a martyr, yet there finally
comes a point where the very good name of the Navy (or any other
Service in which such an incident occurs) is involved. The country
expects its Armed Services to be models of discipline and deportment and the spectacle of successful insubordination is one to
create fear in the minds of the public that their traditions of service
and subordination to civilian authority are deteriorating. It seems
to me to be another case of "whether you do or whether you don't,
you are bound to regret it."
No one respects courage and gallantry in battle more than I
do. Goodness knows that I have had more reason than most
people to be eternally grateful that in a pinch a young American
exhibits an extraordinary disregard for the dangers of the battlefield. Nevertheless, I feel that we cannot, in succeeding years of
peace, constantly excuse, condone and ignore serious offenses
committed by individuals, whether civilian or military, merely
because their physical courage has been established beyond a
doubt.
These are merely observations-I have no exact knowledge of
any kind applying to this case, and my information is based
entirely on what the newspapers have said and what Forrest
Sherman has told me . Incidentally, Forrest called me to apologize
for what he called "an unwarranted attack on one of the Navy's
friends. " Personally, the whole thing bothers me not a whit; I
don't believe I have mentioned it to anyone but you. But I repeat
that my sympathy is with those who have to handle such disagreeable cases .
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With respect to young [Alvin] Wingfield, I will, on your
suggestion, always be glad to see him. However, he should be
careful to telephone or otherwise communicate with my office (Mr.
[Kevin] McCann, UNiversity 4-3200, Ext. 2773) well in advance of
the proposed visit so that we can find a free period and set up the
engagement.
Love to Ibby and, as always, warmest regards to you,
As ever,

War began in late June 1950, when North Korea invaded
South Korea and President Truman committed the United States
on the side of the South Koreans. Eisenhower strongly supported
the president's decision, though he was critical of the administration's failure to mobilize more rapidly. He was also more critical of
administration defense policies than he had been only a few
months earlier. By September, when he wrote this letter, the
fighting had temporarily stabilized along the " Pusan perimeter"
on the southern tip of the peninsula . Three days later General
MacArthur launched a daring amphibious landing at Inchon, some
two hundred miles behind enemy lines. United Nations forces
quickly rolled back the North Koreans and then pressed ahead,
determined to crush the North Korean army and unify the peninsula under American auspices . This action, which Eisenhower had
joined other American leaders in advocating, led to Chinese
intervention and to an expanded and prolonged war.

12 September 1950
Dear Swede:
This will probably be a very short letter but this does not mean
that I fail to appreciate every single paragraph and sentence of your
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fine missive of August 9th. Of course I am delighted that you liked
my "Silver" lecture. I worked like a dog on it, during the odd
moments of several weeks. Recently I have had to give another talk
and again I worked the same way. This latest one, which I
delivered on Labor Day, was even more difficult to prepare than
the long one that you read. This was because I wanted to say a very
great deal in twelve and one-half minutes. To undertake such a
chore without allowing the text to become nothing more than a
disjointed collection of empty platitudes and aphorisms is rather
difficult for an old soldier. During the last days of my ordeal of
preparation, I had a couple of friends come to visit me to help out. I
am certainly lucky in the friends I have. These two had to come
from a considerable distance, interrupting their own vacations, yet
they came just as if it were fun to do it.
It is slightly irritating to learn that your typewriter is showing
some defectiveness in operation. I remember when I told [Maj.
Robert L.] Schulz to procure one of them, I told him I wanted one
that was noted for its durability and for its general excellence in
operation. I hope you will telephone the man who delivered it to
you and give him instructions to get on the job with necessary
repairs .
The Korean situation seems to be in something of a stalemate
over the past several weeks . Most of us are puzzled by some of the
developments and certainly all of us are experiencing a definite
feeling of frustration . However, we should not fall into the
slovenly and easily acquired habit of just blaming others for all our
misfortunes . However, it seems quite clear that, in one particular,
the civilian authorities of our government must take a very
considerable share of blame. They have never been very seriously
impressed by professional insistence upon the permanent maintenance of a "task force" or as it is sometimes called, a "striking
force ." It has always been obvious that a democracy, even one as
rich as ours, could not maintain in peace the force in being that
could promptly and successfully meet any trouble that might arise
in any portion of the globe, particularly if such trouble should
occur simultaneoulsy in two or three places . But the existence of a
fine , properly balanced, effectively commanded and reasonably
strong task force would not only have a deterrent effect upon
potential enemies, but would give us a splendid "fire department"
basis on which to meet actual aggression .
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Beyond all this, however, we must recognize that we, in
America, have never liked to face up to the problem arising out of
the conflicting considerations of national security on the one hand
and economic and financial solvency on the other. We have always
felt a long ways removed from any potential and powerful enemy.
Our experience has given us the feeling that we have available a
cushion of space that would provide, automatically, a similar
cushion of time . Consequently, we have not pondered deeply over
the individual's obligations to the State, which provides to him
protection in his way of life, nor have we been compelled to
consider how the discharge of these obligations could most effectively and economically be accomplished.
During World War II, I was so frequently shocked and
dismayed by the results of the incomplete training of our youth
and by their lack of knowledge of the age-old struggle between
individual freedom and dictatorship, that I came, unthinkingly, to
assume that after the war our people would at last meet all these
issues head on and do something effective about them. As a
consequence, all of my thinking during the latter part of the war
was based upon the assumption that America would adopt at the
war's end some system of universal military service, a system
whereby every young man would be required to give some 18
months of his time to the government and that the professional
element of our security force would, therefore, be held to a
minimum. Since such service would, I thought, be performed in
discharge of an obligation, there would be no pay other than that
for maintenance and a very small monetary allowance . I likewise
thought that we would develop means and methods of producing
the munitions of war, including stockpiling, without profit to
anyone .
In these assumptions I was, of course, proved quite wrong.
When I came home, General Marshall told me that we could
certainly get no more than a program of universal military training
and that it would take a lot of work to put even this compromise
across . I took his advice-especially when I found that the President was already sold on this idea-and worked hard for the UMT
program. We were defeated even though I am still convinced that
the great mass of our people definitely favor the proposition. I am
sure that if the law had been passed some of our National Guard
divisions would have, before this, been ready to leave for Korea .
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With respect to your speculation that Germany may be the
next place in which internecine warfare will break out, I should like
to observe that if this should be the case, then Russia would,
thereby, come very close to declaring open, all out, war. This is
because of the fact that her troops are in actual occupation of
Eastern Germany and in actual control of that area. Consequently,
if she allows them to move to the attack, she cannot possibly longer
hide behind the subterfuge that a "people's government" is
attempting to liberate their brothers in another part of the country.
I shall not be able to get down to Gordon Gray's inauguration.
The early part of October is already filled with so many engagements on my calendar that I am seriously thinking of going to the
hospital for a week or so. I should like to be at his installationmore to have a long talk with you than to attend another
ceremony. This is true in spite of the fact that I like Gordon Gray
immensely and I am delighted that he is taking over a job that he is
going to find a great deal tougher than he suspects.
My love to Ibby and the children.
Cordially,

In late October 1950 President Truman summoned Eisenhower to the White House and asked him to become supreme
commander of NATO forces in Europe. Only Eisenhower's great
prestige and diplomatic skill, Truman and other leaders in the
administration believed, would assuage French fears over German
rearmament and permit the creation of an integrated military force
in western Europe. Eisenhower agreed to take the post, as indeed
his sense of duty dictated, though he was clearly reluctant to do so.
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1 November 1950
Dear Swede:
I am returning to you the partially written letter that Mr.
[Louis] Graves sent to you some time back. Whenever I read such
convincing evidence that I am held high in the esteem of a loyal
and obviously thoughtful American, I experience a feeling that I
cannot possibly describe . More than likely, it is a combination of a
clear realization of my own unworthiness of such an opinion, but
this mingled with an equal sentiment of pride.
As to conclusions concerning my future responsibility and
duty, I think you know my ideas on this perfectly well. Moreover,
the longer I live the more I realize that no individual can predict
with confidence anything concerning "tomorrow." At this moment I am confronted with possibilities of profound import;
possibilities that had not even crossed my mind as much as a
month ago. You yourself mention them in your handwritten note
on Mr. Graves' manuscript. You say, "I do hope that this weekend
you won't be talked into that Atlantic Pact job."
I am a little astonished at your use of the expression, "talked
into." As you know, I am an officer on the active list on which I
will always stay, by reason of a special Act of Congress, affecting a
few of us, unless I voluntarily remove myself from it. It is clear that
my official superiors don't have to do any talking if they actually
want me to take any military assignment.
But over and above such considerations and addressing myself to the merits of the case, I would conclude from your statement
that you do not attach the same importance to the success of the
Atlantic Defense Pact as I do. I rather look upon this effort as about
the last remaining chance for the survival of Western civilization.
Our efforts in the United Nations have been defeated by the vetoes
of hostile groups-but in the Atlantic Pact we are not plagued by
the hostile groups and are simply trying to work out a way that free
countries may band together to protect themselves. If we allow the
whole plan to fizzle out into a miserable failure, it would seem to
me that our future would be bleak indeed.
Of course, if the authorities can find anyone else who will
tackle the job, and who they believe can perform it, then I hasten to
agree with you that that man would probably do it far better than I
could . Moreover, I believe, in my present job, I am supporting an
effort that will be of unusual significance to the welfare of our
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people . But I still would not agree that there is any job in the world
today that is more important than getting Atlantic Union defensive
forces and arrangements off to a good, practical and speedy start.
Of course, all this may be meaningless; I do not want or need
any other job. Moreover, I understand from the morning's paper
that the [NATO] Council in Washington seems further than ever
from agreement. But the matter still retains its grave importance
and so long as it does, anyone of us-no matter what his station,
his position or what personal sacrifices might be involved-must
be ready to do his best.
As ever,

83

1951

Eisenhower wrote a brief note to Swede in early February
1951, when he returned from an exploratory tour of European
capitals. In April he formally assumed command of Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and by June, when
he wrote this letter, he was deeply involved in the politics of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In his letter of June 1, Swede
noted that "the country is sitting back, perhaps too complacently,
in the comfortable belief that Ike has everything in hand in
Europe ."

21 June 1951
Dear Swede:
Recently, I have been wondering when I was to get another
letter from you; a question that was finally answered by your letter
dated June 1.
Trying to make some comment on each subject you raiseand, God knows, my observations will not only have to be limited,
but will possibly be better classified as hazy day-dreaming-I start
out by saying that, if anyone thinks this whole task is "comfortably
in hand, " he had better acquaint himself a little more accurately
with facts as they are . How can anyone in the world believe that
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numbers of nations could, within a short space of months, so
organize, develop, and train themselves that they were even
capable of putting out timely and necessary decisions in such a
matter as mutual defense, to say nothing of accomplishing all the
material, mental, and psychological jobs as are included? Time and
effort and understanding, and renewed effort and tireless study,
and still more effort, would comprise a fair recipe for the product
we are trying to obtain.
There are, of course, certain encouraging developments. I am
quite sure that anyone acquainted with Europe would, as of now,
sense a tremendous increase in morale, courage, and determination as compared to the level of these only six months to a year ago.
On every front, there has been some improvement, even though
progress is far less rapid than we could wish or even have the
right, in certain instances, to expect.
The one indispensable thing to remember is that, if the free
world cannot provide for its "collective" security, the alternative
for every one of these nations, including our own, is an eventual
fate that is worse than any kind of expense or effort we can now
imagine. Consequently, American leadership must be exerted
every minute of the day, every day, to make sure that we are
securing from these combined countries their maximum of accomplishment. Where any nation fails-as some of them are, of course,
partially failing now-we must take a certain portion of the
responsibility by admitting that, in that particular instance, our
leadership has been partially ineffective .
I assure you that, as I go around to various capitals and meet
with members of the several governments, I never let up for one
single instant on pounding home some serious facts. The first of
these is that each country must provide the heart and soul of its
own defense. If the heart is right, other nations can help; if not,
that particular nation is doomed. Morale cannot be imported.
Next, I insist that Europe must, as a whole, provide in the long
run for its own defense. The United States can move in and, by its
psychological, intellectual, and material leadership, help to produce arms, units, and the confidence that will allow Europe to
solve its problem. In the long run, it is not possible-and most
certainly not desirable-that Europe should be an occupied territory defended by legions brought in from abroad, somewhat in the
fashion that Rome's territories vainly sought security many hundred years ago.
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To m y mind, Turkey and Greece are nations that must be
brought into our defensive structure very definitely and soon.[ 1 1
Whether or not they should be militarily attached to my command,
or should be divided-possibly with Greece under our particular
umbrella and Turkey under another-are problems that are susceptible of several solutions . The main thing is that they, w ith us,
should make common cause against a common enemy and make
this job one of top priority in each country.
As to Iran, I think the whole thing is tragic .l2 1 A stream of
visitors goes through my office, and some of the individuals
concerned seem to consider themselves as authorities on the
Iranian question . Numbers of them attach as much blame to
Western stupidity as to Iranian fanaticism and Communist intrigue
in bringing about all the trouble. Frankly, I have gotten to the point
that I am concerned primarily, and almost solely, in some scheme
or plan that will permit that oil to keep flowing to the westward .
We cannot ignore the tremendous importance of 675,000 barrels of
oil a day. The situation there has not yet gotten into as bad a
position as China, but sometimes I think it stands today at the
same place that China did only a very few years ago . Now we have
completely lost the latter nation-no matter how we explain it, how
much we prove our position to have been fair and just, we failed. I
most certainly hope that this calamity is not repeated in the case of
Iran.
So far as all the MacArthur-Korean-administration-partisan
politics affair is concerned, I have kept my mouth closed in every

1. In deference to the concerns of other Europea n natio ns, neither Greece nor
Turkey had originally bee n included in NATO. Administration thinking changed ,
however, aft er the beginning of the Ko rean War, and in February 1951 the Na tional
Security Council had recomme nded th e inclusio n of both in the Western all ia nce.
The formal invitation to join would come the next year.
2. In May 1951 Iran's nationalist prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, w on
parliamentary approval to nationalize the h oldings of the giant British-o wned
Anglo-Irania n Oil Compa ny. In retaliation , Anglo-Irania n a nd the other large oil
companies that do minated international petroleum markets declared a boycott on
all Ira nian oil, thereby ho ping to bring the Irania n government to its knees. Their
efforts failed , however, as did attempts by the United States a nd o th er countries to
mediate the dispute. In 1953 Eise nhower, the n preside nt, di rected the CIA to help
overth row Mossadegh and to replace him w ith the youn g Shah Mo hammed Reza
Pahlav i.
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language of which I have ever heard .1 3 1 I have some very definite
views about parts of the sorry mess, but I do not have a sufficiently
clear picture of the whole development, starting with some of the
machinations and incidents of World War II, to allow me to make
up my mind on many of the important features of the affair. I guess
that the most we can hope out of the thing is that soon the
Communists will quit pushing the conflict (terminating it somewhat as they did the attacks on Greece), and that we succeed in
developing a sufficient strength among the South Koreans to
withdraw the vast bulk of our own forces.
[Gen . Albert C.] Wedemeyer's testimony left me in complete
bewilderment as I attempted to follow his reasoning. Moreover, I
am not quite sure what you mean when you talk about " punishing
the aggressor." Unless you can get at Mao and the small group of
advisers he has right around him, I do not believe we would be
punishing the aggressor merely by bombing Canton, Shanghai, or
any other place where we would most certainly be killing a number
of our friends along with the people who are true followers of the
Communists .
I will not comment at all upon your observations concerning
your dilemma in the next election if you have to vote for either of
the two men you name [Truman and Ohio Republican Robert A.
Taft] . With respect to your statement, "Worse luck, you seem to be
pretty well out of the present picture," I wish I could feel that way
as definitely as you do. Not only has there been a very recent poll
taken which continues to stir up trouble, but a whole bevy of
visitors here, and correspondents in the States, keep plugging
away at a contrary view and determination.
I never heard of Clugston (w ho had written a right-wing attack
entitled Eisenhower for President?]. Moreover, I am told that his book
was written as a very sly piece of " smear" work. I can' t be
bothered, although he is one campaigner w ho is apparently in
league with another fellow named Dewey Taft who publishes a

3. Truman had relieved the insubordinate Ge neral MacArthur of command in
Korea in April 1951, triggering a torre nt of cr iticism . Althoug h privately critical of
MacArthur, Eise nhower heeded the ad vice of his old fri end Gen . Luciu s D. Clay,
who warned him to " let no one maneuver you into any .. . co mme nt o n the
MacArthur incident."
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queer little paper down in Wichita. This latter character insists that
I am one of the great friends of Communism in our country, and
the darling of Moscow. I wish to God he could see some of the
propaganda spread around this country by the Communist Party.
If I am not Moscow's number one public enemy today, then I am
certainly running that number one man a close race .
You are right in your idea that I had nothing to do with the
appointment of [Adm. William M .] Fechteler [the new naval
commander for NATO], but you are wrong that I went over
backward in naming Monty [Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, one of Eisenhower's old antagonists] as my Deputy. Monty
not only has avery fine reputation in this region as a soldier, but he
is one. Moreover, he is a very determined little fellow who knows
exactly what he wants, is simple and direct in his approach, and
minces no words with any soldier, politician, or plain citizen when
he thinks that that particular individual (or the country he represents) is not fulfilling his complete obligations to NATO. He is one
man who clearly recognizes the truth of the assertion that Europe
cannot forever depend upon America for military and economic
aid and assistance. He hammers away at the idea that this region
must become self-sufficient.
We shall be on the look-out for your friend Corydon Lyons. If
he brings along his students, I think I shall be secretly a bit on the
pleased side. Sometimes I get quite weary of talking to the old, the
fearful, and the cautious. I like to meet young people with their
fresh outlook and their fixed, even if sometimes too complacent,
assumption that they can meet the problems of their own time.
It was nice to hear that Bob Baughey [an air force publicrelations officer and mutual friend] had been to see you. Not long
ago, I had a letter from him.
I assure you that we are not enjoying Paris in the sense that we
would prefer to be here instead of in the United States . I think that,
if ever two people have had enough of foreign service, we are they.
We look forward to coming home-not the least of our pleasures
will be a visit with you and Ibby. In the meantime, please keep
writing.
Cordially,
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In a handwritten note on August 22, Swede enclosed a letter
by his friend and essayist Harold W. Whicker on the theme of
painting. "As I've told you before, Whick is a he-man-exprofessional wrestler, English prof, outstanding painter and essayist, outdoorsman-who is afflicted with a heart ailment but doesn't
let it get him down."

4 September 1951
Dear Swede:
It has been a long time since I last read one of the letters you
receive periodically from Whicker. Yet that interval is not so long
that I fail to recall at once the primary emotion his writing always
inspires in me-a feeling that here is one man who is able to put
down in print a clear expression of the thoughts that flow through
his brain as he contemplates the beauty of a sylvan scene, the
capabilities of man for sacrifice, and the exceedingly disappointing
result we seem always to get when we find men attempting to act
as a group in the solution of common political and social problems .
He finds ways and means of describing, with cameo-like sharpness, his disappointment that men respond far more easily to a
selfish impulse than to a noble one; he is so convincing in this
regard that his reader (this one at least) comes to feel that the
conclusion as to relativity-wheat to chaff-is a gross overstatement.
Of course, I am intrigued by his explanation of his reasons for
painting. You may or may not know that I indulge in the same
habit . But in my case there is no faintest semblance of talent, and
certainly I paint for far less complicated or worthy reasons than
does Mr. Whicker. Some years ago I found that I had to limit my
hours devoted to serious and steady reading; my life is given over
to such incessant contemplation of heavy and weighty problemsmost of them made more difficult by the circumstances that they
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have no final and complete answer-that some kind of release or
relief became necessary in order to keep me up to the bit and
operating at reasonable efficiency during the hours when I deal in
the affairs for which I bear some responsibility. So I took up
painting. I did it without a lesson and I have persisted in it for more
than three years with no more constructive help from the outside
than an occasional piece of casual criticism from one of my artist
friends . For me the real benefit is the fact that it gives me an excuse
to be absolutely alone and interferes not at all with what I am
pleased to call my "contemplative powers." In other words, I
paint for fun, for recreation, for enjoyment. When the work is
woefully bad, so that even I recognize its stupidity or banality, I
merely turn it upside down and start again. After I do this often
enough I burn that particular canvas. But once in awhile one comes
out so that it is definitely better than I know how to do! That one I
keep. Such a one may be a portrait, a picture of a tree, or merely a
colored sketch of a couple of flowers. The point is that one with no
talent, no ability to draw and no time to waste can get a lot of fun
out of daubing with oils. Most of mine is done between the hours
of 11 and 12 at night, but when the effort I am making seems
worthwhile pursuing in daylight, then I have a fine early Sunday
morning pastime .
All this to tell you how much I really envy your friend's ability
to paint in a way that pleases himself and the time to do it.
I like his facility of expression-even his flow of words. His
style reflects not only an appreciation of niceties and of nuances,
but his unhurried and even wordy way of reaching his conclusions
adds confidence, because it implies that he had time to think the
matter through carefully. I am tempted to believe he is right in the
suggestion that to attain sheer personal happiness one ought,
through some judgment accepted by all, be relegated, inexorably,
to a life in a woodland cottage .
As to his conclusions about the American scene, I most
thoroughly concur in his condemnation of public violators of the
principles of decency and honor. Now, none of us is so strong that
he is spared the painful embarrassment of looking back upon
moments of weakness; none is so wise that he cannot recall times
when his own ignorance bordered upon the stupid, even the
moronic. Nevertheless, high standards must be upheld-he helps
to do so! He beautifully expresses his respect for courage, integrity
and honest effort.
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Some day I should like to spend a week with him, just sitting
in his backyard and possibly talking about nothing more removed
than the trees and the mountains that he loves so well .
My love to Ibby and your nice family and, as always, my very
best to you.
Cordially,
P.S. I see that you wrote your letter in longhand. Did the blanketyblank typewriter play out? The reason I ask is a bit more than a
mere concern for your convenience; I was told that the particular
typewriter we got was the sturdiest and best in its field. If it
wasn't, I would like to write a sarcastic letter to the producing firm.

By the autumn of 1951 the pressure on Eisenhower to announce his candidacy for the presidency had become intense .
During the summer a group of his business friends had organized,
with his tacit approval, Citizens for Eisenhower; and soon Eisenhower for President clubs were springing up all around the
country. The steady stream of business and political leaders
coursing through his headquarters in Paris increased, as did his
private correspondence. In a front-page editorial in the N ew York
Herald Tribune, his friend William Robinson endorsed him for the
Republican nomination . It seems clear that Eisenhower was himself moving closer and closer to a declaration of candidacy; and in
his correspondence with friends and supporters, as in the ensuing
letter to Swede, he was careful to distinguish his own position
from both the liberalism of the Truman administration and the
extreme conservatism of the Taft Republicans . "Almost daily I'm
asked whether or not you'll run, " wrote Swede on November 2.
"Invariably I answer that I know you don't want it but that you
will, as always, answer a call to duty as your conscience hears itthat if you feel you are necessary to the nation's welfare you'll get
into the race ." For Eisenhower's confirmation, see paragraph
thirteen below.
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14 November 1951
Dear Swede:
Thank goodness, you relieved my mind about the durability
and efficiency of the Royal-until I received your reassuring letter,
I had the unhappy feeling that Schulz may have been taken for a
ride in the purchase he made .
One of the infrequent chuckles that I have had in recent days
was inspired by your sentence that "I see so much in the papers
about Eisenhower these days that I sometimes wonder if I really
know the man they are writing about." If you think that, what do
you suppose I feel? I find in the Communist press that I am a
bloody Fascist, a war monger, and a tool of American Imperialists. The cartoons that accompany these accounts picture a bigpaunched, heavy-jawed Germanic type of brutal soldier. At the
same time, I find somewhat similar cartoons in sections of our
Isolationist press, but in which the labels assert that I am a great
friend of Joe Stalin's or of all the Internationalist do-gooders in the
world. In one paper, I am a New Dealer; in the next, I am such a
Reactionary that the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations]
finds it necessary to condemn me as an economic anachronism. In
the eyes of one columnist, I am too fearful and frightened ever to
attempt to fill a political office; another columnist asserts that I am,
with Machiavellian cunning, pulling every possible string to become President of the United States.
All this is ordinary fare for anyone who tries to pursue a
steady and honest course down the only path available when he is
dealing in complex activities pertaining to large organizations of
humans-a path straight down the middle of the road. Sometime
in September of 1949, I think it was, I made a talk before the
National Bar Association, then meeting in Saint Louis . I pointed
out that anyone who chose the middle of the road was going
constantly to be subject to attack from both extremes . He is hated
by the bureaucrats and the national planners, and he is distrusted
by those who think that Calvin Coolidge was a pink. All of which
would be rather terrifying to the victim if it were anything new or
unique; actually, it is nothing but a mere repetition of what has
been happening for hundreds, even thousands, of years.
You and I have had earlier correspondence concerning our
common admiration for Forrest Sherman. So you must know how
bitterly I regret his death . To my mind, there was no real second to
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him and, as I recall, I wrote you one letter stoutly defending his
selection as Chief of Naval Operations when I thought you had
expressed some doubt about the matter. I do remember, though,
that you wrote me a later letter to say that I had misunderstood the
statements in which I thought I had found the criticisms .
With respect to the top Service jobs in Washington, I believe
that our people have, as yet, a lot to learn. For the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to coordinate and balance the great military organisms that
our country needs in these days of tension requires, in each
member, selflessness, energy, study, and the broadest kind of
viewpoint and comprehension. Each of these men must cease
regarding himself as the advocate or special pleader for any
particular Service; he must think strictly and solely in terms of the
United States. Character rather than intellect, and moral courage
rather than mere professional skill, are the dominant qualifications
required. Each individual will have to give only a modicum of his
time to the establishment of policy affecting his own Service,
because his great problem will be how to work with two others in
devising and recommending to the civilian authorities a properly
balanced force together with the programs and methods that
should be applied to the problem of building global security for
ourselves .
If you were choosing the Chief of Na val Operations by
application of the standards I have just alluded to, I do not know
where your choice would fall . I am not well acquainted with some
of the men now coming to the front in the Navy, but there is one
whom you did not mention and who, on short acquaintance, has
impressed me greatly. He is the Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
named [Adm. Donald B.] Duncan. He is quiet, almost self-effacing,
but he seems to me to have a value that far exceeds the noise that
he makes. Just as I always felt that there was no one in uniform
who loomed above Sherman in value to our country, so I have
some suspicion that Duncan may finally make a similar impression
upon me . (Not, of course, that this is important but, after all, our
correspondence is a personal thing, and so I find no need to
apologize for my personal views .) I believe [Adm . William M .]
Fechteler will do a good job [as chief of naval operations ]-just
possibly an outstanding one, because he seems to have a disposition that is neither easily upset nor particularly upsetting to others .
He is one of those people who does not make the mistake of
confusing strength and bad manners.
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(Adm. Robert B.] Carney, of course, is a very skillful and able
person. I think at times that he may be tempted to argue points
rather legalistically and, because of this tendency, may give unwarranted importance to minor detail. I think this is subconscious but
it does, on occasion, give his presentations an atmosphere of
contentiousness . However, he is saved from any really bad effects
because of his general popularity with his associates-all of us like
him. He is most courteous and hospitable.
Incidentally, when I was in the Mediterranean recently, I
renewed friendship with Admiral [Matthias B.] Gardner, I suppose
of the Class of ' 17 or '18. I like him very much and have a great
respect for his easy-going but effective methods .
Your letter brought me my first news that there had been any
public intimation that even one, much less two, Eisenhowers were
considered for the job of Baseball Commissioner. Over the past
several years, informal suggestions of this character have been
made to me, but my refusals to consider the matter have been both
prompt and emphatic. This has not meant that I was insensible to
the compliment implicit in the suggestion, but it has meant that it
is not the kind of work in which I felt it best for me to engage . I had
no idea that the job had ever been suggested to Milton, but I am
quite sure that, if it was, his reaction was somewhat the same .
I feel impelled to pause for just a moment to make an
observation concerning the topsy-turvy happenings that we accept, today, almost as commonplaces. If, some forty-five years ago,
anyone had suggested to two barefoot boys of the Dickinson
County region that they would one day casually-without even a
second thought-dismiss an opportunity to take over an honorable
and decent job paying $75,000 a year, the entire countryside would
have, at that moment, broken into a very hearty laugh, not to
mention a few snorts of derision. But that's the way it goes! I am
not so terribly much richer in money than I was in those days (even
though we had nothing then) but I guess that, in certain respects,
my sense of values has changed considerably. And, after all,
anyone with a $75,000 salary must have a great deal of anguish
when he figures out his income tax!
The West Point scandal (in which a number of cadets were
caught cheating] made me heartsick. The only grain of comfort I
get out of the whole business was that apparently the authorities,
when aroused to the knowledge that something incompatible with
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the honor system was going on, met the problem head on and
without equivocation.
One single observation about Korea-Iran-Egypt-Germany-and
all the other spots on the earth in which we now sometimes find
ourselves embarrassed. They are all part and parcel of the same
great struggle-the struggle of free men to govern themselves
effectively and efficiently; to protect themselves from any threat
without, and to prevent their system from collapsing under them,
due to the strains placed upon it by their defensive effort. It is
another phase of a struggle that has been going on for some three
thousand years; the unique feature about it now is that it is much
more than ever before a single worldwide conflict with power
polarized in the two centers of Washington and Moscow.
There is no point in my commenting further upon the political
questions that you mention and with which I am so often personally confronted. Your own analysis remains accurate so far as I can
foresee the future .
When I am attempting to answer letters from inquiring friends
on the point, I normally include in the explanation of my own
attitude a paragraph about as follows:
"For me to admit, while in this post, a partisan political
loyalty would properly be resented by thinking Americans and would be doing a disservice to our country. Such
action on my part would encourage partisan thinking, in
our country, toward a job in which the whole nation has
already invested tremendous sums . The successful outcome of this venture is too vital to our welfare in the years
head to permit any semblance of partisan allegiance on
the part of the United States Military Commander in
SHAPE ."
I believe that a bit of reflection will establish that there is no
other possible course for me as long as I am in uniform. A man
cannot desert a duty, but it would seem that he could lay down one
in order to pick up a heavier and more responsible burden. So far
as personal desire or ambition is concerned, there will never be any
change for me. I could not be more negative.
I am glad you told me about the word "exegete." I am now
going to look it up in the dictionary before I go home .
My love to your nice family.
Cordially,
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1952

Although Eisenhower, as we have seen, had moved steadily
closer to a declaration of candidacy, he remained unwilling to
commit himself completely, either publicly or in his private correspondence. This was particularly frustrating for supporters such as
Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge, who believed that if Eisenhower were to
win the nomination, he would have to declare his candidacy and
return home-"possibly, I suppose, as a deserter," Eisenhower
wryly observed. Eisenhower's reasons for holding back were
complex. He was genuinely ambivalent about running, and he was
especially reluctant to commit himself to what he viewed as the
distasteful task of campaigning for delegates. But he also shrewdly
understood the appeal of a candidate who appeared to stand above
partisan politics-couldn't "something of a virtue be made ... of
my refusal to have my attention diverted from my assigned duty?"
he asked . And though he allowed Lodge and others to campaign
hard on his behalf throughout early 1952, he was determined not
to return until June, when, as his close friend Lucius Clay put it,
"you will be a fresh figure, untouched by all the campaigning that
is now going on, and a certain Republican winner."
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12 February 1952
Dear Swede:
The first paragraph of your letter mentions a prescribed
periodicity of three months for your letters. I just want to remind
you that the prescription is self-imposed.
It was a bit amusing to find that you had also been puzzled by
some of the statements made in Mr. Harger' s American Magazine
article [on Eisenhower's appointment to West Point] two or three
months back . Such errors as appear in it, however, mean to me
only that the human memory is a frail, not to say a treacherous,
thing. The older one grows, the more noticeable this is-I have
certainly gotten to the point where I don't like to be too positive
about commonplace occurrences of 40 years ago. However, in this
case, the occurrence was far from commonplace for me-even
though it was for most of the people of Abilene and, for them,
remained so until the day arrived when my name began to appear
with astonishing frequency in the newspapers. It was simply too
big a gap for their memories to bridge and to make the far end
come out at exactly the point where it originally lay.
However, there is this about Mr. Harger. Speaking roughly,
he is about the only one left who was, in 1910, prominent in
Abilene affairs . This statement, of course, excepts Charlie Case,
but at that particular moment he was over-shadowed, to say the
least, by his dad. As the years have rolled on and those who
worked so hard for my appointment have died, Mr. Harger has
become almost my sole contact with that particular generation of
Abilene citizens . Consequently, he has rather symbolized for me
the 1910 kindness of the whole community, and in my conversations and correspondence with him, the recipient of my genuine
gratitude toward the whole community. Actually-if you will
recall-the man who appointed me was one of the earliest so-called
"Progressives," Senator Joseph Bristow. Mr. Harger was in the
other branch of the Republican Party, in those days called the
"Stand patters ." As a consequence of this situation, Mr. P. [Phil]
W. Heath was the spearhead of my supporting phalanx. Others
were Mr. [Reynold G.] Rogers, Mr. [Alfred M.] Ward (a jeweler),
the Hurds [brothers Arthur and Bruce], Mr. [Henry C.] Litts, and
dozens of others who wrote letters to the Senator in my behalf.
Among these, of course, Mr. Harger was included. But I repeat
that, so far as I am concerned, and as of to-day, he is the solely
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responsible individual (except for yourself, from whom I derived
both confidence and inspiration).
I am not particularly amazed that you have had no answer to
the letter you sent to Senator Lodge. You must remember that he
and his associates are busy politicians and have had little real
opportunity, so far, to organize an office in which to do all the work
that they apparently expect to perform. I am quite certain that
neither Senator Lodge nor any of his associates would deliberately
ignore such an offer as you made. I am sure that he personally is
one of those who clearly discerns the need for organization, but he
would require time in which to build it. All this is written without
the benefit of any personal knowledge of what is going on. But I do
know Cabot Lodge to be a very courteous, keen, and knowledgeable Senator, so I feel sure that my explanation is correct (and, of
course, possibly your letter to him was lost) .
Your professorial luncheon partner was not particularly original in accusing me of "coyness." The charge is repeated in some
form or another in every day's mail. It causes me no distress-this
for the reason that I occupy the enviable position of a man who
wants nothing. It does cause me a bit of amazement that many
people who regard themselves as enlightened and well-educated
simply cannot get it into their heads that there may be some
individuals who still regard the word "duty" as a governing one in
their lives . Only a handful of my correspondents, including
yourself, give me credit for meaning exactly what I say and are
completely sympathetic with my attitude . Even among this tiny
group, a few still believe that there is something more that I should
do immediately in the political arena. They argue that I could do so
without, in any way, violating my determination to avoid participation in the preconvention campaign.
The general run of such recommendations roll off my back like
water from a duck. But when the occasional one comes from tried
and true friends, I get to wondering whether I am a bit stiff-necked
in adhering to my own opinions. I haven't any complete answer at
this moment. All that you can be sure of is that, barring unforeseen
and extraordinary circumstances, I shall not do anything that I
personally feel should be interpreted as "preconvention political
activities ."
Last evening, Mamie and I saw a showing of a film made at the
"Eisenhower Rally" at Madison Square Garden. It was brought
over here by Jacqueline Cochran, who was one of the co-chairmen
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of the demonstration. The New York show was held at midnight,
and according to Miss Cochran, with the obstacle of a very noncooperative police and fire department. Nevertheless, she said that
the crowd, which had been predicted by the police department to
reach not more than four thousand, included at its height about
thirty-three thousand people . She said that a blunder of the fire
department kept some four thousand of these from coming inside
the hall. In any event, the two hour film brought home to me for
the first time something of the depth of the longing in America
today for change-a change that would bring, they hope, some
confidence that the disturbing problems of our country will be
sensibly attacked and progress made toward solving them. I can't
tell you what an emotional upset it is for one to realize suddenly
that he himself may become the symbol of that longing and hope.
Possibly I would not have been so impressed had the demonstration been planned over a period of months, and put on at a
reasonable hour.
I never forget America' s great need for success in the job of
building collective security in that part of the world still outside of
the Iron Curtain. But I can assure you that, when I get too involved
or worried in the intricacies of this problem and their possible
conflict with the personal one that may build up in the U.S., I
always remind myself of the fine old proverb "Always take your
job seriously, never yourself." So, no matter what happens, I hope
I am still safe from becoming completely self-centered and impossibly egotistical by remembering this favorite saying of old (Gen .]
Fox Conner.
I cannot tell you how delighted I am to know that you are a
member of the Central Committee for selecting recipients of
important scholarships . I am certain you will like the work; the
longer you stay with it the more rewarding you will feel it.
Please don't take too seriously your own resolution not to talk
to me again about Navy personalities. I assure you there are only a
few of them I know well. I think that I have met [Adm.] Lynde [D.]
McCormick. He is soon coming through here for a visit. I have
heard a lot of fine things about him.
Incidentally, I have tried hard to put across to America's
leading military figures, as well as to those of important allied
countries, what is really involved in the establishment of a large
Allied Command. The first point is that when nations find it
necessary to establish military commands that are as high in the
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hierarchy of control as is a Supreme command, we enter the zone
of combined political, military and strategic decision. It matters
little from what special arm or service the commander may come.
The problems pertaining to a true Supreme command are partially
military, but they are also partially psychological, industrial, financial and political. (Politics in the sense of relationships among the
nations.) The need is for an individual who will take all these
varying and variable considerations and get from them a reasonable answer out of which he can formulate broad military decisions
to issue to subordinates who are, themselves, normally, combined
or joint commanders . The search should therefore be for the
individual. Instead, we normally decide on what nation and
service should assume responsibility of command and then, having limited ourselves in choice, we try to select the individual
deemed best suited for the task.
Actually, the title "Supreme" was manufactured in World
War II. It was to apply to commanders who had responsibilities
extending over a goodly and important section of the earth's
surface. It was to apply only in the event that he commanded
troops of more than one nation and, on top of this, important
contingents from more than one of the three services . For this kind
of job, there is no reason whatsoever that a suitably qualified
admiral could not command at SHAPE or at any other similar
setup . (I admit that this observation would not apply to the
Atlantic Command because it is mostly naval. I see very little
reason for that commander to worry too much about forces other
than naval with some supporting air. He will certainly be not
deeply plunged into the political, economic, industrial and psychological problems of Europe and the North Atlantic countries.)
However, you can see from all this that our ancient ideas of
military organization and training (I am speaking now only of the
very highest echelons) must be revised, enlarged and expanded to
meet the needs of this modern day. It is necessary to select young
men and begin training them on the broadest possible basis . I am
convinced that all of us attach too much importance to routine
military command in time of peace. We cling to the naive belief that
local tactical command constitutes the true basis of the service
man' s development. Not only is that the easiest part, but the broad
education of our most gifted men will not permit the luxury of too
much emphasis on "professional" chores . We will return him
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often enough to troops to retain the touch and feel of commandthen get him on to the hard work!
Well, I see that I have here opened up such a broad subject
that I must wait until you and I can have an evening to ourselves,
and over our coffee, try to agree that the world has difficulty
keeping up to the vision, the wisdom, and the experienced advice
that we jointly are constantly ready to offer it. I had a fortunate
break and a light schedule this morning, but I have now used up
my time . Give my love to Ibby and, of course, always the best to
yourself.
As ever,

The campaign for the nomination, which Eisenhower won
only after a bitter struggle with Robert Taft and the party's
conservatives, and the subsequent campaign for the presidency,
which he won in a landslide over Illinois' Governor Adlai E.
Stevenson, left little time for personal correspondence; and the
letters from this period are hurried and brief. One of the few
substantive issues that Eisenhower discussed in them involved the
so-called tidelands oil controversy. At issue was whether the states
or the federal government would control oil-rich lands submerged
between the low-water mark and the three-mile limit or other
historic states' boundaries . The Supreme Court had ruled that
these submerged lands belonged to the United States government.
Eisenhower, however, whose supporters included a number of
prominent oilmen, took the states' (and industry's) position. In
1953 he would sign legislation reversing the Court's decision and
turning over these lands to the states .
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12 July 1952
Dear Swede:
You will have to forgive me if I put off the answering of your
fine letter to some future date. I read yours last evening, and I
would certainly like to have the time right now to discuss some of
the questions you raise . I shall mention only two.
With respect to the waters adjacent to our coast line, did you
ever read the official resolutions and documents by which Texas
entered the Union? My opinion as to where title rested was based
solely upon what looked to me like a definite contract which gave
Texas possession up to three leagues from their coast line .
Since I first made this statement, the Supreme Court has ruled
otherwise-but it is still difficult for me to understand exactly how
they reached their decision. Quite naturally if this were correct in
the case of Texas, I do not see how we could discriminate against
other states.
One other thing on this particular point. Did you ever compare the record of conservation of Texas oil, under state law, with
the record of the federal government in such places as Teapot
Dome? Actually, of course, I am not any fervent disciple on either
side of the question. My position-if you can call it that-is based
solely on what I thought was the sanctity of a contract. Beyond that
I have not attempted to reason it out exhaustively.
You think that an eighteen year-old should not vote. I am
going to send to you with this letter a guest editorial that appeared
recently in the Denver Post. It was written by a nineteen year old
girl, and I should like for you to decide whether you think she is
capable of voting. It is possible that some states have intelligence
tests for voters. I am not familiar with the law in each of the fortyeight. However, I would venture that the girl who wrote this little
editorial and, indeed, any high school graduate, can pass any
intelligence test that is set up in any state. When you add to this
the fact that it is my humble opinion that eighteen year olds today
know as much as we did at twenty-five, you get some inkling of
what I am getting at. The radio, television, increased numbers of
publications of all kinds, and a greater variety of schooling
available to the young, have all served to bring them along faster
than we developed in our time . Of course the federal government
has nothing to do with this question at all. It is a matter for each
state to decide for itself. Fighting and voting may be two different
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things, but I still feel that if a man is called upon to help defend his
country on the battlefield, he ought to have some little voice in
helping to determine its policies.
Love to Ibby, and as always, warm regards to you.
Sincerely,

In his letter of August 8, Swede had enclosed a letter from
Professor George C. Taylor, a Shakespearean scholar at the
University of South Carolina. Taylor reported widespread support
for Eisenhower among leading Democrats such as South Carolina's Governor James F. Byrnes . But he also warned that if
Eisenhower were to come out for civil rights, then "all our plans
will fall flat." Eisenhower didn ' t need the advice. Indeed, he had
earlier written to his friend Lucius Clay that he did not consider
"race relations" to be an issue.

14 August 1952
Dear Swede:
It is good of you to send me Dr. Taylor's letters. They confirm
many of the reports from the South I have been getting. As you
know, we are devoting particular attention to the southern front in
our planning just now, and I believe we will work out the prohlem
satisfactorily. Reports like yours are a big help.
I hope you are having some pleasant weather in your delightful Chapel Hill .
Sincerely,
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By the time this brief note was written, the campaign was in its
final month. Although Eisenhower and his advisors remained
supremely confident, no one, with the memory of Truman's upset
victory in 1948 still fresh, was predicting a sure thing . As Swede
wrote, "I wouldn' t say I think it's ' in the bag.' I don't!"

16 October 1952
Dear Swede:
Thank you for taking the time to write me your thoughtful
letter of October 8th. I appreciate it very much-not only as an
expression of your faith and confidence, but also as a more
objective evaluation of the situation which tends to be confusing
when one is in the very center of it.
During the past few weeks, I have been confronted with a
number of very difficult decisions. I have always been guided by
what, in my opinion, would be best for the nation as a whole rather
than what might appear to be the most popular thing to do under
any given set of circumstances . I am convinced that leadership in
the political as well as in other spheres consists largely in making
progress through compromise-but that does not mean compromise with basic principles .
It is reassuring to know that, in the last analysis, you have
concurred with my line of reasoning.
Mamie joins me in love to Ibby and yourself-and we hope
that we can find time for a visit after the pressures of this campaign
are over.
Sincerely,
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On November 4, Eisenhower won in a landslide . In early
December he left for Korea to keep a promise that he had made
during the closing days of the campaign. In his letter of November
27, Swede drew Eisenhower's attention to an "anti-Mamie"
editorial by North Carolina newspaperman and Truman' s biographer Jonathan W. Daniels .

8 December 1952
Dear Swede:
A thousand thanks for your highly interesting letter. I wish I
could answer it as you deserve.
It happens that this note is being written aboard the U.S.S.
Helena about five hours out of Wake on the way to Hawaii. At the
former island a group of cabinet officer designates and a few other
trusted advisors boarded the ship . Within a few minutes conferences started and for the next three days I shall be busy indeed.
For quite a while my opinion of Jonathan Daniels has been of
very low order. Your letter with its information that he undertook
to write an anti-Mamie editorial simply eliminates him from my
mind as anyone worth thinking about.
I am glad you converted your little friend Charlie [a young
Stevenson supporter]- ! hate to see youngsters hurt or bitterly
disappointed. Tell him that I hope that I shall see him some day so
that I can thank him in person for accepting me.
With respect to military aides I have decided that they shall be
in the grade of lieutenant colonel and commanders. I do not want
military advisors in the White House; that is the job for the Chiefs
of Staff. Not long ago someone told me that each of the present
three aides has three assistants . It is the case of the old story, "Big
fleas have little fleas ad infinitum. ' '
Give my love to Ibby and take care of yourself,
Sincerely,
105

P.S. I expect you to carry out your promise to write even though
you don't hear from me.
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1953

Swede and his daughter Alice attended Eisenhower's inauguration in January 1953, were seated "about 100 feet on your port
bow," but had no chance to speak to him. Eisenhower's letters to
Swede during the busy spring of 1953 were short and routine
which-together with the fact that they were signed " DE" instead
of "Ike" -revived Swede's insecurities. "Perhaps ... I've been a
bit too brash in my communications, " he wrote on July 15.
Eisenhower replied in the long, reassuring letter that follows. In it
he attempts to outline his ideas on presidential leadership and to
explain his response to the demagogic Wisconsin Senator Joseph
R. McCarthy, whom Swede and others had been urging Eisenhower to "crack down on."

21 July 1953
Dear Swede:
The arrival of your letter reminded me that it has been far too
long since I heard from you. My natural impulse would be to do a
little complaining at this point-but when I found, at the end of
your letter, that you are in the business of marrying off your
youngest daughter, I automatically forgave all sins of omission.
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Eisenhower' s first inaugural, 20 January 1953 (National Park Service
photograph, courtesy of Dwight D . Eisenhower Library). Chief
Justice Fred M. Vinson administers the oath of office as Harry S .
Truman, Herbert Hoover, and Richard M . Nixon look on.

As to the "DE" instead of "Ike, " I found to my amazementonce I was actually sitting behind this desk-that I became somewhat of an embarrassment to many of my old friends. They didn't
want to call me openly-or at least in front of others-by my
nickname, and this embarrassment apparently carried over in
some cases into their letters . They used all kinds of dodges to avoid
extremes of informality and formality, and I soon found that it
seemed better to fall in, at least partially, with their own ideas than
it was to engage in a long and fruitless argument. One or two of my
former correspondents have even cut me off their list-I think for
no other reason in the world than that they felt somewhat
embarrassed in addressing me by a formal title and yet they could
not quite practice the informality that once characterized their
friendships .
This is, of course, only one of the many personal problems
that come to a man in this particular position. In your own case, it
was nothing but habit that made me use the "DE" because,
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certainly, no question of embarrassment or strain had ever showed
up between us-thank the Lord! After this, when you receive a
communication from me, look first at the signature. If I have made
an error, you send it back without reading it, and I will get back on
the rails.
This business of making decisions for America brings me
strange experiences. I recall almost daily an observation attributed
to Napoleon that went something like this: "The genius in war is a
man that can do the average thing when everybody else is growing
hysterical or panicky in the excitement of the moment." Of course
you know that I have always striven to prepare myself as much as
possible for the known or calculable requirements of any job
assigned me. In this particular post such intentions and practices
have to be almost completely discarded. This is because of the
infinite variety of problems presented, and the rapidity with which
they are placed in front of the responsible individual for action.
Consequently, the struggle is to apply common sense-to reach an
average solution.
The one thing that must never be forgotten is that when
outsiders come in, always they have an axe to grind. If a man
comes in protesting bitterly against any increase in second class
mail rates, it is not because he has a burning desire to serve the best
interests of the public; it is because he has a burning desire to save
the amount it would take out of his pocketbook. Even within
government itself, these distorted and selfish views are encountered. For example, you are, of course, personally acquainted with
some of the inter-service difficulties resulting from granite-like
support of a special or parochial viewpoint. These same quarrels I
find endlessly in every department of government.
Fortunately these instances and practices are offset by the
numbers of people in governmental service who are completely
dedicated individuals. I do not mean merely the persons of cabinet
rank, selected, of course, by the President. It extends on down
through the services, both on the appointive and on the career
side. All of these individuals are the ones that help the Head in
reaching a common sense, average solution. They are alert for the
phony argument and the selfish motive and the untrustworthy
individual. They help to meet the deficiencies of a faulty memory, a
deteriorating disposition, and any tendency toward the pessimistic
or the morbid.
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The point of this recitation is that even the matter of reaching a
common sense solution-or making an average decision-is not
one that can be performed by an individual operating alone .
I was interested in a statement of yours in which you express
your satisfaction that " at last you are ready to crack down on
McCarthy." Now I have no doubt that you are correct in the later
statement in the same paragraph where you say, "I have always
known that you feel about him much as I do ." At the same time, I
must say that I am not quite certain as to the meaning of your first
expression. Again referring to the special significance or, let us say,
the popular standing of the Presidency, it is quite clear that
whenever the President takes part in a newspaper trial of some
individual of whom he disapproves, one thing is automatically
accomplished. This is an increase in the headline value of the
individual attacked.
I think that the average honorable individual cannot understand to what lengths certain politicians would go for publicity.
They have learned a simple truth in American life. This is that the
most vicious kind of attack from one element always creates a very
great popularity, amounting to almost hero worship, in an opposite fringe of society. Because of this, as you well know, Huey
Long had his idolaters. Every attack on him increased their number
(an expression of the under-dog complex) and enhanced the fervor
of his avowed supporters.
When you have a situation like this, you have an ideal one for
the newspapers, the television and the radio, to exploit, to
exaggerate and to perpetuate . In such a situation I disagree
completely with the "crack down" theory. I believe in the positive
approach. I believe that we should earnestly support the practice of
American principles in trials and investigations-we should teach
and preach decency and justice. We should support-even militantly support-people whom we know to be unjustly attacked,
whether they are public servants or private citizens . In this case, of
course, it is necessary to be certain ot facts if the defense is to be
a personal one. Of course, the indirect defense accomplished
through condemnation of unfair methods is always applicable .
Persistence in these unspectacular but sound methods will, in
my opinion, produce results that may not be headlines, but they
will be permanent because they will earn the respect of fair-minded
citizens-which means the vast bulk of our population. To give
way in anger or irritation to an outburst intended to excoriate some
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individual, his motives and his methods, could do far more to
destroy the position and authority of the attacker than it would do
to damage the attacked.
Of course, it is really useless to tell you all these things. You
are well aware of them. But it is always easy to grow verbose when
I write to you .
The part of your letter that talked about some of the "pap"
being written about me gave me quite a smile for the simple reason
that I rarely, if ever, read any of these things . Once in a while I see
an editorial dealing with the work I am now doing and the manner
of its performance . This I try to read and apply objectively, but the
old stories of smoking corn silk and fishing for mudcat are written
for someone else, not for me .
I agree with you as to the convenience represented in the
Williamsburg [the presidential yacht, a favorite of Roosevelt and
Truman, the use of which Eisenhower had decided to forgo] . We
liked her. But I am committed to an Administration of economy,
bordering on or approaching austerity. So in spite of the fact that I
felt she performed a desirable, if not almost an essential service, I
felt that the very word "yacht" created a symbol of luxury in the
public mind that would tend to defeat some of the purposes I was
trying to accomplish . For the same reason I gave up the Presidential quarters at Key West. I have kept only the little camp up in the
Catoctins . It has been renamed "Camp David ." "Shangri-La" was
just a little fancy for a Kansas farm boy.
Give my love to Ibby, and, of course, all the best to yourself.
As ever,

At the Bermuda "summit" conference, Eisenhower had
pressed the French both for a more vigorous prosecution of the war
in Indochina (which the United States was to a large degree
financing through its foreign- and military-aid programs) and for
the ratification of the European Defense Community (EDC) . His
efforts were unsuccessful in both instances. On his return, he
delivered a much-heralded speech at the United Nations on the
" Peaceful Atom," urging that the United States and the Soviet
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Union join in contributing fissionable materials to an international
"bank" from which other nations could draw for nonmilitary
purposes-"agriculture, medicine, and [the production of] abundant electrical energy in the power starved areas of the world."
His hopes for the Republican legislative program were soon to
be dashed by the bitter controversies inspired by Joe McCarthy,
which would dominate American politics throughout much of
1954. And he would soon change his opinions about a number of
those whom he had considered to be his possible successors.
Swede, meanwhile, had suffered another heart attack, had been
bedridden for six weeks, and remained, as he put it, "out of
circulation to a great extent."

24 December 1953

Personal and Confidential
Dear Swede:
Your most recent letter to me was written on November
twenty-sixth, more than a week before I went to Bermuda. The
period has been one of the busiest of my life; but, though at times I
have felt almost at the point of exhaustion, there have still been
moments of real satisfaction that have made all the rest of it seem
worthwhile.
I shall not attempt to give you a personal diary covering the
past three weeks. I cannot set down in chronological order all of
the ideas, actions and impulses that have been part of the
innumerable conferences, meetings and discussions that have, at
times, seemed to be never ending. But introductions and alibis will
get me no further along. So without further ado, I shall try to give
you a decently coherent account of the things that come immediately to memory.
First in order would be the Bermuda meeting. With respect to
that trip, my initial observation is that it provides a good example
of how useless it is to tell the full truth to the press-at least when
the representatives of that estate want to believe otherwise. On
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The December 1953 meeting in Bermuda with French Premier
Joseph Lanie! and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (courtesy of Dwight D. Eisenhower Library) .

two occasions I informed the individuals at White House press
conferences that there was no purpose of the Bermuda meeting
that could be defined in terms of agreements sought or arrangements to be definitely fixed . I told them that the purpose was
purely that of meeting in an informal way with friends in order that
we could discuss together our common interests in various portions of the globe and compare our approaches to the problems
that confront us daily. I warned that there would be no agenda-an
error of omission was that I failed to say there would be no "final
communique .' '
As a result of that failure , all other officials at the conference,
influenced by routine and custom, and needled by some two
hundred press, radio, television and newsreel representatives,
spent a great deal of time on the exact wording of a final,
"combined" statement. It bored me immeasurably and struck me
as typifying futility. When people get to arguing heatedly over
such details, I inevitably recall the old saying "picking nits with
boxing gloves .''
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In spite of this frustrating item, the meeting as a whole was
productive, especially in providing opportunity for necessary
conversations with the British. This was not as true in the case of
the French because of the known certainty that this particular
French government would not be of long life.
At times Winston [Churchill] seemed to be his old and hearty
self, full of vim and determination. At others he seemed almost to
wander in his mind. I must confess that occasionally I suspected
this latter was almost a deliberately adopted mannerism rather
than an involuntary habit. At least it seemed to come over him only
when the subject under discussion or the argument presented was
distasteful to him.
The French situation, currently symbolized by their almost
futile effort to elect a President, was clearly felt also at Bermuda.
The answers were always "Yes, but" or "No, unless."
Actually, France's situation is merely symptomatic of what is
happening to the entire world. There is the extreme Right. In
France these people are the deGaullists, while in the world scene
they are Fascist dictatorships, largely found now in Spanishspeaking or in the Arab countries.
There is the extreme Left, in France and in the world,
Communistic.
In between these two extremes is a vast center group which in
basic beliefs has much in common, and, for this reason, should be
a closely knit organization. In point of fact this vast center or
"middle of the Road" group prefers to shut its eyes to the dangers
represented in the extremes-in the current state of affairs, the
only threatening extreme is Communism. The group of nations of
which this center is constituted constantly indulge in all kinds of
divisive arguments and name-calling that grow so important in
their cumulative effect as to nullify any attempt toward unity in
working against the common enemy.
So-just as the French cannot agree upon firm policies respecting the prosecution of the Indo-China war nor decide what they
want to do with respect to EDC, we find that the world cannot
agree on basic policies concerning trade with the Communists,
firming up cooperative plans that would permit us all to advance
economically and politically, nor even decide how we can best
protect ourselves along the sensitive European front.
India would rather see Pakistan weak and helpless in front of a
Russian threat than to see that country grow strong enough to give
114

substance to its hope of annexing Kashmir. France would rather
see Germany weak and helpless in Europe than to see that country
strong enough to serve as an effective bar against possible Russian
invasion. In the latter event, France is fearful that German strength
might again be used against her. Of course to us this particular fear
seems senseless, in view of our guarantees that no country
admitted into the combined European defensive system would be
allowed to attack another.
There is no use belaboring the point nor pursuing the analogy
too far. The fact is, however, that while we get almost disgusted
with the picture that France currently presents, we need only to
look at the rest of the world-indeed to ourselves-to see many
points of similarity.
I think I have digressed sufficiently far from Bermuda that I
should come back there just long enough to say that I left the
Islands one morning, flew to New York, and that afternoon made a
talk to the UN.
That particular talk had been evolving in our minds and plans
for many weeks. Quite a while ago I began to search around for
any kind of an idea that could bring the world to look at the atomic
problem in a broad and intelligent way and still escape the impasse
to action created by Russian intransigence in the matter of mutual
or neutral inspection of resources . I wanted, additionally, to give
our people and the world some faint idea of the size of the distance
already travelled by this new science-but to do it in such a way as
not to create new alarm.
One day I hit upon the idea of actual physical donations by
Russia and the United States-with Britain also in the picture in a
minor way-and to develop this thought in such a way as to
provide at the very least a calm and reasonable atmosphere in
which the whole matter could again be jointly studied. Once the
decision was taken to propose such a plan in some form, the whole
problem became one of treatment, choice of time, place and
circumstance, and the niceties of language . I had, of course, a lot of
excellent help-but I personally put on the text a tremendous
amount of time .
Throughout the friendly world reactions have been good; our
official messages have been much like the public statements you
have seen in the press . The Soviets have now, at last, moved
toward a meeting, though not without their customary grumbling,
griping, and some sneering. We will see now what the next step
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brings forth! But all in all I believe that the effort up to this point
has been well worth while, and has done something to create a
somewhat better atmosphere both at home and abroad.
A week after finishing the UN talk, my Cabinet and I had to be
ready to meet the Republican legislative leaders and go over with
them the legislative program we had prepared during these past
months. We knew exactly where we wanted to go in the matter of
principle and we were quite sure of the basic direction that we
would take in each of the several important fields that together
would make up an entire program. But it was very necessary to get
together with the legislative leaders for several purposes:
(a). To gather from the legislative leaders their impressions of the sentiment of the country, compare their
reactions with ours, and thus arrive at an order of
precedence or priority in the presentation of the program.
(b). Under the principles and purposes laid out by the
Administration, to work out applicable legislative methods, as well as modifying small details to add to the
attractiveness or popularity of the particular program.
(c). To renew the habit of cooperative effort between the
Executive and Legislative Departments.
(d). To bring out that the Republican Party, headed by the
President, had reached that point where a combined,

concerted effort to put over a progressive, enlightened legislative
program was mandatory!
It is, of course, necessary for all to understand that success will
lead to continuing governmental responsibility. Failure would lead
to an adverse result which would be exactly what was deserved in
the circumstances. Since the President, under our system, must
take the lead in the presentation of such programs, the simple
truth is that the mass of Republican and independent supporters
have got to be behind the Administration-or else.
The meetings were on the whole successful-so far as we can
determine-far beyond our expectations. Of course only the stress
of actual Congressional debate and voting will tell the final story,
but I am hopeful.
I do not mean ·by any of the above that mere partisan
Republican support is, under the existing circumstances in Congress, sufficient to the success of a legislative program. We have
got to have the support of reasonable and enlightened Democrats
and I shall certainly do all I can to deserve that support and to act,
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personally, in such a way as to encourage the Democrats to give it
to us.
When last Saturday night arrived and the three days of
conferences, luncheon meetings and arguments had become history, I was so weary and tired that I doubt that I could have spoken
pleasantly to my best friend. However, I did have the distinct
feeling that we could look forward to truly intelligent and cooperative work in both Executive and Legislative branches during the
next session of the Congress. If that comes about, I will, a few
months later, be reaching the halfway mark in my political career
with some sense of real accomplishment, to say nothing of
legitimate reason to hope that improvement and progress will
characterize our country and the world during the approximate
future.
I started this letter in the hope and the belief that it would
really be informative. I have just glanced through what I finished
yesterday and find that it is almost a dud, especially for one who
makes a habit of reading the daily papers. In an effort to include a
piece of news-but after all it will not be news to you-I shall tell
you what would be classed as "Secret Intentions ." It involves
1956, and January 20, 1957. With respect to the political campaign
of '56, my position will be exactly as I determined it would be when
finally I gave way in '52 to the convictions and arguments of some
of my friends . I shall never again be a candidate for anything, and I
so told my friends two years ago. This determination is a fixed
decision (subject to modification only in the case of some worldwide cataclysm that I cannot now foresee and which would make
political change at such a moment almost catastrophic for our
country). Of course I realize that American politics demands that a
President keep his intentions secret in this regard; otherwise, it is
assumed his whole influence on the political scene would disappear and he could not possibly lead in the development of a
legislative program. So, for the moment, I shall observe this socalled political axiom, but this will certainly in no way affect my
intentions!
Meanwhile, I am doing my part to make certain that the
policies in which I firmly believe will have younger and abler
champions when I step off the stage. As I have more than once told
you, the man who, from the standpoint of knowledge of human
and governmental affairs, persuasiveness in speech and dedication
to our country, would make the best President I can think of is my
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young brother, Milton. Under no circumstances would I ever say
this publicly because, in the first place, I do not think he is
physically strong enough to take the beating. In the second place,
any effort to make him the candidate in 1956 would properly be
resented by our people. So he is out so far as I am concerned.
Anyway, I am certain that such a thought has never crossed his
mind and, if it ever did, he would reach the same obvious
conclusion that I have just stated.
But here are some names of people that I am constantly trying
to keep in the public eye so as to let the American people know
more and more about them. Each is able, clean and energetic, and
also important, relatively young. Each is a good executive-and
would certainly have my support-if, at that time, my support
would be helpful. [UN Ambassador Henry Cabot] Lodge, [VicePresident Richard M.] Nixon, [Attorney General Herbert] Brownell
[Jr.], [Mutual Security Administrator Harold E.] Stassen, [Deputy
Attorney General William P.] Rogers, [Secretary of the Army
Robert] Stevens, and one or two others in the Executive Department. In Congress, [Indiana Congressman] Charlie [A .] Halleck is
a standout, and along with him there are a number of young men
developing who could easily become headliners before 1956. They
include [Senator Charles E.] Potter, [Senator Barry M.] Goldwater,
possibly [Senator William F.] Knowland and others.
All I am saying here is that, far from trying to keep young men
out of the spotlight, it is my hope to push them into it and so have
ready a group of young men who are not only able but who will
have the publicity value that a political party always seeks in its
candidate.
Of course I have no fear that you will ever reveal this
information to anyone-but I want you personally to have it so that
if a time ever comes when you see me even appearing to waver from
strict adherence to this pledge-you are to take drastic steps to see
that I do not become more of a damned fool than I was in '52.
Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to Ibby and your nice
family.
As ever,
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1954

In early January, Eisenhower sent Swede a reproduction of
one of his paintings . He wrote again, two weeks later, but only to
bemoan the fact that he had so little time to write . By mid March,
when he finally wrote at greater length, he was preoccupied with,
among other things, his legislative program, a mild recession, the
attempt by Ohio Republican John W. Bricker to win passage of an
amendment to the Constitution limiting the president's power to
make treaties, the French struggle against the Vietminh in Indochina, and the growing controversy between Joe McCarthy and the
Army.

7 January 1954
Dear Swede:
Originally I had no thought of inflicting on my good friends
the print that you will find coming to you in the mail. It is a
reproduction of what I, with some embarrassment, call a " portrait" of Lincoln. The real reason that I am sending it is because I
find myself surrounded only by people who are trying to keep my
spirits at an all-time high and who, out of all reason, praise the
amateurish effort of which you will now have a copy.
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At the very least it brings to you my best wishes for a
wonderful year in 1954.
As ever,

26 January 1954
Dear Swede:
The days go by at their accustomed pace, leaving little time for
the more pleasurable pursuits of life such as indulging in correspondence with good friends. Even now I can do little more than to
tell you again how much I enjoy your letters, and to urge you to
write whenever you feel the impulse to do so.
Occasionally I run into old friends of yours who tell me they
have been to Chapel Hill for a visit. Each time this occurs I make up
my mind to send you a letter telling of the circumstances under
which I encountered your friends.
As you now know from the total failure of such reports to
reach you, my memory plays me tricks-and by the time I get to
the office I am in the midst of politics, economics, education,
foreign trade, and cotton and tobacco surpluses.
All of which is merely preliminary to asking that you give my
love to Ibby, and of course, my warm regard to yourself.
As ever,

18 March 1954
Dear Swede:
I suddenly realize that too much time had elapsed since I last
wrote you an intimate report on the "State of the Union." I believe
I did manage to congratulate you on your (non-existent, but
nevertheless numerical) birthday, but it has been months otherwise.
The interval since the opening of this session of Congress has
been turbulent, as reported too fully in the papers. The press has
harped, or so it seems from this nerve center, on certain demagogic
individuals and practices, and exaggerated, out of all proportion in
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my opm1on, their importance to the nation as a whole . These
things, I am convinced, will run their inevitable course-and I
refuse to deviate from my declared position, in spite of the urgings
of some of my most valued friends and associates in government.
Three things have of this day occupied my time and attention.
(I say three, excluding, of course, the inevitable handshaking or
button-pushing ceremonies that seem daily and inevitably to
intrude on the business of government.)
One of these problems is the recent declaration by the Secretary of Agriculture [Ezra Taft Benson] that as of April first supports
for dairy products will be reduced from 90% of parity to 75%. This
announcement is in accordance with common sense. It has,
however, been widely interpreted as a violation of the principle of
gradualism that we have advocated in flexible price supports. This
may put us in a hole in establishing our sincerity when we talk of
gradualism as a feature of the farm policy. In addition, there is no
question that it will somewhat diminish the purchasing power of
the people in the dairy producing states, and inevitably add to our
burdens there. I personally think the Secretary of Agriculture
made a mistake in failing to take smaller bites-though I hasten to
add that he did so with my general approval and on his understanding of the law, believing it to be compulsory. The error, if any,
was merely in failing to search for some means of acting a bit more
gradually, even though we have butter, milk, cheese and all other
dairy products flooding the country. In saying this I want to stress,
too, that there is no man in government more dedicated and
devoted, and more selfless and sincere, than is Ezra Benson .
Another problem of the day and of the past weeks (now
successfully concluded as I dictate this around five o 'clock) has
been the struggle in the House over the Administration's tax
program. You know as well as I the attack the program has been
under, and there is no need here to repeat the views I expressed in
my television talk on Monday night. But I do want to say that I am
firmly convinced that, under existing circumstances, the Administration's bill is a well thought out program of tax reduction and
economic stimulation. It is designed to do the greatest good for the
greatest number of our citizens, under domestic and world conditions of this moment. The fact that the bill was successfully pushed
through the House was due to the great work done by Charlie
Halleck, Joe Martin [Speaker of the House] and a couple of others
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up on the Hill. On this particular issue I found the Administration
had the good solid team work in the House that it should have had
and did not have in certain other matters in the Senate, notably the
"Bricker Amendment."
The third major problem of the day is the increasingly bad
situation in Indo-China. As you know, the Vietminh continue their
assault on Dien Bien Phu, and the situation there becomes increasingly disturbing. I hope the French will have the stamina to
stick it out; because a defeat in that area will inevitably have a
serious psychological effect on the French. I suspect that this
particular attack was launched by the Communists to gain an
advantage to be used at the Geneva Conference. At any rate, it is
just another of the problems that is dumped in my lap-in this
particular case, of course, there is little I can do except to wait it out
and hope for the best.
You must forgive my rambling-but I do find some release
from the tensions of the day in writing in this fashion. It provides
the next best thing to seeing you.
My love to Ibby, and of course, as always, the very best to
yourself,
As ever,

The war in Vietnam between the French and the Communistled Vietminh had been going on for eight years and was now
nearing its climax in a battle over the isolated French stronghold at
Dien Bien Phu. The French, though Eisenhower does not mention
it here, were appealing for United States intervention and had
received strong support both from Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles and from Vice-President Nixon. Eisenhower himself told a
press conference that Indochina was like a "falling domino"
whose collapse would threaten the entire Pacific basin; Nixon
would tell a meeting of newspaper editors that "we must take the
risk now by putting American boys in"; and the head of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Arthur W. Radford, would put the final
touches on Operation Vulture, a proposed American airstrike at
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Dien Bien Phu. The French, however, were not willing to meet
Eisenhower's conditions-a clear-cut commitment to independence for the Vietnamese, the "internationalization" of the war,
and, implicit in this, a determinative role for the United States in its
conduct.
The defeat of the French and the subsequent Geneva settlements provided a framework for peace in Indochina, though on
terms that almost everyone recognized would quickly lead to
Vietminh control of all of Vietnam. In its efforts to avoid this
outcome, the Eisenhower administration would subvert the Geneva agreements and lay the groundwork for the expanded United
States commitment that would occur under President's Kennedy
and Johnson.
By April the army-McCarthy hearings were playing to a
packed audience in the old Senate caucus room and to a national
television audience of millions. The army, which had been harassed by McCarthy throughout 1953, had accused the senator of
using his office to seek special favors for G. David Schine, a young
staff member who had been drafted. McCarthy counterattacked by
accusing the army of holding Schine as a "hostage." The investigation of these charges and countercharges was conducted by the
Senate's Subcommittee on Permanent Investigations, McCarthy's
own committee, from which the senator had reluctantly stepped
down.
Eisenhower was dismayed by the proceedings . As he suggests
in this letter, quite typically, he would have much preferred a
decorous and orderly investigation by an administrative agency
such as the army' s inspector general. He nevertheless stuck by his
decision not to engage the senator publicly, though he was widely
criticized for doing so. Eisenhower did move against McCarthy
indirectly and through intermediaries. It would remain for the
Senate itself to discipline McCarthy, however, which it did in late
1954 when it voted to censure him .
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27 April 1954

Personal and Confidential
Dear Swede:
A few nights ago I made a talk before the American Newspaper Publishers' Association. In the course of the talk I urged the
need for better understanding in America of today's domestic and
world problems; I likewise urged the need for a greater two-way
flow of information between us and nations abroad. I tried to point
out that regardless of other means of developing understandings
and providing information the most effective vehicle was still the
publicity media of the several nations . The consequence of this
kind of thinking is that newspapers have a very definite responsibility to our country to inform it accurately and adequately, and
that while we must sustain the rights of a free press, it seems clear
that the free press must try to promote reader-understanding as
well as to cater to reader-interest.
To this talk I have had no adverse reaction from outsiders or
laymen; but I have received a number of criticisms from publishers
themselves . The central theme of the criticism has been "Why
should he attempt to tell us about our business?" Personally I
thought I was rather mild in expressing my feelings in the matter,
but where I have made any attempt to reply to the friendly
publishers who have shared this critical view, I have said only two
things-first, "Are you operating a grocery store for immediate
profit or do you regard the publishing of a newspaper as partaking
of a public service? If the latter is the case, then you certainly
assume responsibilities the discharge of which are of great interest
to governmental officials."
My second observation has been, "When have you hesitated
to tell me how to run my business? Admittedly I am a public
servant and therefore subject, in all my public actions, to criticism.
But, again, assuming that you do admit that the publishing of a
newspaper should be as much a public service as a 'commercial
venture' you are also to that degree a public servant and I have a
right to criticize you ."
Beyond this, I did not, of course, make any sweeping allegations against the American press. Consequently any hurt
feelings must be because someone felt that the shoe fit-but
uncomfortably.
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In my last letter I remember that I mentioned Dien Bien Phu. It
still holds out and while the situation looked particularly desperate
during the past week, there now appears to be a slight improvement and the place may hold on for another week or ten days. The
general situation in Southeast Asia, which is rather dramatically
epitomized by the Dien Bien Phu battle, is a complicated one that
has been a long time developing. It involves many talks on the
international level and the frantic desire of the French to remain a
world power, but at the same time defeating themselves through
their deep divisions and consequent indecisiveness at home .
For more than three years I have been urging upon successive
French governments the advisability of finding some way of
"internationalizing" the war; such action would be proof to all the
world and particularly to the Viet Namese that France's purpose is
not colonial in character but is to defeat Communism in the region
and to give the natives their freedom. The reply has always been
vague, containing references to national prestige, Constitutional
limitations, inevitable effects upon the Moroccan and Tunisian
peoples, and dissertations on plain political difficulties and battles
within the French Parliament. The result has been that the French
have failed entirely to produce any enthusiasm on the part of the
Vietnamese for participation in the war. (Incidentally, did you ever
stop to think that if the British had, in our War of the Revolution,
treated as equals the Americans who favored them-whom they
called Loyalists and we called Tories-the job of Washington
would have been much more difficult, if not impossible . I have
read that when the entire colonial forces in the field numbered not
more than twenty-five thousand, that there were fifty thousand
Americans serving in some capacity with and for the British . Yet no
really effective service was rendered by these people because the
British persisted in treating them as "colonials and inferiors ." )
In any event, any nation that intervenes in a civil war can
scarcely expect to win unless the side in whose favor it intervenes
possesses a high morale based upon a war purpose or cause in
which it believes. The French have used weasel words in promising independence and through this one reason as much as
anything else, have suffered reverses that have been really inexcusable.
The British are frightened, I think, by two things . First, they
have a morbid obsession that any positive move on the part of the
free world may bring upon us World War III . Secondly, they are
125

desperately concerned about the safety of Hong Kong . For the
moment the Chinese Communists are not molesting Hong Kong
and the British are fearful that if they should be identified as
opponents of the Communists in the Inda-China affair, they might
suffer the loss of Hong Kong at any moment. All this is conjecture,
but in respect to this particular point, my own view is in almost
direct opposition. I personally feel that if the Communists would
take a good smacking in Inda-China, they would be more likely to
leave Hong Kong severely alone for a long time. Moreover, if a
"concert of nations" should undertake to protect Western interests
in this critical section of the globe, it would appear that Hong Kong
would almost automatically fall within the protected zone.
Just what the outcome will be, of course, is still largely a guess,
but in any event I feel that the situation is a shade-but only a
shade-brighter than it was a week or so ago.
The McCarthy-Army argument, and its reporting, are close to
disgusting . It saddens me that I must feel ashamed for the United
States Senate. Other than that, I doubt that I have any opinions on
the subject that are greatly different from your own, so I will pass it
up for the moment.
One of the features of service life that I miss in this job is an
"Inspector General' s" service. Visitors here-usually meaning to
be helpful-are quite apt to leave with me a hint that something is
wrong here or wrong there, and sometimes these allegations or
charges are of a grave nature.
In the Army it was so simple to turn to a properly trained and
dedicated group any inspection job ranging from suspected peculation to plain incompetence, and it never occurred to me that a
similar or equivalent agency would not be available in the Federal
government . But there is no readily available agency to look into
hints of this character. Even when they are referred to the
interested departments of government, they are very likely to be
handled in a rather lackadaisical manner for the simple reason that
people are not accustomed to the standards of administrative
accounting and responsibility that prevailed in the armed services.
* * *
I had two other subjects-but I stop here in desperation.
*

*

*

Love to the family.
As ever,
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In regard to the development of natural resources, Eisenhower
sought to replace what he called an "exclusive dependence on
Federal bureaucracy" with "a partnership of state and local
communities, private citizens, and the Federal Government, all
working toether ." In practice, this meant a much greater role for
the large private utilities. He tried especially hard to arrest the
growth of the popular New Deal-spawned Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) . The administration's attempt to replace a proposed TVA steam plant with one built by a private utility was
abandoned, however, following revelations of conflict of interest in
the celebrated Dixon-Yates controversy.
Finally, as this letter makes clear, Eisenhower also favored
development, whether public or private, as opposed to the claims
of conservationists. The Bureau of Reclamation ' s proposal to
construct a large multipurpose project on the Upper Colorado
River was opposed by conservationists because it authorized,
among other things, the building of a dam and a reservoir within
the Dinosaur National Monument. This particular provision was
eventually dropped, however, before Congress completed its final
action on the bill in 1956.
On a very different subject, the following letter reveals Eisenhower' s strong commitment to the liberal trading policies of the
Roosevelt and Truman administrations. He was under strong
pressure from protectionists, especially in the conservative wing of
his own party, to raise U.S. trade barriers. He resisted these
pressures, complaining in his diary that many businessmen were
"so concerned with their own particular immediate market and
prosperity that they utterly fail to see that the United States cannot
continue to live in a world where it must ... export vast portions
of its industrial and agricultural products unless it also imports a
sufficiently great amount of foreign products to allow countries to
pay for the surpluses they receive from us."
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20 July 1954

PERSONAL
Dear Swede:
For a number of years I have been serving in posts that were
considered by the press as possible sources of news . Consequently, I have become used to inaccurate reporting-I think it is
not too much to say that, without checking, I believe no story in a
newspaper that involves thoughts, ideas or quotations. I do like to
read editorials merely to find out what editors are thinking about
and what they believe that America is thinking about. Here, too, I
am frequently disappointed by the apparent ignorance of the facts
underlying some opinion or conviction expressed by the writer.
With your last letter you enclosed an editorial having to do
with the darn that is under consideration for construction in
Dinosaur National Park. The statement is made that the place will
be ruined for use by the public; that its scenic beauty will be forever
lost .
Now I have never visited the area and so I don't want to
appear to be as positive of the correctness of the views I express as
was the writer of the editorial you sent. But I can't help wondering
whether he bases his own opinion on a personal visit and
experience or on what somebody else has said.
In any event, the records show that last year, five hundred
Americans visited the affected area. I am not going to try to express
this figure in terms of percentage of 160 million people, but if you
have time to figure it out, you will not be impressed by its size. I
am told that erection of the dam, with the roads leading thereto
and the existence on the artificial lake of a reasonable number of
suitable boats, will make the area truly accessible to travelers . It is
believed that the number of visitors will jump from a figure of five
hundred to many thousands, and I am further informed that the
lake waters will conceal so little of what is now visible as to be
unnoticeable to anyone except a crank. Possibly I am misinformed,
but I venture that the reports I have are as accurate as those on
which the editorialist based his opinion.
He said the principal purpose of the dam was reclamation . It is
not. He even suggested that atomic power would make dams and
power projects useless. Someday perhaps they will. But at this
128

moment such a statement does not appear to me to be very potent
as an argument.
As for the man who wrote the high tariff pamphlet, I hear
these arguments all the time.
If it were possible to erect barriers against the trade of
particular countries and to encourage trade from others, I could
certainly favor some high tariffs. But this is not practicable both
because of the existence of the "most favored nation clause" in
our treaties and because in actual practice it would scarcely be
enforceable.
Without going further afield, let us consider for just a moment
the case of Mexico. We are her greatest customer; she must sell to
us or her standard of living will go markedly down from even the
low level at which it now exists. Already in that country there is a
strong communist leaning among certain groups . Included among
those individuals with such leanings is one of the most popular
men in Mexico, ex President [Lazaro] Cardenas. If we erect barriers
against Mexican trade, I know that the possibility of her turning
communist would mount rapidly. Our border with Mexico runs
from Brownsville to the Pacific Ocean, and it is almost totally
unguarded. The "wetback" problem arose out of the fact that we
simply cannot provide the means to prevent Mexicans from going
back and forth across the border, almost at will. If that country
should turn communist, and without considering all the other evil
consequences that would follow in the wake of such an event, just
think of the job that we would have in closing that border tightly.
The financial outlay alone would be colossal.
As of now we do not take too seriously any direct threat from
Mexico. She is a weak country. But let her once form a partnership
with Moscow and it takes no great imagination at all to see what
would happen.
I have taken this one simple example to show that people
ignore pertinent facts when they center their attention exclusively
upon local matters. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that every
domestic problem of any moment must, before it can be properly
solved, be examined critically against the background of our
international situation. This is what so many of the after dinner
speakers forget .
There are a number of things on which we should possibly
have higher tariffs than we do now. But the problem may not be
solved merely through consideration of local "prosperity" but on
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its effect upon practical cooperation among us and our international friends.
Of course I agree with the argument of the author that to
throw our gates open now to "free trade" would be disastrous.
But I might end this part of my letter by merely saying that anyone
whose business and profits depend upon high protective tariffs is
not, by any stretch of the imagination, a rugged individualist. He is
just as much a kept man as is anyone who lives upon any other
form of subsidy from the people of the United States .
Frankly, I think it almost idiotic to attempt any discussion of
the tariff in a few paragraphs; the subject is so complex and
intricate that the best that can be evolved in a short time is a few
expletives, slogans and aphorisms.
When last I wrote to you, I talked something of Indo-China.
That battle is now being waged as much in Geneva [where an
international conference was taking place] as in the rice paddies of
the Red Delta. In neither place are the French doing well . But one
bright spot in the picture is that [Pierre] Mendes-France [premier of
France] has turned out to be much more of a man than most people
predicted . The next few days should determine what we are now
up against in that area. I keep in close touch with the situation
because I can imagine developments in Geneva that would make
me go on the air with explanations to the people.
Congressional leaders still hope to adjourn by July 31st, but I
must say that to me the prospects look very bleak. My own feeling
is that I want them to go just as quickly as they will give me the
great bulk of the program recommended to them for enactment. Already
we know that there are certain items on which they won't act at
this session or upon which they have acted unfavorably. But they
still could make a very brilliant and fine record if they would just
get going; and after all, I have to have something to fight about
next session.
In the armed services I have been having a struggle with some
of the civilian leadership . Whenever there comes up the subject of
morale, some of my associates bring up calculations, in terms of
percentages, of the disadvantages suffered by the armed services
in the matter of pay. The answer they have is to "increase the
armed services pay 5%. " Such generalizations make me furious .
For a long time I have preached such things for the armed services
as:
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a. Automatic increase in living allowances, based upon proper
"norms."
b. Assurance to all career personnel of adequate quarters and,
above all, adequate medical care for their dependents, under all
circumstances .
c. Adequate survivors' benefits and pensions for dependents-whether active or retired.
d. More stable personnel policies to avoid the incessant moving around of families that now takes place because of some
academic idea as to what constitutes a satisfactory "career."
When they get these things done, I am ready to examine the
salary scales, but as of now I believe that, except possibly for junior
officers, the salary scale is not half as important as the matters I
have just mentioned.
You have probably read something in your newspapers about
the struggle I am having with the fanatical supporters of TVA . The
proposal I have made [to replace a proposed TVA steam plant with
one built by private capital] might be challenged on the possible
basis of violation of the letter of the law. But I believe that so far as
logic and common sense are concerned, the proposal offers a good
temporary solution to a problem that grows more difficult day by
day. The facts are:
a. TVA is an existing fact, and there should be no disposition
to destroy it or damage it.
b. Through TVA, supported in some part at least, by the taxes
of the entire country, the Tennessee Valley area has available cheap
power. Consequently, industries from other regions are showing a
tendency to move into the Tennessee Valley so as to take advantage of these prices for power. Naturally, this arouses a fierce
resentment on the part of competing industrialists and all the
informed tax payers in other areas .
c. Because of the growing demand for power in the Tennessee
region, there is now a shortage which must be supplied from
somewhere.
d . The Federal Government, through the Atomic Energy
Commission, is a great consumer of TVA power.
e. Consequently, the TVA fanatics assert that the Federal
Government has the obligation of supplying this power.
f. Already the power potential of the streams in the region has
been developed, and steam plants have been built by the Federal
Government to firm up the water power of the dams already
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constructed. All further development must be by steam; already
one-half of the power being produced is from steam plants.
With these facts at hand, the questions that arise are: "is there
any limit to the number of steam plants that the Federal Government should build in the region? Should the Federal Government,
having built up the system to its existing extent, now require that
the locality provide for itself any additional power that it needs?"
Admittedly, it has been extremely difficult to dig out all the
pertinent facts. It is for this reason that, to head TVA, I have been
desperately searching for a man who is experienced in hydraulic
engineering and who is completely free from any political or
ideological bias of any kind. I have finally hit upon a man [Herbert
D. Vogel] whose entire life has been spent in the engineering
profession and who has never been connected with politics in any
way. I shall send his name soon to the Senate. The only instructions I am giving him are that he is to find out the facts and report
to me on an objective basis; otherwise, he is merely to run the TVA
as honestly and efficiently as he knows how, and make his
recommendations to the Congress and to me based upon what he
believes to be the best interests of the country.
But in the meantime we have the need for power. And if the
Federal Government does not build the requested steam plants
(located, incidentally, way out on the periphery of the region, at
West Memphis), then the Atomic Energy Commission must purchase its power from private industry or the power shortage will
merely grow more aggravated.
This is what I propose.
The reason that no private individual or municipality in the
area can now build plants and distribute power, is that all the TVA
contracts contain a clause giving to the TVA a monopoly.
It seems a strange thing when, in America, there is bitterly
opposed a governmental proposal that seeks no more than practical opportunity in which to take a look to see what we are doing in
some of these projects that bring the Federal Government into
every facet and phase of our lives.
In permitting the incessant growth of the Federal Government, we have already drifted a long way from the philosophy of
Jefferson. While he was not necessarily always right, he did have
sense enough to know that if Federal authority should be extended
throughout the country, through various subterfuges of corporations, authorities, loans and grants, it would eventually stifle the
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individual freedom that our government was designed to protect
and preserve.
This whole case reminds me of how much time a President has
to spend in resisting pressure groups-each organized to gain for
its members some advantage through Federal law or to make it
possible for them to dig deep into the Federal treasury. At first
blush it would not seem difficult to champion the cause of all the
people against any particular segment thereof. But when you add
up all the segments that have special interests in some kind of
Federal preferment, the picture does not look so rosy. You might
try listing them for yourself.
One of the things we need most in this country today is a
general rainfall of about two inches over the entire country, and
falling softly and gently over a period of about a week. If you can
arrange this, you will make some of my troubles far less acute .
Give my love to Ibby and the family.
As ever,
P.S . This is really-in spite of its length-only a miniature of a
day's worries-problems-etc.
D.

By the time that Eisenhower wrote this letter he was deeply
involved in the election campaign, to a degree all the more
surprising given his repeatedly stated aversion to political campaigning. Despite his efforts, however, the Republicans lost control of both the House and Senate, and for the the next six years,
Eisenhower would be compelled to work with a Congress that was
organized by the opposition party.
In the following letter, Eisenhower provides a brief rejoinder
to those who were charging that he was allowing John Foster
Dulles to virtually run foreign affairs. And in his discussion of Earl
Warren, whom he had named to the Supreme Court in March, he
reveals a stunning misapprehension of both Warren and the civilrights issue . Eisenhower disagreed with the Court's ruling in the
Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, decision and would
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later characterize the appointment of Warren as "the biggest
damfool mistake I ever made.''

23 October 1954
Dear Swede:
Your judgment on the spinning reel coincides exactly with
mine. Since 1944 when I first encountered these gadgets in France,
I have been the recipient of various types of spinners-I should say
one arrives about every sixty days. I leave them to those who like
them. For my own fishing, I keep half a dozen fly rods ranging
from about 1-½ ounces to 4-½, and I keep three favorite casting
rods. I think this combination ought to see me through the fishing
seasons left to me .
I skip over your comments on the election campaign. I have
appeared before a number of audiences, but I strive to deal only
with substantive matters-with fact and logical deduction-while
staying out of political bickering.
When you mention Adlai [Stevenson], I again find myself in
complete agreement with you, except that I doubt that he is a very
dangerous opponent. However, if he should slip into a position of
real responsibility, he would represent a great risk for the country.
As to "four-headed" foreign policy, the Democrats never
succeeded in keeping people like [Nevada's Sen. Patrick] McCarran from sounding off when they so chose. So if a Republican
Senator lets go once in a while, I don' t know what we can do about
it, even though I deplore the misunderstandings they create.
So far as Dulles is concerned, he has never made a serious
pronouncement, agreement or proposal without complete and
exhaustive consultation with me in advance and, of course, my
approval. If your friend Senator [Samuel J.] Ervin [Dem., N.C.]
would take the trouble to look up the record, he would see that
Nixon belonged in the same school, although he admittedly tries to
put his pronouncements into more colorful language.
You are somewhat wrong in your statement, "I know that at
one time you contemplated some really drastic action in Indo134

China." What I really attempted to do was to get established in
that region the conditions under which I felt the United States
could properly intervene to protect its own interests. A proper
political foundation for any military action was essential. Since we
could not bring it about (though we prodded and argued for almost
two years), I gave not even a tentative approval to any plan for
massive intervention.
You are right in your conclusion that the European situation
looks somewhat better. By no means have I made up my mind
finally on Mendes-France. For the moment, I accept your instinctive impression as my own.
As to appointments on the Supreme Court, I think one or two
observations are applicable. Your implication seems to be that
Governor Warren was a "political" appointment. It was most
emphatically not.
That particular vacancy occurred most unexpectedly, and the
particular qualifications in the individual that should fill it were
something that I studied and lived with for a number of weeks .
The Chief Justice has a great many administrative tasks, as well as
obvious responsibilities involving personal leadership. Along with
this, he must be a statesman and, in my opinion (since I have my
share of egotism), I could not do my duty unless I appointed a man
whose philosophy of government was somewhat along the lines of
my own. All this finally brought me down to Warren, especially as
I refused to appoint anyone to the Supreme Court who was over 62
years of age . It seems to me completely futile to try to use a
Supreme Court vacancy as a mere reward for long and brilliant
service. If I should be succeeded by a New Deal President, a judge
who is now 69 or 70 would probably create a vacancy very soon to
be filled by the left-wingers. So-it seems to me that prudence
demands that I secure relatively young men for any vacancies that
may occur. I wish that I could find a number of outstanding jurists
in the low 50's.
The segregation issue will, I think, become acute or tend to die
out according to the character of the procedure orders that the
Court will probably issue this winter. My own guess is that they
will be very moderate and accord a maximum of initiative to local
courts .
Give my love to the family.
As ever,
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In the aftermath of the off-year elections, in which the Republicans had lost control of Congress, Eisenhower returned to the
question of his candidacy in 1956 and to a general analysis of
Republican politics. He makes clear here, as elsewhere, his contempt for Congress and its "demagogues," and his preference for
administration over electoral politics . The letter ends with a frothy
digression on "greatness."

8 December 1954
Dear Swede:
A new phase of political experience has begun for me. We
have now reached the point where we have newspaper and radio
argument as to whether or not I could be re-elected if I should be a
1956 candidate.
The effect on the individual (myself) of this argument is to stir
up a reaction of "I will show them." Possibly, if I read the papers
and listened to the radio as steadily as some others, I would be
more influenced by this kind of thing. Actually I regard it as just
'' sound and fury'' that does not raise in my own mind the slightest
question as to the wisdom of my decision, long ago communicated
to you.
While I don't recall the exact words of that letter [of 24 Dec.
1953], I think I did imply that the only thing that could possibly
make me change my mind would be an unforeseen national
emergency that might possibly convince me that it was my duty to
stay on.
From the reports that come in to me, there appears to be no
doubt that the dominant influence in the Democratic Party has
come to be the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations], or at
least the CIO and the AFofL [American Federation of Labor] in
combination. I am told that labor unions were by far the greatest
contributors to the Democrats in the recent campaign, and if you
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will consider the political complexion of most of the people that the
Democrats put up for the Senate in the last election, you will
realize that they are obviously wooing the leftish vote . Yorty,
Neuberger, Taylor, Carroll, Murray, O'Mahoney, Humphrey,
Douglas, MacNamara-all have the reputation of favoring big
paternalistic government and centralization of political power in
Washington.111
In view of all this, it would appear that the rift between the
Southern and Northern Democrats would widen markedly, but so
great is the politician's thirst for power and personal prestige that
philosophical and doctrinal differences are unimportant to partisans seeking office.
We have some splendid Southern Senators-George, Byrd,
Robertson, Stennis, Price Daniel, Holland and Russell are examples of the kind of men that we should have in Washington.[ 2 1 But
it is almost amazing to realize that they are of the same political
party as the others named above.
Yet this yawning chasm between the two wings of the Democratic Party does not appear to the public to be so formidable or
paradoxical as does the much more publicized but less significant
division in the Republican Party. In the Republicans you find no
extreme leftists. [Wayne L.] Morse [a Republican Senator from
Oregon who switched to the Democrats in 1952] deserted-thank
goodness! We have what I like to call Progressive Moderates and
the Conservative Rightists. However, these two groups often work
in unison on important matters, notably national security, taxes,
farm legislation, and so on. But our trouble has been that all of our
constructive work accomplished through the support of practically
every Republican in the Senate and in the House (with help from

1. The Democrats to whom Eisenho wer referred w ere California Congressm an
Samuel W. Yorty, Sen . Richard L. Neuberger of Orego n , former Se n . G len H .
Taylor of Idaho, Congressm an and later Sen . John A . Carroll of Colorado, Sen .
James E. Murray of Montana, Sen . Joseph C. O ' Mahoney of Wyoming, Sen . Hubert
H . Humphrey of Minnesota, Sen . Paul H . Douglas of Illinois, and Sen. Pat
McNamara of Michigan .
2. The southern senators to w ho m Eisenhower referred were Walter F. George
and Richard B. Russell of Georgia, Harry Flood Byrd and A. Willis Robertson of
Virginia, John C. Stennis of Mississippi, Price Daniel of Texas, a nd Spessard L.
Holland of Florida.
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Democrats of like convictions) has been overshadowed by the
headline value of the McCarthy argument, the TVA filibuster, and
the Bricker Amendment debates. These have come to mean
"Republicanism" to far too many people.
The average level of ability, dedication and integrity is invariably higher in the Cabinet than it is among the politicians, where
we find so many demagogues . The reason is that Cabinet members
are selected person by person, normally on the basis of experience,
ability, character, and standing in their several communities. This
is the way mine were chosen! Others attain office through many
means and methods-sometimes they are far from representative
of America's best qualities . So it is lucky for a President that he is
enabled to associate much more intimately with his own Cabinet
than he does with politicians in general.
It is astonishing how infrequently anything of a partisan
character is mentioned in the Cabinet; problems are discussed
objectively and argument proceeds on the basis of bringing to bear
every viewpoint on the specific project. Two of my most trusted
advisors were, up until a few years ago, dyed-in-the-wool Southern Democrats. Yet this fact is one that I believe rarely occurs to any
of the members of the Cabinet as we try to work out composite
solutions for specific problems.
Incidentally, one of these old Democrats but now a Republican-Bob Anderson of Texas-is just about the ablest man that I
know anywhere. He would make a splendid President of the
United States, and I do hope that he can be sufficiently publicized
as a young, vigorous Republican so that he will come to the
attention of Republican groups in every state in the union . Another
fine man is Herbert Hoover, Jr. In addition there are Dick Nixon,
Cabot Lodge, Herb Brownell and Charlie Halleck. Some still
believe that Harold Stassen has a political future, but others think
he has more or less eliminated himself from serious consideration
by the Republican Party as its future standard bearer.
Incidentally, there is one fact pertinent to a second term
candidacy that many people seem to have overlooked. It is a
tradition in this country that the moment a President publicly
announces his determination not to seek re-election, his political
influence disappears. From that day onward the leaders of his own
party jockey for position in the hope of becoming his successor in
the Presidency, while newspapers and the opposing party alike
138

lose interest in him because of his self elimination from the political
future of the country.
Now here is the particular point I bring to your attention. We
now have a constitutional amendment prohibiting to any man
more than two terms as President. Consequently, any President who is
elected for a second tenn has, on that date, been officially and irrevocably
eliminated as a future candidate-and presumably as a real political
influence.
The implication of this fact and this assumption is that only the
most unusual of circumstances should induce any man to stand a
second time for the Presidency.
Not long ago my old friend Winston [Churchill] reached the
venerable age of four score. The occasion was made one of
celebration throughout the Empire, and our own papers were filled
with reminiscent accounts of his experiences and accomplishments . Some of these were, I thought, both reasonable and
accurate; others extravagant. In reflecting on some of the statements made, I began in my own mind to arrange in priority of
"greatness" the people I have known.
This is an interesting mental exercise because first one is
compelled to define for himself the qualities and circumstances
that enter into his own evaluations. (I have got the uneasy feeling
that I may have talked on this subject to you before. If so, you can
skip the next few paragraphs.)
I have long believed that no man can be classed as great
unless:
a. He is either so pre-eminent in some broad field of human
thought or endeavor as to have earned this classification by
common acclaim
or . . .
b . He has, in some position of great responsibility, so discharged his duties as to have left a marked and favorable imprint
upon the future of the society or civilization of which he is a part.
Plato would be an example of the first classification; George
Washington of the second.
Greatness, of course, does not necessarily mean perfection.
But I do think we have to make a distinction between a great man
and a great specialist, as, for example, a great general.
Martin Luther was a great man; Napoleon was a great general.
Indeed the latter had some of the qualities of a great man, but had
obvious and glaring defects.
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The qualities we seek in a great man would be v1s10n,
integrity, courage, understanding, the power of articulation either
in the spoken or the written form, and what we might call
profundity of character. The great specialist would be measured, I
think, largely by results.
Now Churchill. Unquestionably he is a great politician and a
great war leader. In addition, he has displayed many of the
qualities of a great man. For my part, I think I would say that he
comes nearest to fulfilling the requirements of greatness in any
individual that I have met in my lifetime. I have known finer and
greater characters, wiser philosophers, more understanding personalities . But they did not achieve prominence either through
carrying on duties of great responsibility or through giving to the
world new thoughts and ideas of such character as to bring to them
by popular acclaim the title of great.
Of course I remember the old proverb that "the prophet is not
without honor, save in his own country." So I think that almost
any of us is more likely to call a man great if we have known him
only slightly or through casual reading than we are if we have been
well acquainted with him personally or studied him too long. Yet
three Americans whose lives most of us have studied fairly
thoroughly stand up well against all these tests, even though each
had his admitted weaknesses. They are Washington, Lincoln and
Robert E. Lee. Some would add Jefferson and maybe Wilson.
Of Americans I have known personally, I think that George
Marshall possessed more of the qualities of greatness than has any
other. [Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer, of Germany, ranks high on
my list. And Henry L. Stimson [former secretary of state and war]
was another. Among those that the Congress had produced (now I
am talking again of those of whom I have read as well as those I
have known), I think John Quincy Adams would head my list. In
his later years, Arthur [H .] Vandenberg [senator from Michigan]
came close, and in his prime I think that Senator [Walter F.] George
[Dem., Ga.] likewise did so .
In any event, one is struck by the fact that two centuries have
produced but few individuals who we can without any hesitation
put into the classification of great. All this is of no interest, but it
does give you some understanding of the thoughts that began
wandering aimlessly through my mind this morning as I have
dictated between appointments. These included an appointment
with an official of the Pocket Testament League, the President of
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Eisenhower and United States Chief of Staff George C. Marshall in
Algeria, 3 June 1943 (United States Army photograph, courtesy of
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library) .

Saint Louis University, a new Minister from the Rumanian People's Republic, and the Ambassador of Honduras.
If there is any association of ideas between the things I have
jotted down for you here and the presence of these individuals in
my office this morning, I could not possibly trace it or explain it.
Maybe you can.
In any event, give my love to the family, and, of course, all the
best to yourself.
As ever,
P.S . I hope that my observation about greatness and its scarcity did
not sound pessimistic. Long ago I learned to look for caliber or
relative size in individuals rather than for perfection. So perhaps it
is enough to say that with the principal officials of the Executive
Department I am more than pleased. I am highly gratified with
their performance and I should say that if today I could without
question or confusion change any or all members of this organization, I would not remove more than two or three at the outside.
Even in these cases I could not be too sure that a change would be
an improvement.
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1955

In December, Eisenhower sent to Swede copies of a recently
completed portrait of himself and of a painting of Washington that
Eisenhower himself had done. In January 1955 he returned to the
subject of better pay, housing, and health benefits for members of
the armed services, a rather ironic discussion given his own strong
opposition to the national-health-care proposals of the Truman
administration. And in an afterword, he discusses, briefly, his
son's somewhat reluctant decision to remain in the army.

28 January 1955
Dear Swede:
It will probably be some time before I answer your letter in the
detail that such a thoughtful communication deserves. However, I
want to remark upon one point you brought up-a raise in pay for
the Services.
I have personally conducted quite a survey among a number
of young officers and enlisted men as to what particular thing
would add most to the attractiveness of a service career for them.
Of course, a number have just said, "Raise my pay." But when the
subject is pursued further, much more comes to light, and, out of
all this, I have concluded about as follows:
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(a) A raise in pay is badly needed for highly trained technicians and non-commissioned officers in the enlisted grades.
(b) A selective raise in pay for officers should be enacted,
particularly for those in the Army grades of Second Lieutenant to
Major inclusive, and similar grades in the other Services .
(c) Some raise in pay for " hazardous duty" is needed . Since a
great portion of this pay goes to aviators and submariners-and
these are principally in the grades just indicated-there would be a
dual raise in pay for many officers of the grades of Second
Lieutenant to Major.
(d) For officers of the career services, there should be adequate
quarters .
(e) For all officers of all grades, there should be fewer changes
of station. These always occasion a drain upon the private purse
and create a recurring necessity of fitting out homes and making
new friends.
(f) Each officer should be assured decent and adequate medical care for dependents . This is particularly important these days
because a young officer is so often ordered away on tours of duty
of three months to a year in duration and forbidden to take his
family with him. Without exception, the younger married officers I
have seen give this as one of the most depressing things they
encounter in Service today.
(g) There should be better provisions made for the care of
dependents upon an officer' s death, whether he is on the active or
the retired list-in the first case, it would be a higher pension. (As
of this moment, a reserve officer' s widow gets something on the
order of 5 or 6 times as much as a regular officer' s widow if both
officers die while on active service.) Likewise, retirement pay
should contain a survivor' s clause which would provide a minimum standard of living for his widow.
Income taxes, so far as I can see, are never again going back to
the comfortable 3 or 4 percent that we paid in our early years of
service . Consequently, in the average case, for every three cents
added to an officer's pay, he returns one to the Federal Government. But this is not the case in what you call the " fringe "
benefits .
I've had a number of Service officers conducting similar
surveys and their findings largely confirm my own . But as to the
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basic issue, I endorse your thought, " ... We must make the career
services more attractive ."
Thanks for your letter.
As ever,
P.S . In this matter I had a curious reaction from my son. Of course,
his case is not typical; both he and his wife are Service "brats," he
has from his grandparents some financial help and prospects and,
because of me, feels a certain special obligation to the Service .
When a large firm offered him a most attractive position, he
said to me :
(a) The Services are losing many young officers because of low
pay and allowances, and domestic hardships .
(b) I'm in a bit better financial position to stay than is the
average.
(c) If I'm any good, the Service needs me.
(d) If I'm no good, the Service will eventually fire me-as it
should-but in any case I would not be existing on the charity of a
business firm or friend extended to me because of my parents.
(e) So far as Service Public Relations are concerned, I think it
would be unfortunate for the son of the President to resign.

In February, Eisenhower sent to Swede a brief greeting on his
"non-existent" leap-year birthday. Then, in June he returned
again to the possibility of his candidacy in 1956 and to a review of
the accomplishments of the first several years of his presidency.
Among the "definite victories" the administration had scored
were Iran and Guatemala, where the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) had toppled existing governments. The " stalemate" was
Korea; and the " limited loss" was Indochina, where the French
and the Vietminh had agreed to a temporary partition at the
seventeenth parallel.
In his catalogue of domestic triumphs, Eisenhower obviously
avoided mention of the administration's inept handling of the new
poliomyelitis vaccine, which led to the resignation of the secretary
of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Oveta Culp
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Hobby, or to the Dixon-Yates scandal, which undermined his
efforts to limit the TVA.
The "London Agreements" to which Eisenhower alludes
brought West Germany into NATO, finally accomplishing what
the United States had earlier attempted through the abortive
European Defense Community. The "Big Four" meeting, coming
shortly after the ascension to power of Nikita Khrushchev in the
Soviet Union, did indeed signal a relaxation of East/West tensions,
and for at least a brief while, both East and West basked in the
"spirit of Geneva."

4 June 1955

Personal
Dear Swede:
A thousand things engage my attention these days, butlargely through a bombardment by loyal and well-meaning
friends-the one that dominates all others is "1956." Some time
ago, probably in 1953, I gave you an outline of my intentions with
respect to my future in politics. Those intentions have undergone
no significant change whatsoever. But as the tension mounts and
the bombardment continues, the question that I will have to face
next spring will be: "Are the conditions actually prevailing in the
world and at home sufficiently serious as to be classed as an
emergency which should properly override any personal decision
or desire?"
As of this moment I feel no qualms as to my ability to hold out
in what I think to be a sane and proper determination, formulated
in the light of the good of the whole country. No man has ever
reached his 70th year in the White House; this may not mean much
in itself, but it does remind us that every Presidential term is for
four years and no one has the faintest right to consider acceptance
of a nomination unless he honestly believes that his physical and
mental reserves will stand the strain of four years of intensive
work . Incidentally, this inspires the observation that the greater
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the tensions of the domestic and world situation, the greater would
be the erosion in mental and physical resistance.
In any event, if I should come to feel any weakening of my
own resolution in this whole affair, I may get you on the phone .
You are one of the very few who has seemed, from the beginning,
to have been on my side in such matters .
The past two years or more have shown tremendous progress
in procuring legislation that has been needed. This had included a
new farm program, reforms in tax systems, a marked increase in
pay of the uniformed services, a bill for increased pay and reform
in the postal services, enactment of a better trade law and, of
course, many others, particularly in the field of social security,
unemployment insurance and so on. On top of all this, we have
had a major tax reduction-the largest single reduction in our
history-and if nothing unforeseen occurs, we approach a balanced budget, Possibly the greatest accomplishment has been the
stabilization in the purchasing power of the dollar. The cost of
living has varied only in the range of something like one half of one
percent in the past two years .
In the international field the record is not all that we could
hope, but it still shows tremendous improvement. In January of ' 52
Korea, Indo-China, Iran, Egypt and Guatemala all presented
problems of the most acute character, some even carrying the
possibility of major war. There is no need to recite here what
happened in each case, but in at least three we had definite
victories and of the others, a stalemate in one and limited loss in
the other.
Added to all these there is the great accomplishment of the
ratification of the London Agreements. The record is one to give
ground for hope of greater things still to come .
Personally I do not expect any spectacular results from the
forthcoming "Big Four" Conference. Nevertheless, I should think
that Foster and I should be able to detect whether the Soviets really
intend to introduce a tactical change that could mean, for the next
few years at least, some real easing of tensions . If we do not obtain
some concrete evidence of such a tactical change, then, of course,
the effort must be to determine the exact purpose of recent Soviet
suggestions for conferences and easing of tensions and so on.
In any event, the general world and domestic outlook is better
than it was two and a half years ago .
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Along with this, of course, my associates and I hope to
recreate in this country some respect for constitutional methods
and procedures in government, and renewed confidence in personal initiative and responsibility as the indispensable foundation
of free government. I think that this also is being done.
Possibly all that I am trying to say is that if I had any special or
particular function and duty in our national life in 1952, that such
special duty has been or is being-so far as current circumstances
will allow us to judge-largely fulfilled.
Of course I believe that prospects as of some ten months from
now will be even better than at present. I hope that we will be
prosperous, fully employed, and with a growing confidence in our
own security and general international position. In such circumstances, I doubt that even the most demagoguish of New Dealers
could induce our citizens to abandon the course on which we are
now embarked so long as we could present to them as candidates,
worthy representatives of "moderate conservatism."
Give my love to Ibby and all the family.
As ever,

After his return from Geneva and the adjournment of Congress, Eisenhower left Washington for Denver and an extended
vacation. The question of his candidacy, however, as his letters to
Swede and others indicate, remained uppermost in his mind.
There was more to the replacement of Adm. Robert B. Carney
as chief of naval operations than Eisenhower's letter to Swede
suggests. In late March 1955, in the midst of the tense crisis over
the Chinese offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, Carney had
told a group of reporters that war was imminent and that some in
the military were pressing the president "to destroy Red China's
military potential and thus end its expansionist tendencies."
Eisenhower moved swiftly to quash such speculation, and two
months later he had Carney quietly replaced as CNO .
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15 August 1955
Dear Swede:
This is my first day in Denver and I have a half hour to myself
while waiting for an appointment with the Mayor and one or two
other people. For some days I have been wanting to write to youfirst to answer your intriguing letter of June 8, second to tell you
something of my Geneva impressions.
Incidentally, mere mention of the date on which your letter
was written takes my mind back eleven years, to June 8, 1944. That
morning I visited all our landing beaches which we had struck the
previous day; before the day was over I was in a first class
shipwreck . I hit a sand bar-and stuck on it-at 33 knots.
A goodly portion of your letter was an analysis of the various
reasons pro and con that will affect my decision about running
again and the pressures that will be brought to bear-some of them
spurious-by those who believe that I should do so. Of course
some of this urging will come from people who merely believe that
with my name on the ticket they can themselves do better
politically; others, I like to believe, will be moved by real (even if
possibly mistaken) concern for the country.
By and large I agree with what you have to say about age. You
treat it as a relative rather than an absolute matter, and to a certain
extent this is true. There is, however, one insidious factor in this
matter which you do not mention. It is this. Normally the last
person to recognize that a man's mental faculties are fading is the
victim himself.
Exactly one week later.
I shall not attempt to explain the hiatus just indicated. It was
one of those things that happen.
* * *
To return to my subject. I have seen many a man "hang on too
long" under the definite impression that he had a great duty to
perform and that no one else could adequately fill his particular
position. The more important and demanding the position, the
greater the danger in this regard.
As to who relieves me, I do not believe the question can be
answered now, nor four years from this date, if I should then be at
the helm .
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The fact is that only the designation of a Presidential nominee
by a political convention can glaringly focus national political attention upon any individual. For two and a half years I have genuinely
tried to place two or three of our able youngn men constantly
before the public in the hope of giving them the publicity value that
would compare favorably with their abilities. The inertia and
indifference that I have encountered are scarcely less than phenomenal.
On the other hand, whoever heard of Stevenson before he
was nominated? Yet today he is the tacitly acknowledged leader of
the Democratic Party. What I am getting at is that no one can make
accurate judgment as to the kind of political race an individual will
run until after he is nominated. That is not wholly true in the
negative sense . By this I mean that you could name dozens who
could get nowhere . On the other hand, I am sure that I could name
at least eight or ten Republicans, any one of whom could, by
reason of personality, ability and energy, conduct a most effective
campaign in our country.
So I feel that your question as to a possible successor is
unanswerable, but if I should be a second term President I argue
that even four years from now the question would still be unanswerable .
Of course, now, with a Constitutional amendment prohibiting
a third term, the interest in a second term President would begin to
die out very seriously after about the first eighteen months . All
attention would be turned to the "heir apparent." This situation
might in fact bring out two or three individuals who would stand
out so much above the crowd that the choice could be narrowed
that far.
At least I feel that the absence of an obvious successor
provides no valid reason for my considering a second term.
Your concern lest I allow the rantings of an "Eager Beaver
from Tennessee" to disturb me may be instantly dismissed. I never
read them. In fact, there are so few people who have any real
conception of the need and difficulty of keeping "fit" in this
position that I pay no slightest attention to any advisory comments
as to my efforts in that direction.
My reactions to Geneva have been fairly well publicized. It
was difficult indeed to reach a decision that I should go to such a
meeting. The twin dangers of encouraging either complacency or
defeatism, depending upon the outcome, were very great indeed.
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These, however, were lessened by the Soviet agreement to the
Austrian Treaty, by their invitation to Adenauer to come to
Moscow-after having previously threatened the most dire consequences in the event that the Paris Agreements [formally approving the inclusion of West Germany into NATO] were signed-and
finally the general attitude of the new Kremlin masters: all of these
encouraged the belief that possibly a new attitude might be
developed in the conduct of foreign relations .
On our side, we were careful to state we were looking for
nothing more, on a short term basis .
The general results you know so well as to need no elaborate
comment from me. However, I am quite sure that the October
meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva will begin to tell the
true story. But a long time must elapse before developments can
possibly reach the stage that we can have any confidence in the
announced purposes and proposals of the Soviets . In the meantime we must keep up our guard.
As for the change in the office of CNO, I think no one doubted
the intelligence and general capacity of Admiral Carney. But I
know that a very distinct difference in philosophies affecting naval
direction and authority arose between him and the Secretary of the
Navy [Charles S. Thomas] . Personally, I think there is nothing
complicated about the line of authority and responsibility. The
President is Commander in Chief. He delegates to a Service
Secretary a certain amount of his Constitutional authority and that
Secretary becomes the President's representative in the affected
service. The Secretary's orders are presumed to be the orders of
the Commander in Chief. If the Secretary is the type who does not
take the advice of his own military choices, or who is domineering
and arbitrary in his decisions, then it is the fault of the Commander
in Chief for having selected such a person, if things go wrong-as
they surely would.
But the theory that the control and direction of all parts of the
Navy fall within the responsibility and authority of the Secretary
cannot be questioned, even though the CNO has an additional
capacity as the chief "Naval Adviser to the President." As I
understand the matter, from both sides, (and of course this a
highly secret) Carney holds that there are certain matters within
the direction and operation of the Naval chiefs, with which the
Secretary has no possible concern or right to interfere .
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I would go so far as to say that if the Secretary felt it necessary
to interfere, then he should instantly relieve the CNO . However,
the only way he can know what is going on is to be constantly
informed and to demand and have all the inspectional rights as to
operations, reports, communications and so on, which are necessary to him in order to form his own judgment in these matters .
Unless this is so, there could be no control over any CNOcertainly the President has no time to check up on such details .
By no means do I intend to imply that the difference was
carried to the point of acrimonious debate or any kind of insubordination. However, I believe it was serious enough that the
Secretary was no longer too happy with the current situation and
therefore recommended the change . Without exception all of us
think that Thomas has been a good Secretary, so in the circumstances it seemed best to make the change.
With warm regard,
As ever,

Early on the morning of 24 September 1955, Eisenhower
suffered a severe heart attack and was rushed to a nearby military
hospital. In Washington there was anxious talk of constitutional
succession. In New York the Dow-Jones industrial average fell
more than thirty points. For the next several weeks the president
remained in virtual seclusion, shielded by his physicians, by
Assistant to the President Sherman Adams, and by his trusted
press secretary, James C. Hagerty. "Welcome to the Cardiac
Club, " wrote Swede on September 27, in a determinedly cheerful
letter. Eisenhower' s reply, dictated on October 6, was accompanied by a note from his private secretary, Ann C. Whitman, who
passed along a request from Hagerty that it not be made public. "It
is one of two dictated by him today," she wrote, "and of course
the newspapers would love nothing better than to know about it."
Whitman went on to assure Swede that Eisenhower' s progress
was, if anything, underestimated. "He looks wonderfully well, he
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Eisenhower at Fitzsimmons Army Hospital, Denver, Colorado, 25 October 1955 (by permission of
United Press International).

is relaxed and cheerful-and he promises to be a good patient.
More than that we cannot ask!"

6 October 1955
Dear Swede:
While the doctors have almost completely succeeded in '' divorcing" me from my secretary (and thus effectively prevented the
kind of reply I should like to make to your note), they relented
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sufficiently to allow me a moment to tell you how much I
appreciated your letter. It was the best possible therapy.
As soon as possible, I want to write you fully. Meantime, my
warm and grateful thanks.
With affectionate regard to Ibby, and, as always, the best to
yourself.
As ever,

"But of course you won't run-and I'm glad," wrote Swede
on October 21, reminding Eisenhower that he had once written
that he considered his brother Milton the best fitted of anyone in
the country to serve as president. "I think he is a natural," Swede
concluded, "and the Eisenhower name alone will pull a lot of
votes." In his reply, Eisenhower reiterated his high regard for his
younger brother's abilities but also repeated his conviction that
Milton had no interest in "politics."

26 October 1955

Personal and Confidential
Dear Swede:
I shall not attempt fully to answer your very fine letter, but,
regarding the paragraph at the top of your second page, which
deals with the "hands off" attitude with regard to a successor, let
us not forget this one thing. I am vitally concerned in seeing
someone nominated who not only believes in the program I have
been so earnestly laboring to have enacted into law, but who also
has the best chance of election. This is the tough one.
With regard to Milton, I have not changed my mind one iota .
In fact, my judgment of past years has been strengthened with
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every new day. But what might ever come of my own opinion in
this matter is something that I have not even seriously considered.
Certainly this is no time for anyone to make any kind of a move. In
fact, it is my own private opinion that if ever there is a fight to
develop in this world between my kid brother and myself, it will be
when and if he ever finds out that I would like to see him shoved
into politics in this fashion.
Today I am walking a few steps. The doctors say my progress
follows the normal pattern. With your experience you know, I
assume, exactly what that means. Apparently there is a period of
some four months before they can make an accurate prognosis of
the level of activity a heart victim can sustain without incurring any
damage . By that time a lot of factors that now appear doubtful or
uncertain should definitely crystallize.
Give my love to Ibbie.
As ever,

On December 19 a friend of Swede's from California wrote
Eisenhower that Swede "has been having a rough time and I just
wasn't sure he had admitted to you how rough." Eisenhower
immediately dictated the following letter. Later, after hearing from
Swede, he had Ann Whitman write to the friend that while
Swede's condition was "not good of course, it is apparently no
worse than it has been for some time."

23 December 1955
Dear Swede:
It seems much too long since I have heard of you, and with the
approaching holiday season I feel once again the necessity of being
in touch- even if it must be by letter-with you.
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I find that my last letter was dated October twenty-sixth, and
its principal topic, still unresolved, swirls daily around my mind
and keeps me awake at nights. At the moment I don't want to mar
the holiday season-and my exhilarated state of mind at being a
grandfather for the fourth time-with delving into the matter too
deeply in a letter.
As far as my physical condition is concerned, I seem to be
making the progress the doctors have anticipated . The one thing I
need is exercise, but the weather at Gettysburg was too uncomfortable to permit me to be out very much- and while I can get a
reasonable amount of exercise in the gymnasium here, the activities are not really those I most enjoy. I would like to go south for
a couple of weeks, but there are certain family considerations
which have priority.
I am afraid that I have had far too great a preoccupation with
my own health these past months. More importantly, what about
you? I would very much like to know how you are feeling and
whether or not you are getting the treatment you need.
The other day I sent you one of the lithographic reproductions
of a painting I did the last week I spent in Fraser. I hope you and
Ibby like it.
This rambling letter represents nothing more, as I say, than a
desire to be in touch with you and, specifically, to inquire about
your health.
Give my love to Ibby and, as always, the best to yourself.
As ever,
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Reassured somewhat as to the state of Swede's health, Eisenhower launched into a long discussion of his own regimen and of
the still unresolved question of his candidacy.

23 January 1956

Personal and Confidential
Dear Swede:
I was more than delighted to have your letter. It had been
some time since you had written to me, and I had begun to grow
fearful you were feeling badly and that correspondence was too
much of a drain on your strength. So when I found I had two or
three pages of pure "Swede, " I experienced a great lift, even
before I had started its reading.
From your letter I see that I must have previously mentioned
some of the difficulties I have in sleeping. Let me assure you that I
have no trouble at all going to sleep. For a matter of five hours or so
I sleep as well as I ever did in my life . But ever since the hectic days
of the North African campaign, I find that when I have weighty
matters on my mind I wake up extremely early, apparently because
a rested mind is anxious to begin grappling with knotty questions .
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Incidentally, I never worry about what I did the day before .
Likewise, I spend no time fretting about what enemies or critics
have said about me. I have never indulged in useless regrets.
Always I find, when I have come awake sufficiently to figure out
what may be then engaging my attention, that I am pondering
some question that is still unanswered .
So I think it is fair to say that it is not worry or useless anxiety
about the past, but a desire to attack the future that gets me into
this annoying habit.
On the whole, however, I think I do pretty well in the matter
of rest. Almost every day, since my attack, I have gotten a nap
ranging from a few minutes to more than an hour. In addition to
this, I certainly must average (because sometimes I do go back to
sleep for a while after an early awakening) some six to six and a
half hours at night. A fellow my age ought to get along all right on
the aggregate .
Incidentally, you might be interested in what Dr. [Paul Dudley] White has to say about mid day rest . He is very much against
lying prone after lunch . He insists that I lie down at least a half hour
before luncheon, and does not seem to be too much concerned
whether I actually go to sleep . After lunch he insists that I take an
hour's rest in an easy chair, but I must not lie down . During this
hour in the chair, he has no objection to my conversing with a
friend or reading papers that are not too full of argumentative
features.
My exercise is supposed to include a short swim in a warm
pool each day, a walk of some half hour (this I have almost wholly
neglected since returning from the south), climbing of one full set
of stairs of about twenty steps, and several sessions of swinging
my golf clubs even when I am not attempting to play outdoors .
I am supposed to take ten minutes each hour out of every long
conference and to leave the room and either lie or sit down by
myself, allowing nothing to disturb me. Likewise, I am to avoid all
situations that tend to bring about such reactions as irritation,
frustration, anxiety, fear and, above all, anger. When doctors give
me such instructions, I say to them, "Just what do you think the
Presidency is?" Finally, the instruction that I simply have not
learned to keep is "eat slowly." For some reason I have never been
able just to sit leisurely at a table and take my time enjoying food. I
am always hungry as a bear when I sit down and I show it . For
forty years I have been a trial to Mamie. She has done her best, but
she still has made little impression.
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As I have tried to tell so many people, I do not think it is of any
great importance just what this job might do to me as an individual. I recognize that men are mortal. Moreover, during the war
there were sometimes situations involving decisions compelling
temporary and occasionally fairly acute personal danger. I had to
become sufficiently objective to realize that great causes, movements and programs not only outlive, but are far more important
than the individuals who may be their respective leaders.
But I do think people ought to give a little more thought to
what the failing health of a President might do to the office and to
the cause for which a whole Administration could be working.
We well know that when advancing years and diminishing
energy begin to take their toll, the last one that ever appreciates
such a situation is the victim himself. Consequently, he can slow
up operations, impede the work of all his subordinates, and by so
doing, actually damage the cause for which he may even think he
is giving some years of his life. (And loyal subordinates will not
break his heart by telling him of his growing unfitness-they just
try to make up for it.)
Also, let us remember that at this moment we are not trying to
guess how I will feel next January twentieth with respect to four
future years, after I have had a full year to make my own
conclusions . Right now, still only four months after the first heart
attack that ever hit the Eisenhower family, I have soon to decide
what is my answer with respect to the next five years.
It is all very complicated, and I could fill any number of pages
with the various considerations pro and con that I think have some
bearing on the matter.
In any event, it was wonderful to read about your activities
and to note that you are going strong.
Give my love to Ibby and the children, and, of course, always
the best to yourself.
As ever,

Despite his frequently stated intention not to run in 1956,
despite the clear absence of any threatening international emer158

gency (such as he had suggested, at one point, might cause him to
reconsider), despite his advancing age (he would turn sixty-six in
October), and in spite of the heart attack he had suffered the
preceding fall, Eisenhower nevertheless decided to run again for
the presidency, a decision that he announced in late February. This
is, despite the many disclaimers, the letter of a man who fully
enjoyed the power and prestige of the presidency and who,
indeed, was prepared to fight, if necessary, to retain it.

2 March 1956

Personal and Confidential
Dear Swede:
The whole tough business of making up my mind to bow my
neck to what seemed to be the inevitable; of then deciding how
and when to make my announcement as to a second term; and
finally the intensive work of preparing notes from which to speak
to the American people, has so occupied my mind and days that I
simply had no chance to carry out my hope of writing to you in
advance to tell you all about it.
Even the giving of my consent, in 1952, to stand for the
Republican nomination was not as difficult as was the decision to
lay my name again before that convention. I suppose there are no
two people in the world who have more than Mamie and I
earnestly wanted, for a number of years, to retire to their home-a
home which we did not even have until a year or so ago.
When I first rallied from my attack of September twentyfourth, I recall that almost my first conscious thought was "Well, at
least this settles one problem for me for good and all."
For five weeks I was not allowed to see a newspaper or to
listen to a radio. While, within a matter of a week after I was
stricken, I took up the practice of daily meetings with Governor
[Sherman] Adams and gradually increased my contacts with other
members of the staff and the Administration, the doctors still kept
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the newspapers away for the reason they didn't want me worried
about stories and gossip concerning my illness .
On top of this, I found it something of a relief to be away from
the daily doings of the world, and consequently I did my work
from knowledge already acquired, and from official reports, memoranda and studies brought to me by associates.
As a consequence of this hiatus in my understanding of what
was going on in the world, I was astounded when I found that
even as early as early November a great number of people were
saying that they believed I could and should run again! I had a letdown feeling that approached a sense of frustration . As I look
back, I truly believe that could I have anticipated in early October
what later public reaction was going to be, I would have probably
issued a short statement to the effect that I would determine as
soon as possible whether it was physically possible for me to finish

out this tenn, but that I would thereafter retire from public life.
Having missed the opportunity to do this (and again I say I
cannot be so certain that I would have done it), it seemed to me
that I had no recourse but patiently to wait the outcome of all the
tests the doctors wanted to make on me and gradually come to a
decision myself as to whether or not I could stand the pace.
I wish I could tell you just exactly what finally made me decide
as I did, but there was such a vast combination of circumstances
and factors that seemed to me to have a bearing on the problemand at times the positive and negative were delicately balancedthat I cannot say for certain which particular one was decisive.
One-and this has been mentioned to no one else-had to do
with a guilty feeling on my own part that I had failed to bring
forward and establish a logical successor for myself. This failure
was of course not intentional. To the contrary, I struggled hard to
acquaint the public with the qualities of a very able group of young
men; I will not bore you with the repetition of the story I told you
many months ago . But the evidence became clear that I had not
been able to get any individual to be recognized as a natural or
logical candidate for the Presidency.
Parenthetically, I have just about decided that a first-term
President-unless he has been publicly repudiated from the beginning of his term-can scarcely get his own party to think in terms of
a candidate other than himself.
Of course, I told my story as much as I could over the
television, the other evening, but in any such presentation it was
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obviously impossible even to refer to all the types and kinds of
influences that seemed important.
For example, I think we have put together in the Executive
Branch, the ablest group of civilians that has worked in government during the long years I have been around Washington. If I
had quit, no matter who might be elected in my place, there would
be a tendency for this band to scatter. After all, two or three of
them are even older than I, and most of them have business affairs
and interests that attract them to a freer existence than they can
lead here.
There was a volume of mail from people who almost prayerfully hoped that I would consider the matter favorably. Only two
or three of my friends really urged me to decline, and all of these
put the matter purely on the personal basis-that I would shorten
my life . Possibly this is so . But it is certainly true that never once in
all these weeks of study has it occurred to me that that particular
point was of great importance .
There remain several questions about the current year.
The first is that if I am to have a recurrence of this illness, I
assume that the possibility is greater during this year than it will be
during any one of the following two or three . In my case this
would seem to be true if for no other reason than because, in an
election year, the tirades of demagogues and the newspaper
quarrels tend to reach a venomous level. In fact, if one were not
rather philosophical about the things he reads and hears, any
sensitive man would never attain that calmness of attitude and
spirit that the cardiologists so glibly talk about.
Finally, I am a competitor, a fighter, so if, as normally
happens, politicians begin to get scared along about the middle of
October and see themselves losing the election because of lack of
activity on my part, my own reluctance ever to accept defeat might
tempt me into activity that should be completely eliminated from
my life .
This I shall, of course, earnestly try to resist, but politicians are
funny people and they can certainly paint a situation "scary"
when they get to worrying about an election.
When I consider how many times I have been driven away
from personal plans, I sometimes think that I must be a very weak
character. I think that one mistake I made was in assuming, in
1948, that I had forever destroyed the possibility of a political
career for myself. When I finally, in January of '52, acknowledged
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publicly that I was a Republican, I realized that I had gone a long
ways away from the personal objectives that Mamie and I had laid
down for ourselves. Having gotten into the struggle, however, I
naturally was not going to take any chances of defeat that I could
avoid. I worked hard.
The next time that I had a defeat of a similar kind was when I
allowed myself to be talked out of my purpose of announcing, in
my Inaugural Address, that I was a one-term President only.
However, all of the people who persuaded me to do so agreed that,
at my age, one term was all that should be expected of me, or that I
should attempt. My recent decision represents another of the same
kind of defeat-speaking only from the personal viewpoint. I have
gotten to the point that I believe the Constitutional Amendment
limiting Presidential tenure to two terms is a good one, even
though, logically, I think it is indefensible.
Far more than balancing all of this is the hope that I may still
be able to do something in promoting mutual confidence, and
therefore peace, among the nations. And that I can help our people
understand that they must avoid extremes in reaching solutions to
the social, economic and political problems that are constantly with
us . If I could be certain that my efforts would really promote these
two things, I shall certainly never have any cause for sympathizing
with myself-no matter what happens.
I have talked enough and I have probably not clarified for you
a single thing that was causing you doubt; possibly I have not even
added an atom of information to your own store of knowledge. But
I feel better for having written. I am fortunate in having you to
absorb some of the offshoots from my sometimes wandering
mind-and to get your reactions.
Give my love to Ibby and the family.
As ever,

On the evening of 7 June 1956, Eisenhower suffered an attack
of what his doctors now diagnosed as chronic ileitis, and on June 9
he underwent a major operation in which the diseased section of
his small intestine was surgically bypassed . As with the heart
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attack, the president's health once more became front-page news.
But also, as in the case of the heart attack, Eisenhower's vigorous
constitution speeded recovery. Swede's letter to Eisenhower was
acknowledged by his personal secretary, Ann Whitman. "I merely
want to tell you that your letter ... pleased him enormously and
that it will be one of the things he will want to answer personally
when he feels a little more like himself." She assured Swede that
Eisenhower "looked rosy and not at all as though he had lost
weight . .. the important thing is that from now on he won't have
any more of those awful attacks . ... " Two weeks later, she wrote
again, reporting that Eisenhower was feeling much better and
'' getting back his zest and smiling once again that wide, wonderful
smile." Eisenhower himself did not write until he and Mamie had
returned to Gettysburg for a brief convalescence .

12 July 1956
Dear Swede:
Your letter to me in the hospital (which reached me promptly,
despite my long delay in acknowledging it personally) really gave
me a lift at the time it was most needed. I don't want to complain
unduly, but the first days after the operation were really uncomfortable . But your reassurances, coupled with those of the doctors,
buoyed my flagging spirits and got me through three very difficult
weeks .
Now that I am here at Gettysburg and can detect a daily
increase in strength and vitality, I am ready to put the whole nasty
business behind me. The announcement [reaffirming his decision
to run] which filtered out Tuesday through Senator [William F.]
Knowland was an attempt to do just that.
The farm has never looked better, mainly by virtue of the
frequent gentle rains we have had since we have been here, and I
have been happily renewing my acquaintance with my tiny Angus
herd . Official business, a small amount of "farming," and a strict
regime of treatment, mild exercise and rest, more than occupy my
days .
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I want to write you again when I have more time to myself, but
meantime I did want to tell you, before another day passed, how
greatly [I appreciated] the thoughts and prayers of Ibby and
yourself.
With warm regard,
As ever,

One of the first crises that Eisenhower faced after his recovery
was the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt's prime
minister, Gama! Abdel Nasser. Even a healthy Eisenhower would
have had difficulty in preventing this crisis, bred as it was by
conflict between colonialism and nationalism, between Arabs and
Israelis, and between the United States and the Soviet Union. As it
was, during a year punctuated by both the heart attack and the
ileitis operation, American blunders helped to precipitate Nasser's
seizure of the canal in late July.
In Washington, meanwhile, the House of Representatives
failed to approve Eisenhower's recommendation that the United
States join the Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC). Protectionists, led for the most part by conservative Republicans, charged
that United States membership in the OTC would harm American
industry.

3 August 1956
Dear Swede:
From a personal viewpoint, the past year has been notable
mainly because of unaccustomed illness . It is scarcely useful,
however, to make this a subject of a letter to you because my
"innards" have been pictured, described and discussed in the
papers, to say nothing of on the television and radio, until you,
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along with many others, must be heartily sick of the whole
business.
Of course, the two illnesses taken together provide for partisan political opponents a very fine platform from which to "view
with alarm." Such people pretend to be astonished that I have not
rebounded, within seven weeks, from a major operation, to my
pre-operational level of weight, strength and physical activity.
I notice that one man has gone to the trouble of figuring out
that, due to my heart attack, I was 143 days absent from duty,
while in the second instance he figured I added another 42, at least.
Nothing is said about the fact that in Denver, within five days of
my initial attack, staff officers were in my room asking for
decisions, while in my latest operation I had to be functioning
again in the space of three days . Actually, after an operation on
Saturday morning, I sat up to receive and talk to Chancellor
Adenauer for quite a visit on the following Thursday.
I am, of course, disappointed that no other Republican has
come sufficiently to the fore in public opinion as to make of himself
a possible Presidential candidate satisfactory to the Party. But this
was true before I thought of being sick; I still believe that, had I not
suffered a heart attack in September, I could have taken much
more drastic steps than I did to force the Republican Party to
consider and accept someone else.
All that is in the past .
Today the difficult things for me are political, both in the
domestic and in the international fields. Nasser and the Suez Canal
are foremost in my thoughts. Whether or not we can get a
satisfactory solution for this problem and one that tends to restore
rather than further to damage the prestige of the Western Powers,
particularly of Britain and France, is something that is not yet
resolved. In the kind of world that we are trying to establish, we
frequently find ourselves victims of the tyrannies of the weak. In
the effort to promote the rights of all, and observe the equality of
sovereignty as between the great and the small, we unavoidably
give to the little nations opportunities to embarrass us greatly.
Faithfulness to the underlying concepts of freedom is frequently
costly. Yet there can be no doubt that in the long run such
faithfulness will produce real rewards.
One of the frustrating facts of my daily existence is the
seeming inability of our people to understand our position and role
in the world and what our own best interests demand of us.
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The other day I happened onto a copy of Mckinley' s last
speech, delivered the day before he was shot. In it he argued for
more and freer trade, for reciprocal trade treaties-and made the
flat assertion, "Isolation is no longer possible or desirable ." What
he discerned 55 years ago has grown more true with every passing
year, especially as we became more and more a creditor nation. Yet
an astonishing number of people today believe that our welfare lies
in higher tariffs, meaning greater isolation and a refusal to buy
goods from others . They fail to see that no matter what we do in
providing, through loans, for the urgent needs of other countries
in investment capital, unless we simultaneously pursue a policy
that permits them to make a living, we are doomed to eventual
isolation and to the disappearance of our form of government.
Now I do not expect the trend of which I speak to go that far.
Before a final disaster of this kind came upon us, there would be
greater understanding of the facts and corrective action gradually
applied. But I do greatly fear that this trend could continue until
we might have lost certain important segments of the remaining
free world-a loss which will make our future existence more
difficult, and possibly even more dangerous .
Many years ago someone wrote a little novel or story, the
central theme of which was that the rich owner of a factory could
not forever live on top of the hill in luxury and serenity, while all
around him at the bottom of the hill his workmen lived in misery, privation and resentment. In comparatively recent years we
learned this lesson nationally. As a result, we have the greatest
middle class in the world because there is practically nobody in the
lowest or "edge of starvation" group. Now we must learn the
same lesson internationally-and once having learned the lesson
we must study the best ways to bring about better standards for
the underdeveloped nations. It cannot be done by grants, it will
not be the result of any one specific action.
We must pursue a broad and intelligent program of loans,
trade, technical assistance and, under current conditions, mutual
guarantees of security. We must stop talking about "give aways ."
We must understand that our foreign expenditures are investments in America's future. A simple example: No other nation is
exhausting its irreplaceable resources so rapidly as is ours. Unless
we are careful to build up and maintain a great group of international friends ready to trade with us, where do we hope to get all
the materials that we will one day need as our rate of consumption
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continues and accelerates? Possibly the future chemist will make all
the materials we need out of crops grown annually, but, if he does,
that day will probably come long after our minerals of various
kinds are fairly well exhausted.
It just occurs to me that I seem to be thrusting off on to you
some of my problems and troubles. I didn't mean to do so, but at
least you will see that in the approach to such grave difficulties as
the Suez crisis, there is a great need for keeping in the back of the
mind the understanding of these broader, long-term issues in the
international world.
Give my love to Ibby.
As ever,

On the day before his departure for San Francisco and the
Republican National Convention, Eisenhower returned to an issue
that had occupied much of his attention during World War II and
during his tour as chief of staff, that of interservice rivalry. It was
an issue that would grow particularly intense during the second
term, as the services, together with their allies in Congress and
industry, lobbied for larger and larger defense expenditures. These
struggles would ultimately prompt Eisenhower, in his Farewell
Address, to warn of the grave dangers to the United States that
were being posed by the "military-industrial complex."

20 August 1956

Personal and Confidential
Dear Swede :
The probable explanation for the simultaneous arrival in New
York of your two letters, one bearing three cents and the other six
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cents postage, is the institution of a new policy on the part of the
Postmaster General. Where a subsidized air line is not involved,
and a three cent letter can be carried on a plane without extra costand space is available-the policy is to pick up the letter and carry it
exactly as if it were bearing a six cent stamp.
Not long ago you expressed some of your irritation that
anyone should even dream of putting the Services into the same
uniform. I won't quarrel with the idea, but I will attempt to give
you a slightly different viewpoint toward the Services than you
probably have.
So far as I am personally concerned, I should say that my most
frustrating domestic problem is that of attempting to achieve any
real coordination among the Services . Time and again I have had
the high Defense officials in conference-with all the senior military and their civilian bosses present-and have achieved what has
seemed to me general agreement on policy and function-but there
always comes the break-up. The kindest interpretation that can be
put on some of these developments is that each service is so utterly
confident that it alone can assure the nation's security, that it feels
justified in going before the Congress or the public and urging
fantastic programs. Sometimes it is by no means the heads of the
Services that start these things. Some subordinate gets to going,
and then a demagogue gets into the act and the Chief of the Service
finds it rather difficult to say, "No, we could not profitably use
another billion dollars."
What I have tried to tell the Chiefs of Staff is that their most
important function is their corporate work as a body of advisers to
the Secretary of Defense and to me. We now have four-star men
acting as their deputies, and those men are either capable of
running the day-to-day work in the Services or they should not be
wearing that kind of insignia. Yet I have made little or no progress
in developing real corporate thinking.
I patiently explain over and over again that American strength
is a combination of its economic, moral and military force. If we
demand too much in taxes in order to build planes and ships, we
will tend to dry up the accumulations of capital that are necessary
to provide jobs for the million or more new workers that we must
absorb each year. Behind each worker there is an average of about
$15,000 in invested capital. His job depends upon this investment
at a yearly rate of not less than fifteen to twenty billions. If taxes
become so burdensome that investment loses its attractiveness for
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capital, there will finally be nobody but government to build the
facilities. This is one form of Socialism.
Let us not forget that the Armed Services are to defend a "way
of life," not merely land, property or lives . So what I try to make
the Chiefs realize is that they are men of sufficient stature, training
and intelligence to think of this balance-the balance between
minimum requirements in the costly implements of war and the
health of our economy.
Based on this kind of thinking, they habitually, when with me,
give the impression that they are going to work out arrangements
that will keep the military appropriations within manageable
proportions and do it in a spirit of good will and of give and take.
Yet when each Service puts down its minimum requirements
for its own military budget for the following year, and I add up the
total, I find that they mount at a fantastic rate. There is seemingly
no end to all of this. Yet merely "getting tough" on my part is not
an answer. I simply must find men who have the breadth of
understanding and devotion to their country rather than to a single
Service that will bring about better solutions than I get now.
Strangely enough, the one man who sees this clearly is a Navy
man who at one time was an uncompromising exponent of Naval
power and its superiority over any other kind of strength . That is
[Adm. Arthur W.] Radford .
I do not maintain that putting all of these people in one
uniform would cure this difficulty-at least not quickly. But some
day there is going to be a man sitting in my present chair who has
not been raised in the military services and who will have little
understanding of where slashes in their estimates can be made
with little or no damage. If that should happen while we still have
the state of tension that now exists in the world, I shudder to think
of what could happen in this country.
* * *
Tomorrow Mamie and I leave for San Francisco and what
promises to be, for us at least, a hectic and tumultuous two days
there. Then Cypress Point-and I hope some rest.
Give my love to Ibby.
As ever,

169

During the fall campaign, Eisenhower wrote to Swede only
once, and then briefly. His secretary, Ann Whitman, also wrote to
Swede a month later.

17 September 1956
Dear Swede:
I shall follow your advice and at this moment shall attempt no
lengthy answer to your fine letter of the twelfth. I give you merely
my own personal report on my health, which is that I really do feel
splendid.
On Wednesday evening I am to make about a twenty minute
talk on the Columbia Broadcasting System, and the following day I
go out to Iowa where I will attend informally (and without a major
address) the plowing contest at Newton, Iowa. Then, after returning here, I shall go out to Illinois only three or four days later to
deliver a major farm speech.
Give my love to Ibby and the children, and again my thanks
for your note.
With warm regard,
As ever,

22 October 1956
Dear Captain Hazlett:
You of all people will understand that for the next two weeks
the President is the busiest of men. He asked me simply to thank
you for your good wishes for his [sixty-sixth] birthday. Incidentally, he told me the other day his current ambition was to live until
he could switch the numbers upside down!
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Furthermore he said to tell you-apropos of your statement
that he should not get too mad-that he had been helped a lot in
this regard by golf. The doctors have insisted that he could play
only if he refused to get mad at himself when he played poorly.
Actually, he hasn't had a game of golf for the last five or six weeks;
there just hasn't been time.
Probably you watched the President's progress through the
last trip. Capsule: here it is-Minneapolis and St. Paul turned out
the most tremendous crowds I have ever seen anywhere-three
and four deep in residential districts (and packed on the sidewalks
in the business districts); Seattle, not too many people along the
motorcade route but an intensely enthusiastic audience at the
Rally. [Republican senatorial candidate Arthur B.] Langlie seems to
be in trouble, as incidentally, does [former Secretary of the Interior
Douglas] Mckay [who resigned to challenge Democratic incumbent
Wayne Morse]. Portland was again wildly enthusiastic, and of
course, Los Angeles outdid itself as only that city can in screwballs
and glamor and enthusiasm.
The President took the whole thing in that magnificent stride
of his, while the lesser of us felt an inclination at times to fall by the
wayside. But we all returned, pretty much in pieces, but here at
least.
The President will write you, I know, once this whole fracas is
over. Meantime, you know he is thinking of you .
Sincerely,
[Ann C. Whitman]

In regard to the Middle East, Eisenhower's repeated efforts to
reach a peaceful settlement to the Suez crisis were frustrated, and
Great Britain, France, and Israel began to make secret preparations
for armed intervention. Their plan was for Israel to attack Egypt
across the Sinai Peninsula, which would then become the pretext
for an Anglo-French invasion to "protect" the canal from the two
combatants, Egypt and Israel. The Israeli attack began on October
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29, in the midst of a two-week period marked also by the abortive
uprising in Hungary and by the election in the United States.
Eisenhower, whom the British and French had sought to
deceive, responded coolly and deliberately. "We cannot and we
will not condone armed aggresison," he declared, "no matter who
the attacker, and no matter who the victim." When British and
French troops landed at the northern end of the canal a few days
later, he quickly moved to tighten economic and political pressure
on his former allies . The Soviet Union, meanwhile, issued threatening warnings to Britain, France, and Israel. Faced with opposition from both Russia and the United States, the British and French
soon capitulated, agreeing to a cease-fire and a negotiated withdrawal.
Meanwhile, in the election, Eisenhower won by a landslide,
easily defeating Adlai Stevenson and his running mate, Tennessee's Senator Estes Kefauver. The Democrats, however, as
Eisenhower seems to have anticipated, retained control of both the
House and the Senate .

2 November 1956

PERSONAL
Dear Swede:
Except for an informal appearance on a "Round-up" telecast
from 11 to 12 o'clock on Election Eve, I have finished my campaigning. It became too difficult for me to keep in touch with the various
items of information that pour constantly into Washington from
Europe and the Mid East and at the same time carry on the hectic
activities of actual campaigning.
It is not difficult at all to operate efficiently in carrying on
Presidential functions from any other point in the United States, if
there is opportunity to set up the kind of communications required . But when I am gone from here for a period of eight to
twelve hours, or up to two to three days, with no communications
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available other than commercial telephone, it becomes much more
difficult, especially so with a world situation such as now exists .
But there is another reason that I decided to do no more in this
campaign. Up until a few months ago, I had set my face determinedly against any campaigning except for three or four television speeches to be given in a Washington studio . Some weeks
back, however, a lot of people in the Administration came to
believe that the distortions and half truths peddled by Stevenson
and Kefauver had to be answered-and that no speaker of ours,
other than myself, could gain a sufficient audience to answer them
effectively.
So I took to the speaking trail, first to call the hand of the
opponents on some of the wild things they were saying, and
secondly, to awaken the American people to the importance of the
contest and to the realization that each of them should record his
own decision.
This I think has been done. So in my last evening's talk, in
Philadelphia, I confined myself to laying out the approach I have
employed since 1952 to the whole problem of foreign relations and
how I would approach it in the future if the American people want
me to continue .
Actually, unless I win by a comfortable majority (one that
could not be significantly increased or decreased in the next few
days by any amount of speaking on either side), I would not want
to be elected at all. This is for a few simple reasons, even though I
believe that the Stevenson-Kefauver combination is, in some ways,
about the sorriest and weakest we have ever had run for the two
top offices in the land.
My first reason is that I still have a job of re-forming and revamping the Republican Party. Since by the Constitution this is my
final term, my influence in these next four years with my own
party is going to be determined by their feeling as to how popular I
am with the multitudes. If they feel that my support will be a real
asset in the next election they, individually and as a party, will be
disposed to go in the direction that I advocate . If, on the contrary,
they think that politically I am a rapidly "waning" star, then they
would be disposed to take the bit in their teeth regardless of my
opinions.
My second reason is that in any event, whether or not we win
control of one or both Houses of the Congress, the division is
certain to be very close. In almost every project some Democratic
173

help will be absolutely necessary to get it accomplished. Again this
strength can be marshalled, on both sides of the aisle, only if it is
generally believed that I am in a position to go to the people over
the heads of the Congressmen-and either help them or cause
them trouble in their districts.
For these two reasons I think that my only opportunity for
doing anything really worthwhile is to win by a comfortable
majority. This belief, incidentally, was an additional reason for my
deciding to do a bit of traveling in the campaign. It also offered me
a chance to prove to the American people that I am a rather healthy
individual.
I had planned two more trips-one for last Wednesday when I
was going to stop at the airfields in Dallas, Oklahoma City and
Memphis, and the other for the last day of the campaign when I
expected to stop in Hartford, Connecticut, and Boston, Massachusetts . These I cancelled, mostly because of preoccupation with
official business .
The Mid East thing is a terrible mess . Ever since July twentysixth, when Nasser took over the Canal, I have argued for a
negotiated settlement. It does not seem to me that there is present
in the case anything that justifies the action that Britain, France and
Israel apparently concerted among themselves and have initiated.
The 1888 Treaty says nothing at all as to how the Canal is to be
operated, although it did recognize the existence of the "Concession" dating, I believe, from 1868. I think, therefore, that no one
could question the legal right of Egypt to nationalize the Canal
Company. And what really became the apparent or legal bone of
contention was, " Shall the world's users of the Canal, which is
guaranteed as an international waterway in perpetuity, be privileged to use the Canal only on the sufferan:e of a single nation?"
Even this, in my opinion, is not the real heart of the matter.
The real point is that Britain, France and Israel had come to
believe-probably correctly-that Nasser was their worst enemy in
the Mid East and that until he was removed or deflated, they
would have no peace . I do not quarrel with the idea that there is
justification for such fears, but I have insisted long and earnestly
that you cannot resort to force in international relationships
because of your fear of what might happen in the future . In short, I
think the British and French seized upon a very poor vehicle to use
in bringing Nasser to terms.
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Of course, nothing in the region would be so difficult to solve
except for the underlying cause of the unrest and dissension that
exists there-that is, the Arab-Israel quarrel. This quarrel seems to
have no limit either in intensity or in scope. Everybody in the
Moslem and Jewish worlds is affected by it. It is so intense that the
second any action is taken against one Arab state, by an outsider,
all the other Arab and Moslem states seem to regard it as a Jewish
plot and react violently. All this complicates the situation enormously.
As we began to uncover evidence that something was building
up in Israel, we demanded pledges from [Prime Minister David]
Ben-Gurion that he would keep the peace. We realized that he
might think he could take advantage of this country because of the
approaching election and because of the importance that so many
politicians in the past have attached to our Jewish vote . I gave strict
orders to the State Department that they should inform Israel that
we would handle our affairs exactly as though we didn't have a
Jew in America . The welfare and best interests of our own country
were to be the sole criteria on which we operated.
I think that France and Britain have made a terrible mistake.
Because they had such a poor case, they have isolated themselves
from the good opinion of the world and it will take them many
years to recover. France was perfectly cold-blooded about the
matter. She has a war on her hands in Algeria, and she was
anxious to get someone else fighting the Arabs on her Eastern flank
so she was ready to do anything to get England and Israel in that
affair. But I think the other two countries have hurt themselves
immeasurably and this is something of a sad blow because, quite
naturally, Britain not only has been, but must be, our best friend in
the world.
Only a star-gazer could tell how the whole thing is going to
come out . But I can tell you one thing. The existence of this
problem does not make sleeping any easier-not merely because of
the things I recite above, but because of the opportunities that we
have handed to the Russians. I don't know what the final action of
the United Nations on this matter will be. We are struggling to get
a simple cease-fire and, with it, compulsion on both sides to start
negotiations regarding the Canal, withdrawal of troops, and even
proper reparations. But the possibility that both sides will accept
some compromise solution does not look very bright, and every
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day the hostilities continue the Soviets have an additional chance
to embarrass the Western world beyond measure.
All these thoughts I communicated to [Sir Anthony] Eden
[British prime minister] time and again. It was undoubtedly
because of his knowledge of our bitter opposition to using force in
the matter that when he finally decided to undertake the plan, he
just went completely silent. Actually, the British had partially
dispersed some of their concentrations in the Mid East and, while
we knew the trouble was not over, we did think that, so far as
Britain and France were concerned, there was some easing of the
situation.
Just one more thought before I close this long letter. There is
some reason to believe that the plan, when actually put into effect,
was not well coordinated. It looks as if the Israelis mobilized pretty
rapidly and apparently got ready to attack before the others were
immediately ready to follow up, using the Israeli attack as an
excuse to " protect" the Canal. In any event, British and French
troops, so far as I know, have not yet landed in Egypt. Apparently
there has been bombing of airfields, nothing else.
If you have any bright ideas for settling the dispute, I, of
course, would be delighted to have them. From what I am told,
[newspaper columnists] Walter Lippmann and the Alsops [Stewart
and Joseph] have lots of ideas, but they are far from good-about
what you would expect from your youngest grandchild.
Give my love to Ibby and the family.
As ever,
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1957

Eisenhower wrote to Swede briefly on November 24 and again
on December 23, enclosing in the latter an invitation to attend the
inauguration on January 21 . Worried about Swede' s increasingly
poor health, he wrote that " Mamie and I would like nothing better
than to have you and Ibby come to Washington for as many of the
festivities as you feel able to attend, but I don't want honestly to
urge you to do it since I know how tiring such a day can." By the
time of the inauguration, Swede was in Bethesda Naval Hospital
for treatment of the chronic high blood pressure from which he
suffered. He was able, however, to attend a private swearing-in
ceremony for Eisenhower's family and close friends-"except for
our wedding day, it was the high point in each of our lives, "
Swede later wrote .
Eisenhower received regular reports on Swede' s condition.
"My underground sources tell me that you are getting along fine ,
although you have had a recurrence of those bad headaches that
used to plague you, " he wrote on February 20 . He wrote again on
March 13, shortly before his departure for a meeting with the new
British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, in Bermuda .
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13 March 1957
Dear Swede:
It is wretched luck that while you have been here in the
hospital, I have myself been feeling so badly that I have just not
had the energy to make the visit to you that I promised myself. I
now understand that you are due to leave the hospital probably
within a week-and of course I am delighted.
Meantime I have decided to seek the sun that so many people
have recommended to me (by way of a "sea voyage" of which I am
sure you will approve) . So these flowers will have to take the place
of the conversation I hoped we would have . They bring you my
hope that those headaches will soon completely disappear and that
you will really be feeling better when you get back to Chapel Hill.
With affectionate regard to you and Ibby,
As ever,

By April the situation in the Middle East had been at least
temporarily resolved-the Israelis had withdrawn the last of their
forces and the canal had been opened to international traffic-and
Eisenhower and Macmillan, meeting in Bermuda, had restored a
degree of comity to strained Anglo-American relations. At home,
though he only mentions it in passing, Eisenhower was embroiled
in a disorderly battle to win congressional approval of his new
budget, a campaign that he handled rather ineptly and that
resulted in cuts of over $4 billion. Swede, meanwhile, had been
discharged from Bethesda.
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5 April 1957
Dear Swede:
I cannot tell you how much I regret that a combination of
bronchitis, work, and a trip to Bermuda prevented me from
coming occasionally to the hospital to see you while you were here.
I truly had looked forward to an opportunity for a couple of real
visits .
There is one thing that I have found out concerning the
relative rank of leaders. Every time you climb a rung, you become
the boss of more people but you become likewise less and less the
boss of your own time. You are constantly the slave of people,
events and circumstances .
Today the weather is a mere continuation of all the vile
experiences we have had since mid winter. To be cold, disagreeable and rainy in Washington on April fifth is almost unbelievable
but it is absolutely true.
Recently I consented (I assure you in a weak moment) again to
sit for a sculptor who was determined to make a bust of me. I
resent even sitting for a painter in spite of the fact that I love to see
a portrait develop and I am particularly interested in the techniques a true painter uses to get the effects he sees. But to sit for a
bust to my mind is about the dreariest experience a man can have
and it always takes longer than does a portrait. Having learned this
lesson so clearly in the past, I do not know why I again fell victim
to the arguments of the artist and one or two " friends(?)."
This morning I gave the sculptor an additional half hour and
as I did so I began to ponder about people, particularly the
Presidents, who have undoubtedly had the same experience in the
past as I am now undergoing. Friends convinced them that they
" owed it to posterity" to leave a likeness in bronze or marble and
they, resenting every minute of the process, consented . Now, in
1957, I looked back, as I sat in front of the sculptor, and tried to
evaluate in my own mind just what those individuals actually did
for this generation.
I decided that the only bust that meant much to me was the
famous one of Washington. Statues and busts of Lincoln were not
made until after he died, if for no other reason than while he was
alive he was far more vilified than admired . While here and there I
have seen busts of other Presidents-even including a head of
Truman- there is no single one of them that has ever provided me
with any feeling of satisfaction, much less inspiration. All of which
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convinces me that again I have sworn off sitting for sculptors for
ever and ever, amen! So if in the future I ever write to you a new
complaint on this score, please remind me that I am a weak,
vacillating and easily swayed individual.
The Mid East continues to be the central factor in my thinking,
in spite of the fact that the newspapers are trying to make the
budget the most important item in the world today. If we could
ever get a concession from Egypt that could to some degree satisfy
Britain, France and Israel, I think I could regain what many people
once regarded as a cheerful disposition .
The Bermuda Conference was very interesting and some day,
when I have an hour or two completely to myself, I will try to give
you an account of it. Macmillan is, of course, one of my intimate
wartime friends and so it is very easy to talk to him on a very frank,
even blunt, basis.
Right now I am off with Marnie to the farm, to be back on
Sunday afternoon. The weather, as I said, is abominable, but at
least it provides a change of scenery and we love the place-both
its interior and the surroundings. I have had bad luck on the
weather at the farm, illustrated by the fact that although I have had
a skeet range there for well over a year, I have never yet fired a
shot.
Give my love to Ibby and, of course, all the best to yourself, in
all of which Mamie joins.
As ever,
P. S.: Of course I do most sincerely hope that those wretched
headaches of yours have disappeared and that you are feeling
much more like yourself.

Swede's health continued to deteriorate. Though the stay at
Bethesda succeeded in bringing his blood pressure down, the
fierce headaches continued, and in late June he returned to the
hospital.

180

24 June 1957
(Dictated 3:00 P.M.)
Dear Swede:
At this moment you are one of the mysteries of my office . We
had clandestine information to the effect that you were entering
Bethesda Hospital tomorrow. Inquiry at the hospital brings a
report "We know nothing about it," so I will send this note to
Chapel Hill in the hope that it will run you down somewhere along
the line .
I am just about to take off for Williamsburg where I am to
address the Conference of Governors. I have a very banal and
colorless talk to deliver. While it expresses an obvious truth-that
governors ought to concern themselves more with retaining states'
responsibilities if they are to retain states' rights-this subject has
been so often discussed that I feel like I am giving a lecture on the
virtues of sunlight. Some of these speaking engagements become
mere ordeals .
Of course if you are on the way here to the hospital, my office
will know it before I get back and will probably have there a word
of welcome to you.
I suppose it is those damnable headaches that are your present
difficulty because you told me that your blood pressure situation
was much improved.
These days find me riding the governmental merry-go-round
at a dizzy pace. Abroad there are several problems that are
immensely acute; for example Jordan, disarmament efforts, Russian propaganda, and the Korean situation.
At home, particularly here in Washington, the Budget governs
the thinking, talking and action of almost every individual. Demagogues are having a field day with their particular venom being
directed at "tight" money. This of course is one of the prices of
prosperity. There is seemingly a much greater demand for money
with which to expand than there is money.
Some people doubt that it is possible for a free government to
live too long with continued prosperity. It looks as if we are having
a chance to prove or disprove the charge . Possibly nations have
some of the characteristics of the individual, and we know many
individuals who stand poverty with good grace grow insufferable,
and degenerate in character, the moment they experience any
good fortune .
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Enough of all this-one of these days I will try to write a letter
characterized by a bit more coherence and good sense.
Give my love to Ibby, and all the best to yourself.
As ever,
6/25/57
P.S.: Immediately after I left for Williamsburg, my secretary
discovered that you had indeed been admitted to Bethesda.
Following my previous instructions, she sent you a few flowers
and this note, of course, I shall now have delivered there. Captain
[Dale J.] Crittenberger will keep in touch with your doctors and
report to me . I do hope this time the doctors will find the cause of
your difficulty.

By the summer of 1957, Eisenhower was engaged in a series of
battles with congressional conservatives over the U.S. Status of
Forces agreements and over foreign aid. The controversy over the
Status of Forces agreements was precipitated by an incident in
which an American soldier shot and killed a Japanese woman and
was subsequently surrendered to Japanese authorities for trial.
There was a move in Congress to revise all Status of Forces
agreements so as to bar foreign criminal jurisdiction over United
States military personnel, a move that was quickly squelched by
Eisenhower's strong opposition.
He was less successful, however, in winning support for
increased foreign aid . Although Congress had endorsed his call for
a policy of economic and military aid to counter "Communist
aggression" in the Middle East-the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine-it nevertheless slashed his requests for such aid by more
than a billion dollars.
The growth of the civil-rights movement clearly troubled
Eisenhower, to whom order and public tranquility were extremely
important. Relatively insensitive to the plight of black Americans,
he feared the passions that civil rights aroused among both blacks
and white southerners . He believed that the decision in Brown vs.
Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, had been a mistake, and he
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refused to endorse it or to identify himself with the goal of
desegregation. In his State of the Union address in January he had
called for passage of a modest civil-rights bill. Though the bill was
further weakened by Congress, it finally passed in August. The
first civil-rights legislation in nearly a century, it established the
federal Civil Rights Commission and strengthened, if only slightly,
federal protection for voting rights.
Finally, he could not abide the disorderly processes of congressional politics. Congress was a warren of greedy special interests,
he believed, and most congressmen were little better than demagogues. "We can' t let just a popular majority sweep us in one
direction," he wrote to Vice-President Nixon, "because then you
can't recover." His faith in the Supreme Court was based, not on
its particular decisions, with which he frequently disagreed, but on
its role in providing "stability in a form of government where
political expediency might at times carry parties and political
leaders to extremes ."

22 July 1957

PERSONAL
Dear Swede:
The fact that you had to remain in the hospital such a short
time encourages me to believe that your condition must have
improved definitely and rapidly. While I had hoped to get out to
Bethesda some time when Ibby would be present, I am still
delighted that you are not compelled to spend most of the summer
in a hospital room.
Concerning my present situation, I think it is best described by
merely saying "the grind goes on ." I am repeatedly astonished,
even astounded, by the apparent ignorance of members of Congress in the general subject of our foreign affairs and relationships .
I realize that by this time I should accept, as a matter of course,
Congressional reaction that seemingly reflects either this abysmal
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ignorance or a far greater concern for local political sentiment than
for the welfare of the United States.
I am sure that this second possibility is not correct so far as the
conscious attitude of the average Congressman is concerned . In
the general case each of them thinks of himself as intensely
patriotic; but it does not take the average member long to conclude
that his first duty to his country is to get himself re-elected. This
subconscious conviction leads to a capacity for rationalization that
is almost unbelievable.
In any event, right at this moment lack of understanding of
America' s international position and obligation accounts for the
fact that we seem to be trying to make a national hero out of a man
who shot a woman-in the back at something like ten to fifteen
yards distance.
As quickly as this incident became a popular one in some parts
of the isolationist press, it was taken up by dozens of Congressmen
who "viewed with alarm" and were "shocked and distressed" at
the injustice done to this great soldier and citizen.
We have even had a serious attempt made to force me to
denounce our Status of Forces treaties. These treaties, as you
know, are fair and just to Americans serving abroad and are the
only means by which we retain jurisdiction in most offenses
committed. Because they establish a reasonable jurisdictional balance between ourselves and the host country, they are at the very
foundation of our defensive alliances. To denounce them would
make us completely isolationist and force us to abandon practically
every base we have abroad.
Of course there are people who believe that the United States
would not only be secure but would greatly prosper by withdrawing into a fanciful "Fortress America ." I say fanciful for the reason
that any sensible man knows that there can be no such thing as
security in isolation, no matter if our armed forces were multiplied
three-fold.
This same unreasoning attitude is reflected in the constantly
repeated effort in Congress to slash mutual security funds. Again
and again I have explained to individuals and to the public that, as
of this moment, our mutual security operations represent America's best investment. Through them we are able to keep down the
direct costs of our own military establishment. More than this, we
are increasing the consuming power of many friendly nations and
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helping to build up future markets for our rapidly expanding
productive capacity.
Last year our excess of exported goods over imported goods
was something on the order of nine billion dollars . Subtract from
this all of the funds that we currently send out to aid the military
establishments and economies of our friends and we still have a
comfortable surplus. It is quite clear that except for the funds we
have spent in the past in order to give help to economies in Europe
and in Asia, there would not be the purchasing power in a number
of countries to buy from us .
Some people worry that the long range competitive position of
the United States will be damaged if we help now to build up the
productive capacity of others . Some day this might be a problem.
But there are two main points to remember.
(a). If other countries improve industrially their standards
of living will usually go up . This means that in the normal
case their wage scales will begin to rise and eventually will
come closer and closer to our own. Consequently we will
still have the competitive advantage of our deeper experience in management, production and, we like to think, in
inventiveness and imagination. In the meantime we will
have expanding markets.
While you may argue that, in the case of Japan,
increasing industrialization has raised living standards
very slowly indeed, I think that as of today labor would be
in a far better position in that country if their society had
been a free one rather than a dictatorship.
(b) . Before any of the underdeveloped countries can reach
a position where they can export to others, on a competitive basis with the United States, many years must elapse
and during that period their purchasing power will multiply rapidly. We, if we are wise, will share prominently in
that increasing market. This applies to all of South America, Africa, and to portions of Asia, particularly in the Mid
East.
All this, of course, is nothing but a by-product of a process
which has as its principal purpose the strengthening of freedom
and the gradual exhaustion of Communism in the world. I merely
refer to it to express my belief that both in the short term and in the
long term our mutual security program will advance our country's
best interests .
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Undoubtedly I have written to you a number of times on the
subject of " Civil Rights." I think that no other single event has so
disturbed the domestic scene in many years as did the Supreme
Court's decision of 1954 in the school segregation case. That
decision and similar ones earlier and later in point of time have
interpreted the Constitution in such fashion as to put heavier
responsibilities than before on the Federal government in the
matter of assuring to each citizen his guaranteed Constitutional
rights . My approach to the many problems has been dictated by
several obvious truths:
(a) . Laws are rarely effective unless they represent the
will of the majority. In our prohibition experiment, we
even saw local opinion openly and successfully defy
Federal authority even though national public opinion
then seemed to support the whole theory of prohibition.
(b) . When emotions are deeply stirred, logic and reason
must operate gradually and with consideration for human feelings or we will have a resultant disaster rather
than human advancement.
(c). School segregation itself was, according to the Supreme Court decision of 1896, completely Constitutional
until the reversal of that decision was accomplished in
1954. The decision of 1896 gave a cloak of legality to
segregation in all its forms. As a result, the social,
economic and political patterns of the South were considered by most whites, especially by those in that
region, as not only respectable but completely legal and
ethical.
(d). After three score years of living under these patterns, it was impossible to expect complete and instant
reversal of conduct by mere decision of the Supreme
Court. The Court itself recognized this and provided a
plan for the desegration of schools which it believed to be
moderate but effective.
The plan of the Supreme Court to accomplish integration
gradually and sensibly seems to me to provide the only possible
answer if we are to consider on the one hand the customs and fears
of a great section of our population, and on the other the binding
effect that Supreme Court decisions must have on all of us if our
form of government is to survive and prosper . Consequently the
plan that I have advanced for Congressional consideration on this
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touchy matter was conceived in the thought that only moderation
in legal compulsions, accompanied by a stepped-up program of
education, could bring about the result that every loyal American
should seek.
I think that some of the language used in the attempt to
translate my basic purposes into legislative provisions has probably been too broad. Certainly it has been subject to varying
interpretations . This I think can be corrected in Congress .
But I hold to the basic purpose. There must be respect for the
Constitution-which means the Supreme Court' s interpretation of
the Constitution-or we shall have chaos . We cannot possibly
imagine a successful form of government in which every individual
citizen would have the right to interpret the Constitution according
to his own convictions, beliefs and prejudices. Chaos would
develop. This I believe with all my heart-and shall always act
accordingly.
This particular quarrel is not completely devoid of some
amusing aspects. For example, a violent exponent of the segregation doctrine was in my office one day. During the course of his
visit he delivered an impassioned talk on the sanctity of the 1896
decision by the Supreme Court. At a pause in his oration I merely
asked, " Then why is the 1954 decision not equally sacrosanct?" He
stuttered and said, "There were then wise men on the Court. Now
we have politicians." I replied, "Can you name one man on the
1896 Court who made the decision?" He just looked at me in
consternation and the subject was dropped.
I suppose at the moment a problem of possibly even greater
importance to us is the threat of inflation. Indeed it has passed the
point of mere threat, as evidenced by the fact that in the last year
we have had about a four percent rise in living costs . Since we had
in the first three and a half years of this Administration succeeded
in holding this rise to under one percent, the present situation
shows that accumulated pressures are at last forcing prices up-or
if you want to put it another way, the dollar down .
There are so many contributory causes to inflation that it
seems to be idle to pick out any one as the real culprit. Nevertheless many people try to do this. One man will wail about the wageprice spiral. Another lays everything to government spending . Still
another will blame unlimited consumer credit, while others find
banking policies to be wholly to blame .
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Actually all these factors and even more enter into the
problem. Even worse, not everybody acts consistently. Again
consider the Congress . Suddenly convinced that governmental
expenditures were too high-which they are-Congress entered
upon a great economy drive . This it did under the belief that this
subject would remain popular for so long that no better record
could be taken to the voter in the fall of 1958 than one of consistent
voting against expenditures.
This drive was underway long enough to provide opportunity
for speeches by almost every individual member of the Congress,
but by the time the first round was over, some of the boys began to
wake up to the fact that a good many pressure groups wanted to
dig a little deeper into the Federal treasury. As a result, in the field
of housing Congress insisted upon putting a billion dollars more in
the authorization bill than the Administration had requested. On
top of that, Congress is in the process of passing a pay raise for
mailmen that will give them a twelve percent increase even though
Congress is well aware of the fact that this will practically compel
raises for the entire classified civil service . This vastly increases
Federal expenditures . Worse than this, there can be little doubt
that the industrial wage-price spiral would get a terrific upward jolt
from any such action on the part of the Federal government. But in
voting as he does the Congressman feels that he is winning votes
for himself. So out the window goes his concern about the effect of
government expenditures on inflation.
In the same way, I doubt that there is any Congressman who
fails to realize that so-called cheap money likewise has a stimulating effect on inflation. Yet he is willing to expose the country to the
ravages of inflation so long as he can make a showing that he is for
"cheap money for the little fellow."
I know that you will understand I am not criticizing all
Congressmen. I am talking mainly about those who strive for the
headlines by reckless and impulsive statements. Indeed in the
normal case the average Congressman, when met individually,
seems to be a perfectly logical and high-minded individual. It is
usually when he gets to operating in the mass with opportunities
for making rash and unwise statements that we gain such a bad
impression of his capabilities .

*

*
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This letter is far too long-you will be worn out with its
reading. In any event, when I started my chief purpose was merely
to express the great hope that you were improving as rapidly as
your short stay in the hospital seemed to indicate you would.
Everything between this paragraph and the beginning represents
only the meandering reflections of an individual who has daily to
use up more than a normal ration of his sense of humor in order to
keep right side up . Possibly I am something like a ship which,
buffeted and pounded by wind and wave, is still afloat and
manages in spite of frequent tacks and turnings to stay generally
along its plotted course and continues to make some, even if slow
and painful, headway.
Give my love to Ibby and, as always, the best to yourself.
As ever,

Tunisia, where independence leader Habib Bourguiba presided over a former French colony, was among the least of
Eisenhower's worries in the fall of 1957, despite the space he
devotes to it in this letter. Far more pressing were inflation,
continuing turmoil in the Middle East, the Soviet launch of an
intercontinental ballistic missile, renewed pressure for a build-up
at home, and, finally, the crisis over school desegregation in Little
Rock, Arkansas. In Little Rock, where integration of the high
school had just begun, Governor Orval Faubus had ordered in the
Arkansas National Guard, ostensibly to preserve the peace but in
fact to block black children from entering the school. When efforts
at compromise with Faubus had failed, and after angry white mobs
had driven black children from the school, Eisenhower finally and
reluctantly ordered federal troops into Little Rock.
Swede, meanwhile, grew worse, struggling with increased
difficulty to sustain his end of the correspondence, abandoning
altogether his "Royal Ike, " and writing slowly and laboriously by
hand.
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18 November 1957

PERSONAL
Dear Swede:
It is too bad that your condition of weakness does not respond
more readily to treatment. If the writing of a full letter seems to
become too much of a burden, why don't you, from time to time,
just jot down a note, in a few words, about anything that occurs to
you. When you get a package of them, send them on to me. I do
think you should not waste your strength trying to compose a
coherent letter-much as I like your communications.
Since July 25th of 1956, when Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez, I cannot remember a day that has not brought
its major or minor crisis . Some of these have been handled in
secret; that is, no explanation or recitation of fact is possible for the
simple reason that to bring some of them out in the open would
cause as much trouble as the wrong answer. For example, had we
published an account of the long, patient and hard work we did
with the British and French, as well as the Israelis, in order to
prevent the attack on Egypt and in making plain what would be
our attitude in the event that such an attack was undertaken, there
would have been the greatest political trouble in Britain, and
probably in France. So we just had to let people think that we acted
on the spur of the moment and astonished our friends by taking
the action we did. Actually, they knew exactly what we'd do.
In the matters that currently seem to be disturbing the country
so much, namely our relative position with Russia in arms development, you can understand that there are many things that I
don't dare to allude to publicly, yet some of them would do much
to allay the fears of our own people.
The most recent difficulty in the foreign field of which you
have read involves our shipment of token arms to Tunisia. This we
did in conjunction with the British after conversations with them
demonstrated we were thinking in parallel lines .
What happened was this. Somewhere along about early
September the Tunisians came to us saying that they simply had to
have arms for internal security and some protection against border
raids . We knew that the French were maintaining close ties with
Tunisia and we urged the French to make a satisfactory arms deal
with Tunisia, in order that the latter country would not turn to the
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Soviets for help. The political leader in the country, Bourguiba, is a
very fine friend of the West and the most intelligent man that I
know of in the Arab world.
He became more and more insistent when he found that the
French were using delaying and evasive tactics and he told us
frankly that he would simply have to take the Soviet's offer which,
financially, was far more favorable to him and his country than
anything we could give him.
We and the British told the French that we would have to send
a token shipment by November first because in our opinion we
would otherwise risk the loss of that important area. You do not
even have to glance at your map to know what the strategic value
of the region is . The French then replied that they would make
some delivery of the necessary arms to Tunisia and asked us to
abstain. To this we gladly agreed, provided they would do it by
November first .
When their government fell, they pointed out that there was
no one there in power to take action and asked us to delay still
further. This we did, much to the anguish of Bourguiba.
I have forgotten for the moment exactly how we fixed the date,
but we then stated that we would wait until November twelfth, but
we told both the French and Tunisians that, on that date, we
would deliver a token shipment of arms (from us only 500 rifles) .
When November twelfth came, the [Felix] Gaillard government
was in power but the matter had not been settled., Under our
pressing, the French government finally said it intended to deliver
the arms and had agreed in principle to do so, but before actual
delivery could take place the Tunisians would have to agree that their

whole source of arms supply from then on would be France.
In other words, even though Tunisia is ostensibly a free
government, one with which we have exchanged Ambassadors,
the French asked them to agree that for any military purposes they
would be completely subservient to the French .
As you might expect, Bourguiba flatly rejected this condition
and insisted that we deliver the token shipment of arms, as
promised.
On our part, we felt it was a matter of good faith to deliver on
November twelfth, but since the French seemed at last to be aware
of the grim seriousness of the situation, we put off, with the
British, actual delivery for another twenty-four to forty-eight
hours, to give the French a renewed chance to settle the matter.
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[The next nine lines are still classified, in accordance with
restrictions imposed by the Eisenhower family in their deed of
gift. l
In spite of our actions, taken with the utmost caution and after
long and exhaustive conferences, to postpone delivery after November twelfth, and so again breaking a promise we had given in
good faith, the French went back to the Tunisians with the same
old argument-namely that they, the French, had to be the sole
source of supply of arms for Tunisia .
With the matter in this highly unsatisfactory state, we finally delivered the token shipment on November fourteenth, and
France has since been acting like a spoiled child .
Of course we were well aware that France was seeking any
kind of excuse to blame someone else for its own difficulties. That
is a favorite trick of French politicians these days. But no matter
how serious the consequences, we decided that if we were to hold
on to the Mid East and have any kind of decent relations with the
Arab world, we simply had to go ahead with an agreement that
seemed to us to be based on Tunisian rights and on fairness in our
dealings with other nations .
Just what the outcome will be I cannot say. The French are
fully capable of the most senseless action just to express their
disagreement with others.
Their basic trouble is that they are still trying to act as if they
headed a great empire, all of it, as of old, completely dependent on
them. If they would center their attention mainly on their European problems and work with others in their solution, they could
be a happy and prosperous country.
Today their production per man is, I am told by the experts,
even higher than that in Germany. Yet Germany is making money
hand over fist, and France is on the verge of bankruptcy.
* * *
I am slated to make two or three more speeches this fall, or at
least by the end of January. Subjects still to be covered are such
things as "The function of mutual security assistance in our
nation's defense," "The farm problem, " and the "Economic
situation." This last I will defer for some time because of the hope
that a few of the uncertainties will be cleared up and I can make a
more meaningful talk on the matter.
192

You mention the Little Rock situation and your conviction that
I had done the right thing. My biggest problem has been to make
people see, particularly in the south, that my main interest is not in
the integration or segregation question. My opinion as to the
wisdom of the decision or the timeliness of the Supreme Court's
decision has nothing to do with the case.
The point is that specific orders of our Courts, taken in
accordance with the terms of our Constitution as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, must be upheld.
I said to a man the other day: "You disagree with the decision
and tell me that I should show my disapproval by refusing to
prevent violence from obstructing the carrying-out of the Court's
orders ."
"Let us take a different example. Suppose you had been
thrown into jail by an arbitrary sheriff or United States marshal.
Your lawyer asked for a writ of habeas corpus and it is granted by
the judge. But the feeling in the locality is such that the sheriff feels
completely safe in telling you he will not obey the order, and you
will remain in jail. Now comes my question: Would you consider I
was doing my solemn duty as the President of the United States if I
did not compel your release from jail?"
If the day comes when we can obey the orders of our Courts
only when we personally approve of them, the end of the
American system, as we know it, will not be far off.
Along with these speaking chores that I mentioned a while
back, I have the State of the Union speech to make, a Budget in
preparation to send to Congress, the Economic Report to approve
and send on, and then the endless conferences with legislative
leaders while Congress is in session. The only hope I see for any
real letup is some time around next July. Several things would
have to happen to make that period any better than the present.
The Congress would have to adjourn early. There would have
to be a general easing off of tensions in the free world. And fewer
people must be struggling to see me with "very important messages and pieces of advice." If all three of these things happen,
possibly my family, my associates, my secretary and I can give less
attention to our blood pressure and the condition of our general
nervous systems.
Having said all this, I must tell you that physically I seem to
stand up under the burden remarkably well. Yesterday I think the
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doctor said my blood pressure was 130 over 80 and my pulse
something on the order of 66.
The biggest worry of all is the constant question of "doing the
right thing." Certain of the problems are so complex and so
difficult that there is no really satisfactory answer. As [John] Foster
[Dulles] explained it the other day when we were talking about the
French-Tunisian mess, "This is a matter of choosing whether you
want your arm broken in two places-or your leg broken above the
knee." But I have the satisfaction of knowing that I do my best,
that I have with me a group of honest, dedicated, and in some
cases very wise men to advise and help, and that, finally, the
Almighty must have in mind some better fate for this poor old
world of ours than to see it largely blown up in a holocaust of
nuclear bombs.
So with this kind of support I manage to keep at least the
shreds of a once fairly good disposition-a matter on which Mrs.
Whitman may write you a minority report-and all in all feel that
the job is being done about as well as it can be under the
circumstances.
While I am often urged to be more assertive, to do a little more
desk-pounding, to challenge Russia more specifically and harshly,
I do not do these things for the simple reason that I think they are
unwise. Possibly I do not always control my temper well, but I do
succeed in controlling it in public. And I still believe that a frequent
exhibition of a loss of temper is a sure sign of weakness.
I seem to have gotten into a spate of introspective thinking
here and making you the victim of its expression. Actually I have
nothing quite so important to do as to wish for you a reasonable
and quick return to a state of good feeling, particularly in getting
rid of those blankety-blankety headaches. Along with this, I want
to send my love to Ibby and your family.
As ever,

On November 25, while at his desk, Eisenhower suffered a
stroke that left him briefly paralyzed and unable to speak coherently. As word of the stroke spread through Washington, there
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were rumors of resignation and calls, in Congress and by the press,
for the president to step down. Even Eisenhower was heard to
mumble that "if I cannot attend to my duties, I am simply going to
give up this job." But as with his earlier illnesses, Eisenhower' s
powerful will and strong constitution once again took over; and by
the time his secretary, Ann Whitman, wrote the following letter to
Swede, Eisenhower was already recovering .

1 December 1957

PERSONAL
Dear Captain Hazlett:
All week I have wanted to write you this note, not that I can
add anything to the news I know you get daily about the President,
but to try to reassure you-and myself at the same time-that the
President is really going to be all right again. Incidentally, just in
case you didn't see it, I am enclosing a copy of an editorial in the
New York Times of yesterday that has touched me more than
anything else these last difficult days.
You remember, of course, the President' s letter from Augusta .
Now that I think back I could have offered a minority report. I only
knew then that I was fighting a losing battle against the pace that
the President seemingly had compulsively set for himself. We had
all ignored those hard lessons of the heart attack aftermath and
everybody seemed to be dumping all the unsolvable problems
squarely in his lap . With the Sputniks and Little Rock and the
failures of the last Congress still fresh, there wasn't ever for the
President, here in Washington at least, a moment that he could use
to think. He was, furthermore , wrestling with speeches at all hours
of day and night, and under great pressure. For instance, a
concrete example of what I mean was the Oklahoma speech. I had
no plans to go on that trip, but at noon that day the speech was still
far from final. So typewriters were dumped on the plane and
somehow or other we finished it. All that tends to build up in me
and must for the President be magnified a thousand times, a
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tenseness that means loss of sleep, and a feeling always that you
are not doing the job right because there simply isn't time .
On the plus side, I think the high government officials and the
President's staff have learned, this time, that they must stand on
their own feet. I believe the President is the only person who can
save the world today for a future that surely could be bright. If we
can un-clutter his desk with the trivia (and I take that back, it really
isn't trivia) but the less of the more important, I think he is the only
person who can weld our friends into a cohesive group and
overcome the suspicions of our potential enemies . And certainly
he has the courage and will to do his best, despite all these blows
that fate throws him.
I seem to have wandered far from what I meant to be a
reassuring note to you. I know how worried you are . These are
little simple things: The President has called me on the phone
several times since last Monday. He has seemed absolutely perfect
in his speech. There is positively no loss of anything except this
business of trying to find the right word, and that occurs only
when he is tired. One of his friends from New York saw him
yesterday at the farm, and reported that he looked just fine .
We had an alert out at Bethesda, but apparently you did not go
there for the overnight checkup that you wrote the President
[about] . Please let us know if you go through Washington, if only
so that Captain Crittenberger or I can bring you fully up to date on
the President.
Don' t think of answering this; it does me good to write to
someone as close as you are to the President. And please forgive
my bad (Sunday, let's call it) typing.
Sincerely,
[Ann C. Whitman]
P.S. Couldn't you have been generous and let Army (and the
President) win yesterday?
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In December, Swede began a long handwritten letter to
Eisenhower, a letter that, given Swede's faltering health and the
continued interruption of savage headaches, took him more than a
month to complete. Ann Whitman typed it up for the president,
who scrawled his own reactions on the margins . In his letter,
Swede expressed his admiration for Eisenhower's determination
to attend the NATO Conference, "in a wheel chair if necessary";
praised Secretary of State Dulles, Assistant to the President
Sherman Adams, and Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson;
criticized actor and television advisor Robert Montgomery's staging of Eisenhower's television address on his return from Paris
("to be frank, you looked decidedly ill at ease"); and applauded
Eisenhower's selection of Neil H . McElroy as secretary of defense .
'Tm afraid, though, that you can't expect too much enthusiasm on
his part as regards further tightening of the bonds of service
integration. As you undoubtedly know, he ran [Procter and
Gamble] on the theory of inter-departmental rivalries. " Swede
attacked columnist Drew Pearson, who in a television interview
had predicted that, within a year, Eisenhower would no longer be
president; criticized French actions in Tunisia; and on the proposed Summit meeting with the Russians, concluded that "unless
the prospects show a real promise of concrete achievement I think
you would be wasting your time ." "I agree fully," wrote Eisenhower in the margin.
In late February, Eisenhower wrote the following "birthday"
letter to Swede .

197

26 February 1958
Dear Swede:
Since I want both to send you felicitations for that non-existent
birthday of yours and to answer, at least briefly, some of the
comments in your most recent letter (which I enjoyed tremendously, as I always do), I shall try to limit myself to those subjects
you bring up and not go off on my usual lengthy, and I like to think
philosophical, discourse.
Now as to your points. Please don't concern yourself about
any lack of coherence, if such there ever might be, in your letters.
The important thing is that you don't tire yourself in writing them.
I always like to have your thoughts, and they don't have to be in
any logical order for them to be of value to me.
As for my recent physical mishap, never at any time did I feel
ill, so I don't deserve any special commendation for making the
Paris trip. My only apprehension was about the formal speeches I
knew I would have to make, and, to some extent, concerning the
informal conferences with the various heads of government. But all
in all, the experience was pleasant and I think all to the good. I
especially got a kick out of my visit to my old SHAPE Headquarters.
With reference to the illness itself, apparently months will be
needed to complete the full cure. But the only symptom I notice
now is a tendency to use the wrong word-for example, I may say
"desk" when I mean "chair." But that tendency seems to be
decreasing and people who haven't seen me for months say,
honestly I think, that they notice a much improved condition in
this ailment.
You know how I feel about the Secretary of State, both from
previous letters and from the many public statements I have made.
I admire tremendously his wisdom, his knowledge in the delicate
and intricate field of foreign relations, and his tireless dedication to
duty. Apparently with strangers his personality may not always be
winning, but with his friends he is charming and delightful. In
addition to Mr. Dulles, Secretary Benson and Governor Adams are
two individuals who have been, in my opinion, unjustly attacked.
They are also dedicated and completely honest men. But in this
business sometimes glibness gives more surface reward than does
honesty.
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Speaking of personalities, the new Russian Ambassador to the
United States, Mr. Mikhail Menshikov, is making quite a splash in
Washington . He is extremely affable, good-looking (I am told by
the ladies of my family) in the "Western sort of way" (whatever
they mean by that), energetic and apparently not impressed with
protocol procedures (which break with routine I admit I find
refreshing). Only time will tell whether his appointment is in any
way indicative of a change in official Russian policy.
Oh yes, I agree completely that Bob Montgomery erred in his
"stage directions" for the report to the nation immediately after
the NATO Conference.
Now to go back to your letter and to my health . I am trying to
follow the advice of the doctors . I want to keep well and conserve
my energy as much as possible for the tasks that lie ahead of me .
But it is not easy since politicians have a habit of making me illmentally and physically! I cannot, for example, understand why
any one, Democrat or Republican, would want to fan the flames of
the so-called "recession" for his own political advantage at the
expense of all Americans . But you know as well as I do that such a
thing is done daily for the cheap advantage that certain people feel
they will gain personally. In the same category I put the request of
some thirty Congressmen that I "fire" Benson simply because they
are so avid for more governmental handouts for the farmers in
their districts .
Already we are in the special fever of a campaign year. If a
Republican Congress could be elected it would be the neatest trick
of the week. The brickbats that will be thrown at me I shall ignore,
and I shall concentrate, as I have tried to do in the past, upon our
national security, upon inching toward a just and durable peace for
all the world, and upon sustaining the health of the American
economy.
Secretary McElroy is, in my opinion, one of the best appointments that could be made. He may have started out, as you say,
without too much enthusiasm for service integration, but I think he
is changing his views . He has, incidentally, absorbed with unexpected rapidity the enormous complexity of the Defense Department and will, I think, make a tremendous contribution there .
This whole business of inter-service rivalries has been greatly
distressing to me, and to all of us. I am sure you are as sick as I am
of public debates among Generals and the Secretaries of the
various services . You referred to the German General staff system.
199

I venture that few people really understand what happened under
that so-called system. Their General Staff was Anny.* For that it
was superb. But military separation in compartments was marked.
Even the Ministry of War in 1914 had nothing to do with the
General Staff.
I have had endless discussions in my office on the relative
merits of the nuclear submarines versus nuclear aircraft carriers. I
agree with you completely that the flattop is becoming obsolete
and I have tried, and will continue to try, to convince the Navy big
brass that their only possible use would be in a small war. Here you
get down to an intra service rivalry that presents its problems, too .
As for the columnist [Drew Pearson] you mention, I merely
say that I have not read a word of his in fifteen years. Personally I
think he is a "spherical" SOB which makes him one no matter
from what angle you may view him. And as for the prophecy you
mention, I had not heard of it before. He could of course be right.
But I think the good Lord will have more to do with what happens
than this particular columnist.
You bring up the fact that retired officers are not included in
the Administration's recommendations for "cost of living" increases. These recommendations were based on the Cordiner
report, which was designed to keep in the services young, able
officers and real technicians . While the Cordiner report provided
for very large increases in senior grades, the theory was that this
would keep young officers in the service permanently. The general
policy was to ignore all others. (This report was made, of course,
when inflation was our number one domestic problem.) I think we
might review the matter now, and I am assured by the experts that,
in any event, the Congress will, for its own political reasons, see
that retired personnel are included when the issue is finally
decided.
I mentioned briefly the "recession" that is worrying everyone
today. We are watching the economy closely and I still believe, as I
said in my last press conference, that there will be more employment opportunities by mid- or late March. But this may mark the
"beginning of the end" of the recession; it will be quite a while
before we reach the "end of the ending." I shall never approve a
tax cut for political reasons, but there are certain economists who
believe that if the recession continues, we may have to give serious
consideration to the possibility.
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And a few brief points-I agree with you completely with
regard to Bourguiba and I deplore the situation the French have
gotten themselves, and indirectly us, into. [Felix] Gaillard [premier
of France] is inexperienced (though in this specific instance I do not
believe he was to blame) but basically he seems to have some of the
marks of a capable leader.
Now we come to the Summit Conference. If we and our allies
can first agree on the positions we will take on the various subjects
that will be discussed; if the Russians will agree to a preparatory
conference at a lower level; and if they will promise to abide by the
agreements made at the preparatory conference-then, and only
then, I am willing to meet with them. If this procedure is followed,
I think we can at least hope for some success; anything else is
bound to bring dismal failure .
I think I have covered all your comments except the most
important ones-the fine Navy football game of last year, your
health, and your birthday anniversary. I was proud of Navy's team
(except on one day that need not be mentioned) and I watched
them on TV whenever I could.
As you know without my telling you, I am distressed about
the seeming lack of progress in your physical condition and I keep
hoping that the doctors will find something that will make you
more comfortable. I am glad you have decided to come back to
Bethesda for another go-round and I shall keep praying that the
doctors there will come up with something that will help you.
And now you are about to have a birthday anniversary, an
event that I suspect you regard with as much dislike and disdain as
I do . But at least you have to endure only fifteen or sixteen actual
such days, while I have that imposing sixty-seven always to
contemplate. But I fancy even that is little enough comfort in view
of falling chests, hair and energy. At any rate you know that my
prayer is that your birthday "present" for the next year will be
better health.
With affectionate regard to Ibby and all the best to yourself,
As ever,
P.S.: Please let me know when you come to Bethesda; otherwise, I
shall have to employ my special intelligence system.
* I am referring here to the justly famous General Staff of 1914. Of
course under Hitler there was a personal Chief of Staff that could
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presumably issue orders to any service . Actually Goering, as long
as he was in favor, went his own way. [This note was apparently
added at a later date.]

Eisenhower soon recovered from the mild stroke that he had
suffered. Swede's health, however, continued to fail, and in March
he returned once more to Bethesda for further tests .

25 March 1958
Dear Swede:
I understand from my private intelligence system that you are
still undergoing tests out at Bethesda. I know you realize how
strongly I pray that medical science will finally find the answer to
your difficulty and some way to alleviate it.
Over the weekend, as perhaps you know, I went to Augusta in
search of the elusive sun and a decent game of golf. The sun I
found but there was absolutely no consolation in the brand of
game I exhibited.
Perhaps these flowers will be a spot of color in your room; at
the very least they will assure you that I am thinking of you.
With warm regard,
As ever,

In April the doctors at Bethesda discovered that Swede had
cancer and operated, removing his right lung. Eisenhower re202

ceived regular reports on the operation and on Swede's slow
recovery. In August, Swede and Ibby moved to Bethesda, Maryland, where they bought a small cottage near the hospital. Here
Swede began the last letter that he would attempt to write. "He
struggled so hard to write to you, " wrote Ibby, who later sent it to
Eisenhower. "He wanted very much to thank you for all that you
had done for him." In October, Swede was again hospitalized with
a recurrence of the cancer. " His courage is magnificent," wrote
Ibby. "I don't know how he bears such continual pain. I just hope
and pray that we both will be given the strength that we need to
face what lies ahead."

23 October 1958
Dear Ibby:
Your note about my birthday anniversary, together with the
letter Swede had struggled so valiantly to write me the latter part
of August, reached me this morning on the last leg of my West
Coast jaunt. I am, of course, grateful for your felicitations and good
wishes.
I have, of course, gotten regular reports on Swede . His
courage I have always admired, and I know he faces this battle
with his flags flying .
You might tell Swede, if possible, that when I was in Abilene
everyone asked about him. The town looks much the same. I saw
Maud Hurd briefly; as you probably know she is not at all well but
she is as keen and alert as ever. Charlie Case is unchanged by the
years and as great a fan of Swede's as ever.
If there is anything I can do for you, please do not fail to let me
know. I would like to see you (although I don't know how or
when), but from the medical reports I have had, I don't believe I
should try to see Swede. He understands, I am sure, that he is
constantly in my thoughts and prayers .
With warm regards,
Affectionately,
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Swede 's funeral at Arlington National Cemetery, 5 November 1958
(National Park Service photograph, courtesy of Dwight D. Eisenhower Library).

At the end of October, Swede died and was buried in
Arlington National Cementery. Eisenhower, who was present at
the funeral, sent Ibby the following note .

November 1958
Dear Ibby:
This note is simply to say what of course you already know.
The prayers and hearts of Mamie and myself are with you today, as
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they have been in the past; we are thinking of you and all the
members of your family with love and devotion.
I can never quite tell you what Swede meant to me. While I am
glad for his sake that he suffers no longer, his passing leaves a
permanent void in my life.
Affectionately,
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